Securing IT Systems with the

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THE CENTER FOR
INTERNET SECURITY
SM

• Securing IT Systems with the
• Consensus Benchmarks
• and
• Scoring Tools
• Clint Kreitner
• www.cisecurity.org
• ckreitner_at_cisecurity.org

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Unfortunate, but true

• Through 2005, 90 percent of cyber attacks will
  continue to exploit known security flaws for
  which a patch is available or a preventive
  measure known.
• Gartner Group, May 6, 2002

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What is causing the vulnerabilities that are
being exploited?

• Software defects
• Fixed with vendor patches
• Lack of technical security controls
• Security settings made to enable or disable
  security features of the OS software
• Think of them as software switches

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Examples of security settings

• Password length, complexity
• Account lockout after X attempts
• Audit what system events?
• Idle time before logoff
• Users allowed to install print drivers?
• What unneededservices to disable?
• File system to use?

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Arent these standards adequate to improve user
security practice?

• ISO 17799
• COBIT from ISACA
• SysTrust, WebTrust from AICPA
• FISCAM from GAO
• Principles and Practices for Security of IT
  Systems from NIST
• Standard of Good Practice from ISF

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These standards are helpful, but incomplete

• They describe what to do, but not how
• These standards are effective only when
  accompanied by details on how to implement their
  requirements

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An Example from ISO 17799 9.7.1 Event
logging Audit logs recording exceptions and
other security-relevant events should be produced
and kept for an agreed period to assist in future
investigations and access control
monitoring. Audit logs should also include a)
user IDs b) dates and times for log-on and
log-off c) terminal identity or location if
possible d) records of successful and rejected
system access attempts e) records of successful
and rejected data and other resource access
attempts.
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One of several actions needed to implement event
logging on Sun Solaris systems cat ltltEND_SCRIPT
gt/etc/init.d/newperf !/sbin/sh /usr/bin/su sys
-c \ "/usr/lib/sa/sadc /var/adm/sa/sa\date
d\" END_SCRIPT chown rootsys
/etc/init.d/newperf chmod 744 /etc/init.d/newperf
rm -f /etc/rc2.d/S21perf ln -s /etc/init.d/newperf
/etc/rc2.d/S21perf /usr/bin/su sys -c crontab
ltltEND_ENTRIES 0,20,40 /usr/lib/sa/sa1 45
23 /usr/lib/sa/sa2 -s 000 -e 2359 -i 1200
-A END_ENTRIES
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Why has it been so difficult to proliferate good
security practice?

• Vendors have been shipping unconfigured systems
  to users with technical security controls turned
  off
• Users dont know how to properly configure their
  systems
• Users are afraid to disrupt operations
• With patches or security settings

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Microsoft Issues Patches, but Users Dont Apply
Them
Forrester Research Report April 3, 2003
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Responding to the challenge

• Cosmos Club meeting Aug 2000
• Need to develop and proliferate detailed
  technical best practices
• The only true solution is try to raise the bar
  everywhere--globally
• Employ a consensus process to define best
  practices that is driven by security savvy users
  from the public and private sectors

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The Center for Internet Security (CIS)

• Formed in October 2000
• Modeled after other community initiatives, e.g.,
  transportation safety
• A not-for-profit consortium of users
• Convenes and facilitates teams that build
  consensus benchmarks

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Some of the participants in the consensus effort

• Government
• Natl Inst Stds Tech.
• Infocomm DevelopmentAuthority of Singapore
• Naval Surface Warfare Center
• US Treasury Financial Management Service
• Washington State Dept. of Health
• Defense Info Sys Agency (DISA)
• Federal Reserve System
• NASA

• US Dept of Justice
• Library of Congress
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police
• Communications Security Establishment (Canada)
• Canadian CERT
• NSA
• GSA
• FedCIRC
• Dept Homeland Security
• State of Maryland

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Participants (contd)

