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The Role of Administrative Reform in

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Title: The Role of Administrative Reform in


1
The Role of Administrative Reform in Koreas
Economic Development
Jin PARK, Ph.D. KDI School of Public Policy and
Management

2
Introduction of KDI and KDIS
3
PARK, Jin (? ?)1991 Ph.D. in
economics, Univ. of Pennsylvania19921998
Research fellow, KDI (???????)19982001
Director, Administrative Reform Team,
Ministry of Planning and Budget (?????
)20012004 Professor, Associate Dean, KDI
SchoolCurrentlyProfessor, KDI SchoolDirector,
Center for Conflict Resolution and Negotiation of
KDI School Member, Presidential Commission on
Policy Planning(???????????? ??)
Presenter
4
Table of Contents
  • I. Administrative Support for Economic Growth
  • during 60s 70s
  • II. Transition of Government for the Growing
    Market Economy after the economic Crisis

5
  • I. Administrative Support for Economic Growth
  • during 60s 70s

6
Capability for Development
  • Political leaders
  • Endowed resources
  • Means to organize the resources

- Willingness to response to social needs -
Capacity to set the right visions and strategies
- Ability to build bureaucracy to implement the
strategies
- Ability to mobilize the resources - Capacity to
generate and implement right policies to achieve
the visions set by the political leaders
What is the role of the administration system in
Koreas early economic development?
7
Three areas
  • 1. Organizational Build-up
  • - Concentration of information
  • - Checking by the President
  • - RD
  • 2. Personnel Management
  • - Recruiting and training for civil servants
  • - Job placement and promotion
  • - Guiding Principles
  • 3. Anti-Corruption
  • - Evaluation and incentives
  • - Monitoring Scheme

8
1.1 Organizational Build-up Concentration of
information
  • Presidential Office
  • - President PARK had three senior economic
    advisers - 1 (General economic issues), 2
    (Heavy and Chemical Industry), 3 (Tourism
    promotion, temporarily since 1972)
  • Economic Planning Board (EPB, 19611994)
  • - Planning Bureau from Ministry of
    Reconstruction
  • - Budget Bureau from Ministry of Finance
  • - Statistics Bureau from Ministry of Interior
  • - Foreign Capital Bureau (new establishment
    in 1961)

9
1-2. Organizational Build-up Checking by the
President
  • Monthly Economic Report Meeting (1963)
  • - Format EPB reports to the President
  • - Participants President, EPB and other
    relevant Ministers, Bank of Korea, Major
    Banks, Private Firms, Economists
  • - Role Discuss current economic issues
  • anecdote Feb. 5th, 1971 (Tong-Il rice for
    green revolution)
  • Monthly Trade and Export Promotion Meeting
    (1965)
  • - Format Ministry of Commerce and Industry
    reports to the President
  • - Participants President, MOCI and other
    relevant Ministries Private Firms and Major
    Banks
  • - Role Check the export performance and
    discuss export promotion
  • Export Day (Nov. 30th) 0.1 billion of
    export in 1964 (284 b, 05)

10
1-3. Organizational Build-up RD
  • Korea Institute for Science and Technology (KIST,
    1963) Korea Development Institute (KDI, 1971)
  • - Start of government-funded research
    institutes
  • - Attracted many scientists in the advanced
    countries with higher salary and other
    benefits (minimize brain-drain)
  • KDI research fellow in the early 1970s
    was offered an apartment, a car with a
    chauffeur, an office, two RAs and one secretary.
  • - Government played an important role in
    making a network between the industry and the
    government-funded research institutes

11
2-1. Personnel management Recruiting and
Training for Civil Servants
  • Recruiting System
  • - Since 1963, the entrance exam for civil
    servants became an appointment exam, which was
    just a qualifying test before. Different
    entrance exam for 5th degree, 7th degree, 9th
    degree
  • - Top graduates from best universities joined
    government such as EPB and Bank of Korea. (No
    nepotism)
  • Training System
  • - Massive retraining program started 1961
    (influenced by the military)
  • average annual trainees 136 (4960)
    gtgtgt 3,000 (6180)
  • - Central Officials Training Institute was
    newly established in 1961 based on former
    National Officials Training Institute
  • In 1963, Officials Training Law was
    enacted to enforce training.
  • - During 1970s, mental was emphasized with the
    start of the Saemaul Movement.

12
2-2. Personnel management Placement and
Promotion for career civil servants
  • Two purposes Dissemination and Incentive
  • - Presidential Office After serving 23
    years at the Office, those elite officials were
    sent back to their home Ministries with a
    promotion.
  • - EPB Many EPB members became vice Ministers
    and Ministers of the other Ministries.
  • Technocrats were respected.
  • - Up to the Assistant Minister level, career
    civil servants completely filled the
    positions. In fact, most of vice-Ministers and
    many of Ministers were from career civil
    servants.
  • Since 1999, an open system was
    introduced so that 20 of director-generals
    should be appointed by open competition.
  • - Ratio of Ministers with career military
    background 38.3 in the non-economic
    Ministries 14.9 in economy-related Ministries
    (0 in Ministry of Finance)

13
2-3. Personnel management Guiding principles
  • Evaluation criteria
  • - Result oriented rather than process-oriented
    administration
  • Sometimes, quality of the performance
    and democracy was sacrificed due to
    so-called Bulldozer administration geared only
    to the target. (e.g. collapse of apartment,
    export without profits)
  • - The target was very simple. e.g. 10
    billion export, 1,000 GDP/capita by 1980.
  • Administration vs. Legislation
  • - Political influence on the economic
    decision making process was minimized by the
    President. (The other side of the coin of the
    underdeveloped democracy.)
  • Legislation has gained a power since KIM
    Dae-Jung Administration (19982003).

