Issues in Contemporary Metaphysics

1
Issues in Contemporary Metaphysics

• Lecture 8 Endurantism

2
Last Lecture

• We started the first of three lectures looking at
  the ontology of material objects.

3
This Lecture

• We continue that investigation my looking at a
  group of theories called endurantist theories.
• Weirdly, Im not going to expend much effort
  explaining what endurantist means.
• Firstly, theres disagreement over the
  terminology (shock horror!)
• Secondly, it more or less means not
  perdurantism. So to explain endurantism, we need
  to explain perdurantism next lecture.

4
This Lecture

• Instead well look at some example endurantist
  theories, and the problems they solve.
• The worry about terminology can be set aside.
• What well do is
• Introduce a problem.
• Introduce one (endurantist) solution The
  Standard Account.
• Look at some alternative solutions Burkean
  theory, temporary identity.

5
The Statue and the Lump
6
The Statue and the Lump
7
The Statue and the Lump
8
The Statue and the Lump
9
The Statue and the Lump
10
The Statue and the Lump
11
The Statue and the Lump

• When does the lump of clay come into existence?

12
The Statue and the Lump
13
The Statue and the Lump

• When does the lump of clay come into existence?
• When does the lump of clay go out of existence?

14
The Statue and the Lump
15
The Statue and the Lump

• When does the statue come into existence?

16
The Statue and the Lump
17
The Statue and the Lump

• When does the statue come into existence?
• When does the statue cease to exist?

18
The Statue and the Lump
19
The Statue and the Lump

• The (intuitively true) indiscernibility of
  identicals is
• ( x y ) ? ( Fx ? Fy )
• Armed with the indiscernibility of Identicals we
  have our antinomy.

20
The Statue and the Lump

• (1) There cannot be two objects in the same place
  at the same time. Premise
• (2) The lump of clay exists from 11am to 3pm.
  Premise
• (3) The statue exists from 12am to 1pm. Premise
• (4) The properties of the lump and statue are
  different i.e. they are not qualitatively
  identical from (2) and (3)
• (5) They are not numerically identical from
  indiscernibility of Identicals
• (6) The statue and the lump are in the same place
  at the same time Premise
• (7) There are two objects in the same place at
  the same time from (5) and (6)
• Contradiction!

21
Misguided Objections?

• Maybe, just maybe, youre thinking of something
  along the lines of
• Its all to do with language a statue is just
  what we call a lump of clay.
• It doesnt work because statues are
  mind-dependent objects.
• etc.

22
Misguided Objections?

• These sorts of objections might be misguided.
• They might be spot on.
• The problem is that adding these statements
  doesnt solve the paradox.

23
Misguided Objections?

• Terminology alert!
• This is because logic is monotonic.
• Whats that mean?
• It means that if you have a set of premises that
  lead to a conclusion adding in extra premises can
  never prevent you from getting to that conclusion.

24
Misguided Objections?

• For instance
• If Jon is tall then he wont fit in the room.
• Jon is tall.
• Therefore Jon wont fit in the room
• Adding in extra premises will never stop those
  two premises entailing the conclusion
• Jon can stoop to a remarkable degree.
• What that statement could do is undermine one of
  the premises.

25
Misguided Objections?

• For instance
• If Jon is tall then he wont fit in the room.
• Jon is tall.
• Therefore Jon wont fit in the room
• Adding in extra premises will never stop those
  two premises entailing the conclusion
• Jon can stoop to a remarkable degree.
• What that statement could do is undermine one of
  the premises.
• What is cant do is be true alongside with the
  premise and undermine the conclusion!

26
Misguided Objections?

• Similarly, no matter what happens you must end up
  denying one of the premises from the argument in
  order to avoid contradiction.

