Title: Wireless LAN Security
1Wireless LAN Security Vulnerabilities
andImplementing Wireless LAN Security
2Objectives - Wireless LAN Security
Vulnerabilities
- Define information security
- Explain the basic security protections for IEEE
802.11 WLANs - List the vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.11
standard - Describe the types of wireless attacks that can
be launched against a wireless network
3Objectives - Implementing Wireless LAN Security
- List wireless security solutions
- Tell the components of the transitional security
model - Describe the personal security model
- List the components that make up the enterprise
security model
4Security Principles What is Information Security?
- Information security Task of guarding digital
information - Ensures protective measures properly implemented
- Protects confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA) on the devices that store,
manipulate, and transmit the information through
products, people, and procedures
5Security Principles Challenges of Securing
Information
- Trends influencing increasing difficultly in
information security - Speed of attacks
- Sophistication of attacks
- Faster detection of weaknesses
- Day zero attacks
- Distributed attacks
- The many against one approach
- Impossible to stop attack by trying to identify
and block source
6Security Principles Categories of Attackers
- Six categories of attackers
- Hackers
- Not malicious expose security flaws
- Crackers
- Script kiddies
- Spies
- Employees
- Cyberterrorists
7Security Principles Categories of Attackers
(continued)
Table 8-1 Attacker profiles
8Security Principles Security Organizations
- Many security organizations exist to provide
security information, assistance, and training - Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination
Center (CERT/CC) - Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
(FIRST) - InfraGard
- Information Systems Security Association (ISSA)
- National Security Institute (NSI)
- SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security (SANS)
Institute
9Basic IEEE 802.11 Security Protections
- Data transmitted by a WLAN could be intercepted
and viewed by an attacker - Important that basic wireless security
protections be built into WLANs - Three categories of WLAN protections
- Access control
- Wired equivalent privacy (WEP)
- Authentication
- Some protections specified by IEEE, while others
left to vendors
10Access Control
- Intended to guard availability of information
- Wireless access control Limit users admission
to AP - Filtering
- Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering
Based on a nodes unique MAC address
Figure 8-2 MAC address
11Access Control (continued)
Figure 8-4 MAC address filtering
12Access Control (continued)
- MAC address filtering considered to be a basic
means of controlling access - Requires pre-approved authentication
- Difficult to provide temporary access for guest
devices
13Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
- Guard the confidentiality of information
- Ensure only authorized parties can view it
- Used in IEEE 802.11 to encrypt wireless
transmissions - Scrambling
14WEP Cryptography
- Cryptography Science of transforming information
so that it is secure while being transmitted or
stored - scrambles data
- Encryption Transforming plaintext to ciphertext
- Decryption Transforming ciphertext to plaintext
- Cipher An encryption algorithm
- Given a key that is used to encrypt and decrypt
messages - Weak keys Keys that are easily discovered
15WEP Cryptography
Figure 8-5 Cryptography
16WEP Implementation
- IEEE 802.11 cryptography objectives
- Efficient
- Exportable
- Optional
- Reasonably strong
- Self-synchronizing
- WEP relies on secret key shared between a
wireless device and the AP - Same key installed on device and AP
- Private key cryptography or symmetric encryption
17WEP Implementation
Figure 8-6 Symmetric encryption
18WEP Implementation
- WEP shared secret keys must be at least 40 bits
- Most vendors use 104 bits
- Options for creating WEP keys
- 40-bit WEP shared secret key (5 ASCII characters
or 10 hexadecimal characters) - 104-bit WEP shared secret key (13 ASCII
characters or 16 hexadecimal characters) - Passphrase (16 ASCII characters)
- APs and wireless devices can store up to four
shared secret keys - Default key used for all encryption
19WEP Implementation
Figure 8-8 Default WEP keys
20WEP Implementation
Figure 8-9 WEP encryption process
21WEP Implementation
- When encrypted frame arrives at destination
- Receiving device separates IV from ciphertext
- Combines IV with appropriate secret key
- Create a keystream
- Keystream used to extract text and ICV
- Text run through CRC
- Ensure ICVs match and nothing lost in
transmission - Generating keystream using the PRNG is based on
the RC4 cipher algorithm - Stream Cipher
22WEP Implementation
Figure 8-10 Stream cipher
23Authentication
- IEEE 802.11 authentication Process in which AP
