Transparent Computationalism

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Transparent Computationalism

• Ron Chrisley
• COGS
• Department of Informatics
• University of Sussex

International Conference on Computing
Philosophy Laval Technological Institute, May
3rd-6th 2006
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Summary

• The claim that cognition is computation can be
  construed opaquely or transparently
• Transparent construal is The mind is best
  understood in terms of whatever concepts, it
  turns out, best explain what computers do
• Many critiques of computationalism succeed only
  on the opaque construal
• Thus, transparent computationalism is not
  threatened
• Extra Three ways the mind may be computational

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Opaque computationalism

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Transparent computationalism

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The transparent strategy

• For each critique, present
• A current (opaque) view of computation
• The critique based on that view
• An alternative view of computation that avoids
  the criticism
• Independent motivation for that view of
  computation

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Critique 1 Dynamics

• Opaque view Discrete steps in an algorithm
  essential to computation
• van Gelder
• Cognition isn't discrete, but fundamentally
  dynamical
• Therefore, cognition isn't computation

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Dynamical computation

• Alternative view Generalise notion of an
  effective procedure to include any physically
  realisable and exploitable process, even
  dynamical ones
• Independent motivation
• Real-time computational control of an airplane
  wing

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Critique 2 Externalism

• Opaque view Computational properties are
  syntactic and local
• Fodor
• Psychological properties are semantic and
  relational/external/non-local
• Therefore, there can't be a computational
  psychology

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Externalist computation

• Alternative view Even computational
  explanations are external/relational (cf
  Peacocke's "Content, computation and
  externalism", 1994)
• Independent motivation Embedded computational
  systems

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Critique 3 The Chinese Room

• Opaque view
• All essential computational properties are formal
• Non-formal properties of a computation are mere
  implementation detail
• Searle
• Formal properties are insufficient for mind
• Therefore, there can't be a computational
  psychology

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Grounded computation

• Alternative view
• Having a semantics is crucial to computation
• Some properties that current formal theory takes
  to be irrelevant play a constitutive role in
  determining computational state
• Independent motivation
• Not every process is a computation
• Real-time computational control of an airplane
  wing

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Extra Computation and mind

• Traditionally, two ways computation is relevant
  to understanding or replicating mind
• Weak AI Computational simulation of mind
• Strong AI Cognition is computation

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Strong AI without Cognitivism

• Another route to Strong AI Computers as
  plastics
• Mentality is not computation, but rather having a
  a particular sort of causal/dynamical profile
• Computation is a convenient way to configure a
  system's causal/dynamical profile

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Thank you!