27
Statues and Lumps

• (1) There cannot be two objects in the same place
  at the same time. Premise
• (2) The lump of clay exists from 11am to 3pm.
  Premise
• (3) The statue exists from 12am to 1pm. Premise
• (4) The properties of the lump and statue are
  different i.e. they are not qualitatively
  identical from (2) and (3)
• (5) The statue is not the lump from (4) and the
  indiscernibility of Identicals
• (6) The statue and the lump are in the same place
  at the same time Premise
• (7) There are two objects in the same place at
  the same time from (5) and (6)
• Contradiction! from (1) and (7)

28
Misguided Objections?

• Similarly, no matter what happens you must end up
  denying one of the premises from the argument in
  order to avoid contradiction.
• So merely saying it has something to do with
  language etc. doesnt help unless you think this
  justifies denying a premise.

29
The Statue and the Lump

• The Standard Account says there can be two
  objects in the same place at the same time.
• So premise (1) is false.
• Nihilism denies the existence of statues and
  lumps
• So premise (2) and (3) are false
• Less severe anti-realist answers deny the
  existence of certain other things
• So one of (2) and (3) is false.
• Non-classical identity accounts deny the IoI
• So premise (4) is false.

30
The Statue and the Lump

• The Standard Account says there can be two
  objects in the same place at the same time.
• So premise (1) is false.
• Nihilism denies the existence of statues and
  lumps
• So premise (2) and (3) are false
• Less severe anti-realist answers deny the
  existence of certain other things
• So one of (2) and (3) is false.
• Non-classical identity accounts deny the IoI
• So premise (4) is false.

31
The Standard Account

• SA simply says that there can be two objects in
  the same place at the same time.
• So, in the case of Statue/Lump, the paradox is
  just yielding a relatively reasonable
  metaphysical result.
• One that might not even require any adjustment to
  our folk ontological beliefs.
• So in the case of Statue/Lump the following
  premise is false

32
The Statue and the Lump

• (1) There cannot be two objects in the same place
  at the same time. Premise
• (2) The lump of clay exists from 11am to 3pm.
  Premise
• (3) The statue exists from 12am to 1pm. Premise
• (4) The properties of the lump and statue are
  different i.e. they are not qualitatively
  identical from (2) and (3)
• (5) They are not numerically identical from
  indiscernibility of Identicals
• (6) The statue and the lump are in the same place
  at the same time Premise
• (7) There are two objects in the same place at
  the same time from (5) and (6)
• Contradiction!

33
The Standard Account

• Problems
• There can be no superposition
• It is a case of double counting
• The Standard Objection

34
The Standard Account

• Problems
• There can be no superposition
• It is a case of double counting
• The Standard Objection

35
Problems for the Standard Account

• You might think that superposition is impossible.
• Clearly I cant interpenetrate tables and walls.
• But maybe superposition isnt impossible
• Example Ghosts, sub-atomic particles
• And maybe superposition is fine in this context?

36
The Standard Account

• Problems
• There can be no superposition
• It is a case of double counting
• The Standard Objection

37
Problems for the Standard Account

• Theres just one object where a statue is! Not
  two!
• But is that a general case? Counting can be
  context relevant.
• Example Is there one object behind this lectern?
• Or 7x1027 objects?
• Just as the latter is an odd context, but true
  there being two objects there might be an odd
  context, but true.

38
The Standard Account

• Problems
• There can be no superposition
• It is a case of double counting
• The Standard Objection

39
Problems for the Standard Account

• Mereological coincidence occurs when x and y have
  exactly the same parts as one another.
• The statue and the lump (allegedly) have exactly
  the same parts.
• The sub-atomic particles that compose one,
  compose the other.

40
Problems for the Standard Account

• The first problem is a brute intuition that
  things with exactly the same parts must be
  identical.
• After all what would make the difference
  between the two?
• This is called a commitment to mereological
  extensionality.
• But, I suppose, we could drop that commitment.

