Institutional Options for CDD in Ruritania

1
Institutional Options for CDD in Ruritania

• Scenarios and
• Role Play

2
Ruritania Background

• Population 50 million
• GDP per capita 390
• Literacy 35 (Male 48 Female 22)
• Life expectancy 51 years (Male 49 Female
  53)
• 80 of labor force work in the agricultural
  sector
• Infrastructure poor. Most villages have no
  electricity, telephone service or water. Roads
  are bad

3
Ruritania Background

• Government type Unitary state (Republic with
  executive presidential system)
• Treatment of Women there are constraints on
  women working, inheriting property and receiving
  a secondary education.
• Subnational Populations
• Provinces 3-4 million
• Districts 250,000-400,000
• Subdistricts 5,000-10,000

4
Government Structure
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
PROVINCE
DISTRICT
SUB-DISTRICT
5
The Three Fs
Functions Intergovernmental assignment of
Functions Funds Fiscal Decentralization Fun
ctionaries Administrative Decentralization
6
Political Decentralization

• Elected Local Governments
• democratic political representation of local
  constituencies
• Mandate to respond to local needs within devolved
  or assigned powers (areas of responsibility)

7
Organizational Scenarios for CDD
SUB-DISTRICT GOVERNMENT SCENARIO CHARACTERISTICS

• SCENARIO D
• Political decentralization
• Devolution to Local Government three Fs
  present
• 50 transfers, 40 taxes, 10 fees
• greater willingness to tax
• High public awareness of expenditure allocation
  and revenue distribution
• Strong NGOs and Civil Society
• High accountability to public and CBOs.
• High credibility re service delivery

• SCENARIO C
• Political decentralization
• Devolution to Local Government three Fs
  present
• 80 dependent on transfers (block grants
  specific purpose), 5 taxes, 15 fees
• low willingness to tax
• Low public awareness of expenditure allocation
  and revenue distribution
• Weak NGOs and Civil Society
• Credible in ability to deliver services
• Weak accountability to public and CBOs

• SCENARIO B
• Some political decentralization
• Deconcentrated system three Fs absent
• Local government has very few staff (mostly
  ancillary) receives a budgetary transfer for
  minor recurrent costs. Budget for capital
  major recurrent expenditures is allocated to
  local units of line ministries, not local LG
• No taxation powers
• Vibrant community associations strong NGOs
• Moderate accountability to public and to CBOs,
  low credibility on service delivery

• SCENARIO A
• Some political decentralization
• Deconcentrated system three Fs absent
• Local government has very few staff (mostly
  ancillary) receives a budgetary transfer for
  minor recurrent costs. Budget for capital and
  major recurrent expenditures is allocated to
  local units of line ministries, not LG
• No taxation powers
• Weak/non-existent CBOs and NGOs (low capacity,
  many are phantom NGOs)
• Moderate accountability to public and to CBOs,
  low credibility on service delivery

PROVINCE
8
Scenario A

• Some political decentralization
• Deconcentrated system three Fs absent
• Local government has very few staff (mostly
  ancillary) and a receives a budgetary transfer
  for minor recurrent costs only. Budget for
  capital and major recurrent expenditures is
  allocated to local units of sector ministries,
  not local govt
• No taxation powers
• Weak CBOs, civil society, NGOS (low capacity,
  many are phantom NGOs)
• LG is weakly accountable to public but has low
  credibility on service deliverynot seen as
  important

9
Scenario B

• Some political decentralization
• Deconcentrated system three Fs absent
• Local government has very few staff (mostly
  ancillary) and a receives a budgetary transfer
  for minor recurrent costs only. Budget for
  capital and major recurrent expenditures is
  allocated to local units of sector ministries,
  not local govt
• No taxation powers
• Vibrant CBO Strong NGOs and Civil Society
• LG is moderately accountable to public and CBOs
  but has low credibility on service deliverynot
  seen as important

10
Scenario C

• Political Decentralization
• Devolution to Local Government three Fs
  present
• 80 dependent on transfers (block grants
  specific purpose), 5 taxes, 15 fees very
  reluctant to tax
• Low public awareness of expenditure allocation
  and revenue distribution
• Weak/non-existent CBOs weak civil society Weak
  NGOS (low capacity, many are phantom NGOs)
• LG is credible in service delivery
• Weakly accountable to public CBOsnot
  transparent

11
Scenario D

• Political Decentralization
• Devolution to Local Government three Fs
  present
• 50 transfers, 40 taxes, 10 fees less
  reluctant to tax resources are the same
• High public awareness of expenditure allocation
  and revenue distribution
• Vibrant CBOS Strong NGOs and Civil Society
• High accountability to Public and CBOs
• High Credibility in Service Deliverycan and does
  deliver