accepts or rejects a wireless device - Open system authentication
- Wireless device sends association request frame
to AP - Carries info about supported data rates and
service set identifier (SSID) - AP compares received SSID with the network SSID
- If they match, wireless device authenticated
24Authentication (continued)
- Shared key authentication Uses WEP keys
- AP sends the wireless device the challenge text
- Wireless device encrypts challenge text with its
WEP key and returns it to the AP - AP decrypts returned result and compares to
original challenge text - If they match, device accepted into network
25Vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.11 Security
- IEEE 802.11 standards security mechanisms for
wireless networks have fallen short of their goal - Vulnerabilities exist in
- Authentication
- Address filtering
- WEP
26Open System Authentication Vulnerabilities
- Inherently weak
- Based only on match of SSIDs
- SSID beaconed from AP during passive scanning
- Easy to discover
- Vulnerabilities
- Beaconing SSID is default mode in all APs
- Not all APs allow beaconing to be turned off
- Or manufacturer recommends against it
- SSID initially transmitted in plaintext
(unencrypted)
27Open System Authentication Vulnerabilities
(continued)
- Vulnerabilities (continued)
- If an attacker cannot capture an initial
negotiation process, can force one to occur - SSID can be retrieved from an authenticated
device - Many users do not change default SSID
- Several wireless tools freely available that
allow users with no advanced knowledge of
wireless networks to capture SSIDs
28Open System Authentication Vulnerabilities
(continued)
Figure 8-12 Forcing the renegotiation process
29Shared Secret Key Authentication Vulnerabilities
- Attackers can view key on an approved wireless
device (i.e., steal it), and then use on own
wireless devices - Brute force attack Attacker attempts to create
every possible key combination until correct key
found - Dictionary attack Takes each word from a
dictionary and encodes it in same way as
passphrase - Compare encoded dictionary words against
encrypted frame
30Shared Secret Key Authentication Vulnerabilities
(continued)
- AP sends challenge text in plaintext
- Attacker can capture challenge text and devices
response (encrypted text and IV) - Mathematically derive keystream
31Shared Secret Key Authentication Vulnerabilities
Table 8-2 Authentication attacks
32Address Filtering Vulnerabilities
Table 8-3 MAC address attacks
33WEP Vulnerabilities
- Uses 40 or 104 bit keys
- Shorter keys easier to crack
- WEP implementation violates cardinal rule of
cryptography - Creates detectable pattern for attackers
- APs end up repeating IVs
- Collision Two packets derived from same IV
- Attacker can use info from collisions to initiate
a keystream attack
34WEP Vulnerabilities
Figure 8-13 XOR operations
35WEP Vulnerabilities (continued)
Figure 8-14 Capturing packets
36WEP Vulnerabilities (continued)
- PRNG does not create true random number
- Pseudorandom
- First 256 bytes of the RC4 cipher can be
determined by bytes in the key itself
Table 8-4 WEP attacks
37Other Wireless Attacks Man-in-the-Middle Attack
- Makes it seem that two computers are
communicating with each other - Actually sending and receiving data with computer
between them - Active or passive
Figure 8-15 Intercepting transmissions
38Other Wireless Attacks Man-in-the-Middle Attack
Figure 8-16 Wireless man-in-the-middle attack
39Other Wireless Attacks Denial of Service (DoS)
Attack
- Standard DoS attack attempts to make a server or
other network device unavailable by flooding it
with requests - Attacking computers programmed to request, but
not respond - Wireless DoS attacks are different
- Jamming Prevents wireless devices from
transmitting - Forcing a device to continually dissociate and
re-associate with AP
40Wireless Security Solutions
- IEEE 802.11a and 802.11b standards included WEP
specification - Vulnerabilities quickly realized
- Organizations implemented quick fixes
- Did not adequately address encryption and
authentication - IEEE and Wi-Fi Alliance started working on
comprehensive solutions - IEEE 802.11i and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- Foundations of todays wireless security
41WEP2
- Attempted to overcome WEP limitations by adding
two new security enhancements - WEP key increased to 128 bits
- Kerberos authentication
- User issued ticket by Kerberos server
- Presents ticket to network for a service
- Used to authenticate user
- No more secure than WEP
- Collisions still occur
- New dictionary-based attacks available
42Dynamic WEP
- Solves weak IV problem by rotating keys
frequently - More difficult to crack encrypted packet
- Uses different keys for unicast and broadcast
traffic - Unicast WEP key unique to each users session
- Dynamically generated and changed frequently
- Broadcast WEP key must be same for all users on a
particular subnet and AP
43Dynamic WEP (continued)