41
Problems for the Standard Account

• The bigger problem is one about supervenience.
• For those who arent in the know, X supervenes on
  Y iff there can be no change in X without a
  corresponding change in Y.
• Example My moral properties supervene on what
  actions and intentions I form.
• Example My height supervenes on the arrangement
  of my particles.
• The Standard Objection is (roughly) that various
  properties supervene on the arrangement of your
  sub-atomic particles.
• So the arrangement of your particles at this
  moment fixes the properties you have at this
  moment.

42
Problems for the Standard Account

• But yet the statue and the lump have different
  properties and the same sub-atomic particles
  composing them.
• Example Sortal properties.
• Example Persistence conditions.
• Example Aesthetic properties.
• Example Conscious properties.
• So if there were two objects, they would have
  different properties and the same particles
  composing them.

43
Problems for the Standard Account

• So hows this meant to work?
• If the properties an object has supervene on the
  sub-atomic arrangement of parts, how can the
  statue and the lump have different properties?
• This objection is covered in the Olson reading.
• Also, its covered in the Wassermann reading
  (where he argues perdurantism cant do any better)

44
The Statue and the Lump

• The Standard Account says there can be two
  objects in the same place at the same time.
• So premise (1) is false.
• Nihilism denies the existence of statues and
  lumps
• So premise (2) and (3) are false
• Less severe anti-realist answers deny the
  existence of certain other things
• So one of (2) and (3) is false.
• Non-classical identity accounts deny the IoI
• So premise (4) is false.

45
Nihilism

• The nihilists are meant to be able to get off the
  hook.
• They dont believe in statues or lumps.
• So they deny the following premises

46
The Statue and the Lump

• (1) There cannot be two objects in the same place
  at the same time. Premise
• (2) The lump of clay exists from 11am to 3pm.
  Premise
• (3) The statue exists from 12am to 1pm. Premise
• (4) The properties of the lump and statue are
  different i.e. they are not qualitatively
  identical from (2) and (3)
• (5) They are not numerically identical from
  indiscernibility of Identicals
• (6) The statue and the lump are in the same place
  at the same time Premise
• (7) There are two objects in the same place at
  the same time from (5) and (6)
• Contradiction!

47
Nihilism

• We spent a large portion of last week discussing
  nihilism.
• So we wont so much more except that this is
  another motivation for that thesis.
• And, similarly, a motivation for those closely
  related eliminativist theories.

48
The Statue and the Lump

• The Standard Account says there can be two
  objects in the same place at the same time.
• So premise (1) is false.
• Nihilism denies the existence of statues and
  lumps
• So premise (2) and (3) are false
• Less severe anti-realist answers deny the
  existence of certain other things
• So one of (2) and (3) is false.
• Non-classical identity accounts deny the IoI
• So premise (4) is false.

49
Other anti-realisms

• Remember that denying the existence of some
  things was to be an anti-realist about those
  things.
• So a very extreme anti-realism about material
  objects is nihilism.
• But maybe we could be less extreme nihilists, and
  just deny some objects rather than all composite
  objects.

50
Other anti-realisms

• For instance, we might say that in the
  statue/lump case theres only one object all the
  way through.
• So rather than saying there are two objects, the
  statue and the lump, theres just one.
• On the more naïve version, the theory is that
  when we shape the lump into a statue there is no
  substantial change.
• There is substantial change df something new
  comes into existence

51
Other anti-realisms

• This is naïve because it seems implausible.
• Look at what premise we would deny if we said
  that the lump was shaped into a statue but no new
  object came to be.

52
The Statue and the Lump

• (1) There cannot be two objects in the same place
  at the same time. Premise
• (2) The lump of clay exists from 11am to 3pm.
  Premise
• (3) The statue exists from 12am to 1pm. Premise
• (4) The properties of the lump and statue are
  different i.e. they are not qualitatively
  identical from (2) and (3)
• (5) They are not numerically identical from
  indiscernibility of Identicals
• (6) The statue and the lump are in the same place
  at the same time Premise
• (7) There are two objects in the same place at
  the same time from (5) and (6)
• Contradiction!

