TOO MUCH INFORMATION? PRIVACY, RATIONALITY, AND TEMPTATION

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TOO MUCH INFORMATION? PRIVACY, RATIONALITY, AND
TEMPTATION

• Katherine J. Strandburg
• DePaul University College of Law

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MOTIVATION FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY

• AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY FOR ME
• v.
• FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION FOR YOU (BETTER
  DECISIONS)
• ?

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IS MORE INFORMATION ALWAYS BETTER?
SOCIAL NORMS AGAINST DISCLOSING PERSONAL
INFORMATION SUGGEST THE ANSWER IS NO WHY DONT
WE WANT TO LEARN EVERYTHING ABOUT EVERYONE?
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TOO MUCH INFORMATION?

• TOO MUCH INFORMATION CAN DEGRADE DECISIONMAKING
  IN 3 WAYS
• MORE INFO NOT ALWAYS BETTER IF IT IS MISLEADING
  (EVEN IF COMPLETELY RATIONAL)
• 2) BOUNDED RATIONALITY MISTAKES IN ANALYSIS
  DUE TO LOSS AVERSION, INACCURATE PROBABILITY
  ASSESSMENT, MENTAL ACCOUNTING
• 3) LIMITED WILLPOWER INABILITY TO IGNORE
  IRRELEVANT INFORMATION (MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN
  PROBATIVE)

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TOO MUCH INFORMATION?
CONCLUSION CONTROLLING FLOW OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION IS A TWO-WAY STREET BOTH SUBJECTS
AND RECIPIENTS MAY BENEFIT FROM PRIVACY BOTH
SUBJECTS AND RECIPIENTS CAN BE AFFECTED BY
BOUNDED RATIONALITY BOTH SUBJECTS AND RECIPIENTS
CAN SUFFER FROM SELF-CONTROL FAILURES
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IMPLICATIONS for PERSON-TO-PERSON DISCLOSURES

• SOCIAL NORMS REGULATE INFORMATION BY CONTEXT,
  APPROPRIATENESS (ABILITY TO PROCESS
  ACCURATELY)
• PRIVACY TORTS SHOULD DO THE SAME
• BUT WHAT ABOUT COMPUTERIZED DATA PROCESSING?

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CAN COMPUTERS HAVE TOO MUCH INFORMATION?

• WHO DECIDES WHAT INFORMATION TO COLLECT?
• - Loss aversion of agents
• - Private rationality v. Social optimality
• - Time-inconsistent preferences of agents (short
  term v. long term business goals)
• - Externalities on subjects of information

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CAN COMPUTERS HAVE TOO MUCH INFORMATION?

• WHO DECIDES WHAT THE COMPUTER DOES?
• - Statistical optimization techniques (such as
  data mining) rely on human input
• - What data is significant
• - When are results significant, interesting
• - Statistical optimization techniques may be
  distracted into local optima
• - Categorical choices about relevance of
  information may avoid some pitfalls

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CAN COMPUTERS HAVE TOO MUCH INFORMATION?

• WHO ASSESSES THE OUTPUT?
• Tendency to over-emphasize the certainty of
  quantitative output
• Tendency to over-emphasize specific output
• Tendency to inaccurately interpret statistical
  output

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CAN COMPUTERS PROVIDE TOO MUCH INFORMATION?

• COMPUTERIZED AGGREGATION OF DATA PERMITS TARGETED
  MARKETING
• Targeted provision of information?
• OR
• Targeted persuasion?
• UNDERMINING STRATEGIC IGNORANCE?
• ENTRAPMENT?

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CAN COMPUTERS PROVIDE TOO MUCH INFORMATION?

• - COMPUTERIZED AGGREGATION OF DATA MOVES
  INFORMATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS
• - INTERFERING WITH SOCIAL NORMS OF
  APPROPRIATE DISCLOSURE?
• - NORMS THAT WE PROTECT WITH THE PRIVACY
  TORTS?

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CONCLUSION

• THE SOCIAL VALUE OF FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION
  PERSONAL INFORMATION MAY BE LESS THAN IT SEEMS
• HUMAN COGNITIVE AND WILLPOWER LIMITATIONS SHOULD
  BE KEPT IN MIND
• - THE VALUE AND MEANING OF COMPUTERIZED DATA
  PROCESSING ALSO DEPENDS ON UNDERLYING HUMAN
  INPUT, ANALYSIS, AND RESPONSE

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