Figure 9-1 Dynamic WEP
44Dynamic WEP (continued)
- Can be implemented without upgrading device
drivers or AP firmware - No-cost and minimal effort to deploy
- Does not protect against man-in-the-middle
attacks - Susceptible to DoS attacks
45IEEE 802.11i
- Provides solid wireless security model
- Robust security network (RSN)
- Addresses both encryption and authentication
- Encryption accomplished by replacing RC4 with a
block cipher - Manipulates entire block of plaintext at one time
- Block cipher used is Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) - Three step process
- Second step consists of multiple rounds of
encryption
46IEEE 802.11i (continued)
Table 9-1 Time needed to break AES
47IEEE 802.11i (continued)
- IEEE 802.11i authentication and key management is
accomplished by IEEE 802.1x standard - Implements port security
- Blocks all traffic on port-by-port basis until
client authenticated using credentials stored on
authentication server - Key-caching Stores information from a device on
the network, for faster re-authentication - Pre-authentication Allows a device to become
authenticated to an AP before moving to it
48IEEE 802.11i (continued)
Figure 9-2 IEEE 802.1x
49Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
- TKIP was the first attempt to fix WEP security
holes. - Not perfect solution to 802.11s security, but
better than WEP - TKIP uses RC4 encryption, same as WEP
- WEP uses 64-bit 128-bit keys, TKIP uses only
128-bit keys - TKIPs implementation of RC4 encryption is
stronger than WEPs - TKIP uses per-packet key mixing and automatic
rekeying
50Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- TKIP - Per Packet Key Mixing
- Each station is assigned a static WEP key which
is the same for all stations (same as in WEP) - This key is called the temporal key
- Each stations combines this key with its six-byte
MAC address to create an encryption key that is
unique for each station
51Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- TKIP - Per Packet Key Mixing
- TKIP also uses a six-byte IV instead of WEPs
three-byte IV. - This is known as Phase 1 intermediate key
- The second phase, the Phase 1 intermediate key is
run through a simple algorithm known as mixing
algorithm to produce the encryption key for the
frame. (makes it hard to determine if using WEP
or not)
52Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- TKIP - Automatic rekeying
- TKIP provides a mechanism whereby a stations
temporal key can be periodically changed. - This is performed every 10,000 frames
- Rekeying ensures that
- No station has a temporal key long enough to
exhaust the keystream associated with that key - No station has a temporal key long enough for an
attacker to crack the key - If an attacker does crack the key it is only good
for the balance of the current set of 10,000
frames
53Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- TKIP
- TKIP addresses replay attacks by enforcing
sequence number ordering on frames - TKIP addresses frame forgery through use of a
message integrity checksum (MIC) - This is a small eight-byte additional encryption
method that detects if the frame has been modified
54Wi-Fi Protected Access (continued)
Figure 9-3 Message Integrity Check (MIC)
55Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)
- Second generation of WPA security
- Based on final IEEE 802.11i standard
- Uses AES for data encryption
- Supports IEEE 802.1x authentication or PSK
technology - Allows both AES and TKIP clients to operate in
same WLAN
56Summary of Wireless Security Solutions
- Wi-Fi Alliance categorizes WPA and WPA2 by modes
that apply to personal use and to larger
enterprises
Figure 9-4 Security timeline
57Summary of Wireless Security Solutions
(continued)
Table 9-2 Wi-Fi modes
Table 9-3 Wireless security solutions
58Transitional Security Model
- Transitional wireless implementation
- Should be temporary
- Until migration to stronger wireless security
possible - Should implement basic level of security for a
WLAN - Including authentication and encryption
59Authentication Shared Key Authentication
- First and perhaps most important step
- Uses WEP keys
- Networks that support multiple devices should use
all four keys - Same key should not be designated as default on
each device
60Authentication SSID Beaconing
- Turn off SSID beaconing by configuring APs to not
include it - Beaconing the SSID is default mode for all APs
- Good practice to use cryptic SSID
- Should not provide any information to attackers
61WEP Encryption
- Although vulnerabilities exist, should be turned
on if no other options for encryption are
available - Use longest WEP key available
- May prevent script kiddies or casual
eavesdroppers from attacking
Table 9-4 Transitional security model
62Personal Security Model
- Designed for single users or small office home
office (SOHO) settings - Generally 10 or fewer wireless devices
- Two sections
- WPA Older equipment
- WPA2 Newer equipment