53
Other anti-realisms

• This is naïve because it seems implausible.
• Look at what premise we would deny if we said
  that the lump was shaped into a statue but no new
  object came to be.
• Now thats false.
• The contradiction is averted, but at what cost!

54
Other anti-realisms

• Now we have to say that either
• No statue came into existence because there are
  no statues
• No statue came into existence because the lump is
  the statue.
• On this second reading, the lump became the
  statue.
• In the same way that a young child may become a
  man without there being substantial change.
• But this is implausible surely the statue did
  not exist at that point, and is destroyed when
  its crushed.

55
Other anti-realisms

• So a naïve anti-realism wont work.
• But a more sophisticated version might Burkes
  Dominant Sortal Theory.
• On this view, we are anti-realists not about the
  statue, but (in a sense) about the lump of clay.
• Burke endorses sortal essentialism.
• That is, what sort of thing something is, it is
  essentially.
• Example Humans are essentially human walruses
  are essentially walri pandas are essentially
  pandas statues are essentially statues etc.

56
Other anti-realisms

• This means that when the lump is shaped into a
  statue, it would become a statue.
• But it cant! It would have to be essentially a
  statue.
• So what happens is that the lump of clay ceases
  to exist.
• (Do that again
• If the lump of clay didnt cease to exist itd
  become a statue
• If it became a statue it would at some point not
  have been a statue but now would be i.e. would
  not be a statue essentially
• If x is a statue, it is a statue essentially
• Ergo, the lump of clay must cease to exist)

57
Other anti-realisms

• So Burke things that you have one object, a lump
  of clay, that is shaped into a statue.
• That lump of clay then ceases to exist and is
  replaced by a statue.
• When the statue is crushed, it ceases to exist.
• It is replaced by another lump of clay.
• So Burke denies the following premise

58
The Statue and the Lump

• (1) There cannot be two objects in the same place
  at the same time. Premise
• (2) The lump of clay exists from 11am to 3pm.
  Premise
• (3) The statue exists from 12am to 1pm. Premise
• (4) The properties of the lump and statue are
  different i.e. they are not qualitatively
  identical from (2) and (3)
• (5) They are not numerically identical from
  indiscernibility of Identicals
• (6) The statue and the lump are in the same place
  at the same time Premise
• (7) There are two objects in the same place at
  the same time from (5) and (6)
• Contradiction!

59
Other anti-realisms

• Note that Burke doesnt think that the clay
  magically vanishes and is replaced by new clay.
• The bits of clay stay in existence.
• That is, the bits of clay that compose the lump
  stay in existence.
• Its just the lump itself which ceases to be (and
  is replaced by a statue).
• What are the problems with DST?

60
Other anti-realisms

• Well, some problems are laid out in the reading.
• For instance, why is it the sortal statue that
  counts?
• Why not other sortals.
• For instance, presumably human will be one of the
  relevant sortals, whereas child wont be.
• But why?

61
Other anti-realisms

• And what about other cultures with their own,
  weird, sortals?
• For instance, given DST if we deform a lump of
  clay just a little bit, it will be the same lump
  of clay.

62
(No Transcript)
63
(No Transcript)
64
(No Transcript)
65
Other anti-realisms

• And what about other cultures with their own,
  weird, sortals?
• For instance, given DST if we deform a lump of
  clay just a little bit, it will be the same lump
  of clay.
• Whereas when we shape it into a statue, it ceases
  to be a lump of clay.

66
(No Transcript)
67
(No Transcript)
68
Other anti-realisms

• But what about a culture who thinks the minor
  deformation corresponds to some sort of thing?
• Say that have werlicks that are important types
  of objects to them.
• Imagine that they also believe in statues, but
  believe statues are very different sorts of
  things from werlicks.
• So they have lumps of clay, werlicks and statues

69
(No Transcript)
70
(No Transcript)
71
(No Transcript)
72
Other anti-realisms

• And all of these things are, given DST, distinct.
• There are three things there.

