Sea Mine Warfare: An Assessment Update

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Sea Mine Warfare An Assessment Update
RDML M. A. Sharp, Program Executive Officer
23-26 July 2001
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Program Executive Office Mine and Undersea
Warfare
AN/AQS-14
AN/ALQ-141
ZODIAC F-470
ALMDS
AN/AQS-20
LMRS
CLOSED LOOP DEGAUSSING
PMSNSW
PMS210
EMATT/MK 30 Targets
PMSMDS
SQQ-34(V)CV-TSC
PMS403
AN/SQQ-89(V)
PEO-MUW
PMS411
PMS490
DD-21
MCM 1 Class
PMSEOD
MHC 51 Class
VSW MCM
RMS
MCS 12
MARINE MAMMAL SYSTEM
ASSAULT BREACHING
REMOTE ORDNANCE NEUTRALIZATION SYSTEM
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PEO Top Four

• Create a Navy Plan for Battle Space Dominance
  Under-the-Sea
• Determine the Way Ahead for Naval Mining
• Conduct End-to-End Assessment of Organic Mine
  Counter Measures Capability
• Dedicated MIW Forces Roadmap to the Navy after
  Next

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Current Mining Capability
MK 56
QS SLMM
No Requirement
MK 56
MK 65/63/62 QUICKSTRIKE
QS SLMM
MK 60 CAPTOR
MK 67 SLMM
SHALLOW
MEDIUM
DEEP
150 fsw
600 fsw
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Current Status of USN Mines

• Quickstrike Mk 62/63/65
• Support for older Mods fully funded
• Mod 3 procurement initiated this fiscal year
• Air platform integration and algorithm
  development above core
• Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM) Mk 67
• Demil/Disposal directed by PR99
• Retention directed by POM02 SPP
• Limited support until maintenance is
  reestablished in FY04
• Out of Service by 2010
• Mine Mk 56
• Demil/Disposal directed by PR99
• Retention of contingency quantity directed by
  POM02 SPP
• Minimal support for safety issues only
• Out of Service by 2010
• Encapsulated Torpedo (CAPTOR) Mk 60
• Demil/Disposal directed by PR99
• Out of service by end of this fiscal year
• Some components retained for possible future
  mines developments

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Mining Capability Beyond 2010
No Requirement
No Capability
MK 65/63/62 QuickStrike
SHALLOW
MEDIUM
DEEP
150 fsw
600 fsw
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Year 2010 Problem

• Limited Inventory-Shallow or Medium (Bottom)
  Water Only
• No Medium (Moored) or Deep Capability
• No Covert Mining Capability
• Infrastructure Atrophy
• Reduced budget
• No New development Planned or Programmed
• U. S. Navy Core Competency Threatened with
  Extinction

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US Naval Mines Inventory
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Mining Infrastructure ST and Development Work
Force
Core Infrastructure ST 15 WY Dev 21
WY Total 36 WY
Desert Storm
Core Infrastructure 36 WY
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U.S. Mining Vision - Integrated Littoral
Battlespace Dominance
Mine Node
Mine Node
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Top 4 Organic MCM

• Will Organic MCM Systems satisfy the operational
  mine warfare requirements?
• Led by overarching IPT
• Composed of three separate but related IPTs
• Analysis
• Research
• System Engineering
• IPTs composed of N7/N8/PEO MUW, SURFLANT, CMWC,
  CSS representatives
• Provided interim report mid June, final report
  NLT 30 September

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Objectives

• Determine the technical capabilities of complete
  suite of organic systems (seven) and C4I in a
  coordinated (net-centric) warfighting role
• Requirements
• CONOPS
• Technical Performance
• Describe capabilities and shortfalls
• Identify holes, issues, and recommendations
• Formulate alternatives to shortfalls
• Recommend solutions

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E2E Assessment Team
Review Panel

CINCLANTFLT CMWC N752 PMA-299 N763
N77 N78 N74 2nd FLT
Executive Board

Co-chairs
CAPT Lambert (PMS 403)
CAPT Jimenez (PMS 210)
CAPT Briggs (PMS 490) K. Haas (PMS 210) T.
Stefanick (PMS 210)
Core Team Cells
Analysis
Research
Systems Engineering
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Assessment Process
Integrate Concept of Operations and
Employment AMCM LMRS RMS
MIW Operational Requirements
System Technical Parameters Probability of
detection Probability of neutralization Enduranc
e False alarm rate Other
Assessment Methodology Measures of
effectiveness Modeling Fleet expertise Review
Panel
Identify Capabilities and Shortfalls
Communications / Data flow
Baseline Scenario Development Threats
TACSITs Environmen Asset
Availability
Prioritize and Rank Recommendations
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Top 4 - Dedicated MIW Forces Roadmap to the
Navy after Next

• MCMs/MHCs/New Payloads
• Plan for improvement not clear or funded.
• MCS Replacement
• Valid need for dedicated ship?
• Expected life of Inchon
• Realistic plan for way ahead
• Convert existing ship?
• New Construction of a unique ship?
• Build an additional ship of an existing class?
• MH-53 vs. MH-60
  

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Top 4 - Improving USW Battle Space Dominance

• Advancing USW as a concept that includes ASW and
  MUW
• Shallow water operations means we no longer have
  the luxury to keep ASW and MUW separate.
• Assured access requires an Undersea Warfare
  Approach.

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Top 4 - Improving USW Battle Space Dominance

• USW ESG refocused
• Cross platform, leveraged efforts approach
• Eliminate program redundancies/stovepipes
• Capability and mission based
• Marries ASW and MUW to assure access
• Modified SUBTECH process
• IPTs to explore future technologies which could
  contribute to mission accomplishment
• Outcomes to affect FY02/03 execution and POM
  04planning

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Questions?
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Differences from Force 21

• Scope of Force 21 included dedicated MCM, End to
  End (E2E) analysis addresses only organic
• E2E is a technical assessment addressing
  interoperability of the suite of systems vs. a
  strictly operational analysis
• End to End study addresses C4I to a much greater
  degree than Force 21
• Level of analysis of individual system timelines
  more detailed in End to End study
• End to End study uses most recent system
  performance estimates, rather than notional
  estimates or ORD thresholds

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• 14 MCM-1 Class ships
• 4 Overseas Homeported

• 12 MHC-51 Class ships
• 2 Overseas Homeported

Dedicated Forces
1 MCS-12 Class ship
An Integrated Force of Ships, Helicopters and
Divers