Captain M' K' Mulvey USMC

1
Prepositioning Road Map - 2025

• Captain M. K. Mulvey USMC
• POE-40, PPO

29 Sep 2009
2
Agenda

• Background
• Campaign Plan Objectives
• Campaign Plan Overview
• MPF History and Relevance
• MPF Overview (Current and Future)
• Ashore Prepositioning
• Way Ahead

3
Background

• May 08 Develop comprehensive prepositioning
  campaign plan
• Jul 08 Kick-off
• Three campaign plan development OPTs
• HQMC PPO (POE, PLN)
• HQMC IL (LPO)
• HQMC CDI (SID)
• HQMC PR
• MCLC (Blount Island Command)
• OPNAV N42
• OPNAV N85
• Military Sealift Command (MSC)
• Nov 08 Campaign Plan Workshop
• Socialize plan and gain warfighter input
• 96 Attendees
• Included ops and log reps from HQMC, OPNAV,
  MARFORs/ NAVFORs, Navy and USMC Supporting
  Establishments and tactical units
• Develop MPF 5-Year Exercise Plan

4
HQMC Objectives
Coordinated effort between HQMC, OPNAV, Navy and
Marine Corps Operating Forces, and Supporting
Establishments

• Develop Comprehensive Prepositioning Road Map
  that
• Provides vision for both Ashore and Afloat
  Prepositioning
• Outlines near and long term objectives
• Integrates future programs and systems
• Describes how prepositioning will support
  emerging concepts, National Strategy, and
  Operational Requirements
• Provides broad planning guidance for operating
  forces and supporting establishments
• Informs future exercise and experimentation
  objectives
• Supports USMC Strategic Communications Plan

Provide unified Marine Corps story on the role of
Prepositioning
5
Road Map Overview

• Prepositioning in Support of Steady State
  Operations
• Disaggregated MPF(F) module, force closure
• Vignette Module supporting MEU and GRF
  conducting IW
• Enablers and Supporting Establishment
• Enabling programs and organizations
• Building Prepositioning Competency
• Training, exercises, experimentation guidance
• Plan of Actions and Milestones
• Tasks over next Five years
• Prepositioning Road Map updated every 5 years, at
  a minimum

• Foreword
• DC, PPO and DC, CDI
• Prepositioning - A Strategic Imperative
• Strategic relevance and history
• Employing Marine Corps Prepositioning
• MAGTF Overview and employing prepo
• Future of Marine Corps Prepositioning
• Integration of LMSRs, MPF(F) and increasing
  capability
• Vignette reinforcing JFEO

6
History and Growth
MPF MPF (F) 2022
Capability Equipment Growth
Armoring T/E Increases
MPF(F)
Less
LMSR Integration 2008-2010
LMSR
Port Dependence
MPF Transition 1998-2002
Sea Basing
MPF 1984-1998
LMSRs
NTPF 1981-1984
NMCB, NFH, EAF
In Stream Offload Bulk Liquid Discharge
Rolling Stock
More
Integration
3 x MPSRON Integrated
14 MPS, 1 Tanker, 1 Container
3
13
16
7
Operationally Relevant

• DESERT SHIELD/STORM 1990
• RESTORE HOPE 1992
• IRAQI FREEDOM - 2003
• IRAQI FREEDOM II - 2004

8
Expanding Capabilities
MPF(F) Connectors
MPF(F) FOC
MPF(F) IOC
LMSR Integration, 1st MPF(F) T-AKE
Current Seabasing
Charts are for illustrative purposes only do
not reflect assessment of capabilities
9
MPF Current - 2012
Maersk Termination/ Waterman Purchase
LMSR Integration
2008
Integrates three LMSRs, a tanker and container
ship
2010
2011
1
Mitigates T/E Growth and Armoring
3
2
Enables advanced seabasing experiments
MPF Equipment Reset Complete
2009
10
MPF 2017 MPF (F) IOC
Disaggregated MPF(F) Supports Phasing in of
vessels
Increases MPF(F) Advocacy
1
3
Supports USMC/USN emerging concepts
2
At Sea Arrival and Assembly of MEU Sized MAGTF
2017
11
MPF 2022 MPF(F) FOC
Operates in restrictive access environments
2022
Integrates MPF(F) Vessels to respond to multiple
AORs
2019
1
3
Increases Usage of MPF(F) for low spectrum ops
2
Arrive, assemble and integrate at sea of MEB
sized MAGTF
12
MPF 2025 Seabasing Vision
Seabasing Enablers
1
3
2
13
Operational and Strategic Flexibility
MPF Vessels MPF (F) Module MPSRON (MEB Set)
Disaggregating Provides Seabasing Capability to
Multiple CCDRs
MPF (F) Module x 3 1 MEB Set Aggregate MPF(F)
to Support National Contingencies and Crisis
MPSRON x 3 MEF
MPF Vessels
MPF (F) Module
14
Notional Ashore Prepositioning2008-2025