73
(No Transcript)
74
Other anti-realisms

• And all of these things are, given DST, distinct.
• There are three things there.
• Think back to the Sider reading sentences about
  how many concrete things exist are going to not
  just not be vague, but wont be culturally
  relative.
• So which culture is right?
• The one that says there are two things, or three
  things?

75
Other anti-realisms

• Picking either option seems arbitrary or
  prejudiced, so were back to where we were last
  week.
• Theres a worry about cultural prejudice when it
  comes to discerning which material objects exist.
• So trying to eliminate the statue, or eliminate
  the lump, proves problematic.

76
The Statue and the Lump

• The Standard Account says there can be two
  objects in the same place at the same time.
• So premise (1) is false.
• Nihilism denies the existence of statues and
  lumps
• So premise (2) and (3) are false
• Less severe anti-realist answers deny the
  existence of certain other things
• So one of (2) and (3) is false.
• Non-classical identity accounts deny the IoI
• So premise (4) is false.

77
Deviant Identity

• The last option well look at (which doesnt
  exhaust the possibilities) is deviant identity.
• We may start treating the identity relation in a
  way we otherwise normally wouldnt.
• For instance, we may relativise identity.
• We may relativise it to sorts or to times.

78
Further Reading

• Geach, P. (1967) Identity, The Review of
  Metaphysics 21 3-12.
• Myro, G. (1997) Identity and Time, in Material
  Constitution ed. Michael Rea
• Doepke, F. (1982) Spatially Coinciding Objects,
  Ratio 24 45-60.
• Gallois, A. (1998) Occasions of Identity Oxford
  OUP.
• Wiggins, D. (2001) Sameness and Substance Renewed
  Cambridge Cambridge University Press

79
Deviant Identity

• Just to finish, well concentrate on the type
  that relativises to times.
• That is that at one time x is identical to y but
  at another time x isnt identical to y.
• So the statue is identical to the lump of clay
  between 12 and 1.
• But it isnt identical to the lump of clay at
  other times (as it doesnt exist!)
• How does this help? (remember, they have to deny
  one of the steps of the argument)
• They deny IoI, ergo the move from (4) to (5)

80
The Statue and the Lump

• (1) There cannot be two objects in the same place
  at the same time. Premise
• (2) The lump of clay exists from 11am to 3pm.
  Premise
• (3) The statue exists from 12am to 1pm. Premise
• (4) The properties of the lump and statue are
  different i.e. they are not qualitatively
  identical from (2) and (3)
• (5) They are not numerically identical from
  indiscernibility of Identicals
• (6) The statue and the lump are in the same place
  at the same time Premise
• (7) There are two objects in the same place at
  the same time from (5) and (6)
• Contradiction!

81
Deviant Identity

• So whats the downside?
• These options are deeply unpopular.
• Most people say identity isnt deviant.
• For instance, if the statue just is exactly the
  same thing as the lump of clay at any time then
  how is it that it isnt that self-same thing
  later on.
• What part of that very thing didnt you
  understand?!

82
Deviant Identity

• Theres obviously a little more too it than that.
• But not much

83
Recap

• We introduced the problem of the statue and the
  lump
• There are other paradoxes which are different,
  in saliently important ways.
• Example Tibbles the cat the Ship of Theseus
  the paradox of growth
• We discussed four responses
• Standard Account
• Burkes Dominant Sortal Theory
• Nihilism
• Deviant Identity
• These are endurantist accounts.
• There are more besides!

84
Next Lecture

• I still havent explained what endurantism is.
• Next lecture well introduce perdurantism.
• Well see how perdurantism aims to
• Solve the problem of the statue and the lump
• Solve the problem of cultural prejudice with
  material objects
• Solve the problem of vagueness
• Solve the problem of temporary intrinsics (not
  yet introduced)
• Part the red sea
• And in so doing well see what distinguishes the
  perdurantist from the endurantist accounts.