• Commercial
• Eastman Kodak
• SASKTel
• LGE Energy
• Hallmark
• Intel
• Deutsche Telecom
• Caterpillar
• Baylor College of Medicine
• NCR
• Batelle
• U.S. Central Credit Union
• VISA

• Thomson Holdings
• Pitney Bowes
• First Union Corporation
• Intuit
• Union Bank of California
• Swiss Reinsurance Co
• Elemica
• Online Resources
• Agilent Technologies
• Shell Info. Tech. Intl
• PeopleSoft
• News Corporation

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More (contd)

• Consulting/Service
• IBM Business Consulting
• Grant Thornton
• Deloitte Touche
• ISS
• Symantec
• BindView
• NetIQ
• SecureNet Solutions
• RDA Corp

• CSC
• Procinct Security
• Solutionary
• Polivec
• Mobile Automation
• ConfigureSoft
• GFM Consulting

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More (contd)

• Universities
• Institute for Security Tech. Studies at Dartmouth
• Virginia Tech
• Monash University (Australia)
• Illinois Institute of Technology
• University of Missouri
• William Mary
• Utah State University
• University of California, SF
• New York University

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Auditing Participants

• Information Systems Audit and Control Association
  (ISACA)
• American Institute of Certified Public
  Accountants (AICPA)
• Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)

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What has this public/private partnership
produced so far?
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Currently available

• Level I Configuration Benchmarks
• Solaris
• Linux
• HP-UX
• Windows NT
• Windows 2000
• Cisco Router IOS

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A Level I Benchmark

• Can be implemented by a sysadmin of any level of
  security expertise
• Can be monitored by a compliance tool
• Is not likely to break any function
• Represents a baseline level of security

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Currently available

• Gold Standard Benchmarks
• W2K Professional Level II
• W2K Server Level II
• CISCO Router IOS Level I/II
• Solaris Level I

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Also currently available

• Configuration Scoring Tools
• Solaris
• Linux
• HP-UX
• Windows NT
• Windows 2000 Server
• Windows 2000 Professional
• Cisco Router IOS

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Under development

• Benchmarks and Scoring Tools for
• Oracle databases
• Apache
• Windows IIS
• Windows XP
• Windows Server 2003
• Catalyst Switches
• PIX Firewalls
• Check Point FW-1
• SQL Server
• Juniper Routers

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How is this work being done?

• Teams are formed with security experts from
  member organisations
• An initial benchmark draft is obtained or
  developed
• Consensus is established via email and conference
  call discussion
• A scoring tool is developed
• They are made available free to all users
  globally via the CIS website
• (www.cisecurity.org)

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The good news Case studies show that 80-90
of known vulnerabilities are blocked by the
security settings in the consensus benchmarks.
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Case Study Methodology

• (1) Scan a system out of the box and list
  identified vulnerabilities
• (2) Configure the system with the appropriate
  benchmark
• (3) Rescan the system and note the
  vulnerabilities remaining

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Vulnerability Assessment Case studies
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Encouraging progress

• U.S. government promulgation of CIS benchmarks
  and tools via FedCIRC
• VISA adoption of CIS benchmarks for its
  Cardholder Information Security Programs Digital
  Dozen
• Progress at the vendor level
• Dell now delivering pre-configured systems
• Top security experts from Microsoft, Sun, HP,
  Cisco, and Oracle are active on the benchmark
  consensus teams

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Benefits of using benchmarks and tools

• Substantially reduce the risk of unauthorized
  intrusion
• Following a recognized patching and configuration
  standard demonstrates due care against legal
  liability
• Provides a basis for ongoing measurement and
  reporting of security status to management

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Recommended policies

• Use govt purchasing power to buy only benchmark
  configured systems from vendors
• Encourage corporate and other institutional
  buyers to do the same
• Establish benchmark compliance as an audit
  requirement
• Encourage users in all sectors to download and
  use the consensus benchmarks and tools

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• Thank you!
• ckreitner_at_cisecurity.org
• http//www.cisecurity.org