• Meet MARFOR/CCDR demands
• Mutually Supporting Afloat and Ashore
  Prepositioning sites
• - Increased usage/relevance

MCPP-N
CLNC
CPEN
MCBH
MPSRON-1 Mediterranean
Western Pacific Guam
Rota
Okinawa
Kuwait
Singapore
MPSRON-3 Guam/Saipan
MPSRON Siting
HOA/Djibouti
Main Operating Bases (MOB)
Gulf of Guinea
MPSRON-2 Diego Garcia
Darwin, Australia
Forward Operating Sites (FOS)
Cooperative Security Locations (CSL)
14
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Considerations

• MPF Maintenance Cycles
• Squadron vs Module integrity
• Command and Control
• Aggregated Ops
• Interoperability
• Seabasing and Conventional

16
Way Ahead

• Expeditionary Policies Road Map
• Will combine both Prepo and Amphib Road Maps
• Address perceived gaps/seams in programs
• Annex to the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan
• Appendix 1 Prepositioning programs
• Appendix 2 Amphibious programs
• Initial One-Star draft due early-Oct
• Final draft due Nov

17
Questions
18
Backup Slides
19
Aggregated vs. Disaggregated

• POE/LP/SID/N85/N42/MSC have developed a MPF (F)
  Integration Plan that builds MPF (F) modules in
  each of the MPSRONs until MPF (F) FOC (2022). A
  MPF (F) module is comprised of one TAKR, one
  T-AKE, one MLP, and one big deck (LHA-R or LHD).
  This plan allows for seabasing experimentation
  and enables the incremental build up of MPF (F)
  capability to conduct CAESR (Close, Assemble,
  Employ, Sustain, and Reconstitute) at sea.
• Dis-aggregation of the MPF (F) will enable
  habitual relationships and training opportunities
  for all three MEFs and the supporting numbered
  fleets.
• Dis-aggregation decreases steam time and costs
  when employing MPF (F) modules in various AORs.
• Dis-aggregation tells a great story to Congress
  and OSD, displaying the incremental gains that
  come with MPF (F) vessels as well as the Services
  plan to employ the incremental improvements
  provided.
• N42 plans to recap MPF between 2023 and 2032 as
  the Watermans, E-ships and Amseas reach ESL

20
Force Closure

• 10-14 day closure and stand-up of the MPF (F) MEB
  is difficult to defend when Amphibious MEB Task
  Force closure times are considered.
• MPF can arrive and assemble much faster than ATFs
  can close, as is the case today.
• While aggregating 3 MEUs would give a MEB like
  capability faster than a ATF-East/West, this
  concept raises many operational difficulties, not
  the least of which is C2.

21
Competing with MEU/ARG

• USMC stakeholders must ensure MPF (F) capability
  is not seen as a replacement for one of the
  Assault Echelon Amphibious MEBs or as a
  replacement for MEU/ARG shipping. MPF (F)
  capability must be seen as an additive
  capability, providing CAESR at sea, a reinforcing
  MEB to the two assault echelon MEBs and as a
  means to equip forward deployed Naval Forces
  conducting Phase O/Theater Security Cooperation
  operations. Current CCDR requirements justify
  this.
• The MEU/ARG brings a capability set (personnel,
  equipment, training) to the CCDRs that can not be
  matched by the MPF(F) Module
• The MEU/ARG presence and rapid ability to respond
  to crisis can not be matched by the MPF(F) module
  as