63WPA Personal Security PSK Authentication
- Uses passphrase (PSK) that is manually entered to
generate the encryption key - PSK used as seed for creating encryption keys
- Key must be created and entered in AP and also on
any wireless device (shared) prior to (pre)
the devices communicating with AP
64WPA Personal Security TKIP Encryption
- TKIP is a substitute for WEP encryption
- Fits into WEP procedure with minimal change
- Device starts with two keys
- 128-bit temporal key
- 64-bit MIC
- Three major components to address
vulnerabilities - MIC
- IV sequence
- TKIP key mixing
- TKIP required in WPA
65WPA Personal Security TKIP Encryption
Figure 9-7 TKIP/MIC process
66WPA2 Personal Security PSK Authentication
- PSK intended for personal and SOHO users without
enterprise authentication server - Provides strong degree of authentication
protection - PSK keys automatically changed (rekeyed) and
authenticated between devices after specified
period of time or after set number of packets
(10K) transmitted (rekey interval) - Employs consistent method for creating keys
- Uses shared secret entered at AP and devices
- Random sequence of at least 20 characters or 24
hexadecimal digits
67WPA2 Personal Security AES-CCMP Encryption
- WPA2 personal security model encryption
accomplished via AES - AES-CCMP Encryption protocol in 802.11i
- CCMP based on Counter Mode with CBC-MAC (CCM) of
AES encryption algorithm - CCM provides data privacy
- CBC-MAC provides data integrity and
authentication - AES processes blocks of 128 bits
- Cipher key length can be 128, 192 and 256 bits
- Number of rounds can be 10, 12, and 14
68WPA2 Personal Security AES-CCMP Encryption
(continued)
- AES encryption/decryption computationally
intensive - Better to perform in hardware
Table 9-5 Personal security model
69Enterprise Security Model
- Most secure level of security that can be
achieved today for wireless LANs - Designed for medium to large-size organizations
- Intended for setting with authentication server
- Like personal security model, divided into
sections for WPA and WPA2 - Additional security tools available to increase
network protection
70WPA Enterprise Security IEEE 802.1x
Authentication
- Uses port-based authentication mechanisms
- Network supporting 802.1x standard should consist
of three elements - Supplicant Wireless device which requires secure
network access - Authenticator Intermediary device accepting
requests from supplicant - Can be an AP or a switch
- Authentication Server Accepts requests from
authenticator, grants or denies access
71WPA Enterprise Security IEEE 802.1x
Authentication (continued)
Figure 9-8 802.1x protocol
72WPA Enterprise Security IEEE 802.1x
Authentication (continued)
- Supplicant is software on a client implementing
802.1x framework - Authentication server stores list of names and
credentials of authorized users - Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
(RADIUS) typically used - Allows user profiles to be maintained in central
database that all remote servers can share
73WPA Enterprise Security IEEE 802.1x
Authentication
- 802.1x based on Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) - Several variations
- EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS)
- Lightweight EAP (LEAP)
- EAP-Tunneled TLS (EAP-TTLS)
- Protected EAP (PEAP)
- Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling
(FAST) - Each maps to different types of user logons,
credentials, and databases used in authentication
74WPA Enterprise Security TKIP Encryption
- TKIP is a wrapper around WEP
- Provides adequate encryption mechanism for WPA
enterprise security - Dovetails into existing WEP mechanism
- Vulnerabilities may be exposed in the future
75WPA2 Enterprise Security IEEE 802.1x
Authentication
- Enterprise security model using WPA2 provides
most secure level of authentication and
encryption available on a WLAN - IEEE 802.1x is strongest type of wireless
authentication currently available - Wi-Fi Alliance certifies WPA and WPA2 enterprise
products using EAP-TLS - Other EAP types not tested, but should run a WPA
or WPA2 environment
76WPA2 Enterprise Security AES-CCMP Encryption
- AES Block cipher that uses same key for
encryption and decryption - Bits encrypted in blocks of plaintext
- Calculated independently
- block size of 128 bits
- Three possible key lengths 128, 192, and 256
bits - WPA2/802.11i uses128-bit key length
- Includes four stages that make up one round
- Each round is iterated 10 times
77WPA2 Enterprise Security AES-CCMP Encryption
(continued)
Table 9-6 Enterprise security model
78Other Enterprise Security Tools Virtual Private
Network (VPN)
- Virtual private network (VPN) Uses a public,
unsecured network as if it were private, secured
network - Two common types
- Remote-access VPN User-to-LAN connection used by
remote users - Site-to-site VPN Multiple sites can connect to
other sites over Internet - VPN transmissions are achieved through
communicating with endpoints