14
3-1. Anti-Corruption Evaluation and Incentives
  • Corruption has been an important issue in Korea,
    but not that serious enough to endanger the
    development potential.
  • Evaluation system
  • - Result-based evaluation system with very
    simple target decreased the possibility of
    corruption.
  • Especially, when the target is export,
    one has to go through international
    competition to prove oneself.
  • Incentives
  • - Technocrats had many opportunity to serve
    in the related areas after their retirement.
    So it is to their benefits to stay clean.
  • During mid 1980s, 150 out of 470 EPB
    retirees are working for private firms and 196
    out of 311 are working for banking sectors.
  • Of course, this created conflict of
    interest issue, and it is now regulated by
    the government.

15
3-2. Anti-Corruption Monitoring Scheme
  • - Mutual check and balance among intelligence
    agencies
  • - Although not as strong as it is now, a
    monitoring scheme by news media and the
    scholars was working.
  • - The President himself was very clean.

16
  • II. Transition of Government for the Growing
    Market Economy after Economic Crisis

17
Koreas Economic Development Model
  • Government-led growth
  • High savings rate, active investment
  • Export-orientation
  • low wage, work ethic
  • Market friendly strategy (WB, 1993)
  • Economic development before democracy

Is this a right model in Korea in 1990s?
18
Growth Decomposition of S. Korea
19711980 19811990 1991 2000

()
8.6 1.0 7.6 4.6 2.5 2.1 3.0 1.4 0.7 0.9
7.4 -1.0 8.4 5.6 3.2 2.4 2.8 1.4 0.8 0.6
6.1 -0.7 6.8 3.4 1.5 1.9 3.4 1.5 0.7 1.2
Real growth rate Irregular factors Pot. growth
rate(AB) Factor inputs(A) Labor Capital TF
Productivity(B) Economies of Scale Resource
allocation Technological prog.
Is Government intervention effective for tech.
progress?
19
Consequences of Governments Intervention
Development of a market economy was seriously
hindered.
The government became increasingly bloated and
unresponsive to demands for reform.
The economy was hampered by collusive ties
between government and businesses, arbitrary
regulations and corruption.
  • Government intervention is at first effective,
    but as private sector grows, it is not effective
    and even hampers economic growth.

20
Crisis and Reforms
  • Korea suffered the economic crisis in 1997
    because it did not transform the government and
    its role when it had to.

- To start a new as a government that sets an
example for other sectors of the society to
follow. - To start a government that truly
serves the public gtgtgt The government reform had
to be implemented with utmost priority.
the need to establish a firm foundation
upon which to rebuild the economy
21
Efforts for Government Reform after the Crisis
Efforts of previous Administrations
Efforts after the crisis
The reform drive was almost unprecedented in
its comprehensiveness, proceeding simultaneously
on all fronts, Including both central and local
governments, public enterprises, and
quasi-government organizations. The
only exceptions were the political and judiciary
divisions.
Past attempts were partial in nature, whether
they focused on government reorganization, priva
tization, or deregulation.
22
Korean Governments Transition
Open Economic System Government as a Fair
Coordinator
Frequent Intervention and Over-regulation
of the Private Sector
Rapid Economic Growth through
Government Intervention
1960s
1980s
Since 1997
23
New Role of the government
  • The role of the Korean government has changed
    from an active leader and planner of economic
    activities to a fair coordinator and regulator of
    the economy, permitting greater reliance on
    private initiative.
  • From rowing to steering. (David Osborne)

To maximize private sector autonomy and
initiative, government intervention and
regulation has been sharply reduced, superfluous
government functions has been abolished, reduced,
or transferred to the private sector.
The governments role in protecting the weak,
establishing a social safety net, market
supervision and environmental protection, among
others, has been substantially strengthened.
24
Lessons Learned
  • Lesson 1 Strong political foundation and support
    are critical
  • Lesson 2 Maintaining consistency is a crucial
    factor for success
  • Lesson 3 Breaking up some myths is important for
    winning peoples support in the early stage
  • Lesson 4 Finding a right time for important
    issues may influence the whole process of reform
  • Lesson 5 Introducing new systems for reform
    doesnt matter much what matters is how to
    implement them and how to make them deep-rooted

25
Lessons Learned - continued
  • Lesson 6 Reform agenda needs to be placed on the
    short list of the top leader
  • Lesson 7 Reformers should be well aware of the
    true nature of the reform process
  • Lesson 8 Reforming the culture is more important
    and takes more time than reforming laws and
    regulations.
  • Lesson 9 There should be a balance between
    efficiency and better service

26
The innovator makes enemies of all those who
prospered under the old order, and only
lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who
would prosper under the new.


--- Machiavelli
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