Technical Arms Control Work At IIS, Tsinghua

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Technical Arms Control WorkAt IIS, Tsinghua
East Asia Science Security Network Nov 3, 2007
Beijing, China

• Li Bin
• Tsinghua University

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1. Missile Defense

• (1) US Missile Defense in East Europe
• (2) Maneuvering Warheads as Countermeasures

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(1) US Missile Defense in East Europe

• Question How capable the system is to intercept
  Russian missiles if it can intercept Iranian
  missiles
• Capability rather than intention
• Intercept range rather than killing probability

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Interceptors

• BPI(Boost phase Interceptor) its range does not
  cover Iranian missiles flying to the US
• THAAD its range does not cover Iranian missiles
  flying to the US
• GBI (Ground Based Interceptor) guided by radar
• KEI (Kinetic Energy Interceptor) guided by
  satellite radar

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GBI in EU AlaskaIntercept Russian Missiles
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KEI in EU GBI in AlaskaIntercept Russian
Missiles

• KEI in EU intercepts Russian missile at 585s
• KEI in EU GBI in Alaska form a layered defense
  
• GBI in EU contributes little

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Conclusions

• GBIs in EU, which cover Iranian missile, do not
  add new threat to Russia
• KEIs in EU pose new threats to Russia by adding a
  layer of defense
• US commitment of GBIs only in EU can help avoid
  security dilemma

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2. Maneuvering Warheads as Countermeasures

• Russia China declared that maneuvering warheads
  help penetrate missile defense
• The research is to understand whether and how it
  works
• China case
• Ongoing work

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Preliminary Results

• Solid-fueled missile (DF-31) is not able to do
  this due to limited payload
• Liquid-fueled missile (DF-5) may or may not be
  able to do this
• Depends on the vulnerable time window

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Vulnerable Time Window
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Vulnerable Time Window Depressed Trajectory

• Depressed trajectory ? shorter vulnerable time
  window ? less fuel for maneuvering.

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Export Control

• Impact of US export control on its trade with
  China
• Economic factors in export control scale economy
  

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Historical Statistics of US-China TradeUS
Perspective (M)
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US Export to China (M)
Cox Report
Tiananmen Sq
Taiwan Str
EP3
RMB devalued
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How US Export Disturbed

• Licensing contributes little
• Psychological burdens contributes a lot
• sanctions,
• fear of accusation by ultranationalists

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2. Economical Factors in Export Control Policy?

• Economical factors drive the export control
  policies of all countries.
• The US has had big markets in most areas, so it
  is not eager to expand its markets by lower
  export control standards.
• Countries with small domestic markets and small
  fraction in international markets may be
  different.

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A US Case

• US nuclear industry has zero domestic market and
  small international market so it needs to create
  new market.
• US-Indian nuclear deal

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Other work

• 1. Chinese nuclear strategy
• Operation, Terminology, NFU
• 2. Energy
• (1) New security theory military security not
  1 concern
• (2) Peaceful access to energy