Link-local security - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Link-local security

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Do not preclude the use of IKE or GSAKMP to establish keys. Manual Key Management ... All are sending on the same destination address ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Link-local security


1
Link-local security
  • J.W. Atwood, S. Islam, S. Maziar
  • PIM Working Group
  • 2008/11/18
  • bill_at_cse.concordia.ca

2
draft-ietf-pim-sm-linklocal-05
  • Minor changes
  • Introduction sets up the environment
  • Notes possibility of GSAKMP for automated key
    management
  • Some housekeeping
  • New Stuff
  • Section on Rekeying (copied from 4552)

3
Recent activity
  • Attempts to get help on the environment problem
  • Distributed key servers
  • Router identification
  • Realization that this draft is (almost)
    independent of those issues

4
Setting the Environment
  • Router identification
  • Controlling keys
  • Controlling adjacency
  • Usefulness of distributed keyservers

5
Router Identity
  • A mechanism exists to give each router an
    identity
  • Unique within an administrative region
  • PKI, HIP, etc.
  • See Router Identification Problem Statement at
    IETF-71

6
Controlling keys and adjacency
  • GC/KS exists
  • Assign DEKs and SAIs
  • GC can answer the question, is this router a
    legitimate neighbor for me?
  • A distributed key server model may be
    appropriate
  • See Distributed Keyservers at IETF-71

7
Examples
  • Two end cases provide the examples
  • One key, one SA for the entire administrative
    region
  • One key, one SA for each speaking router

8
A walk through the draft
  • RFC 4601 is based on the new AH, and mandates
    authentication using AH
  • We draw heavily from RFC 4552
  • Specify mandatory authentication and optional
    confidentiality
  • Keying
  • Require manual keying
  • Provide means of support for automatic keying

9
Transport vs. Tunnel mode
  • Two routers are acting as hosts
  • MUST support transport mode
  • MAY support tunnel mode

10
Authentication Confidentiality
  • MUST support authentication
  • MUST support ESP
  • MAY support AH
  • SHOULD support confidentiality
  • MUST use ESP

11
IPsec requirements
  • Transport mode
  • Multiple SPDs
  • Selectors
  • Interface ID tagging
  • Manual key support
  • No stream ciphers
  • IP encapsulation

12
Key management
  • MUST support manual keying
  • Do not preclude the use of IKE or GSAKMP to
    establish keys

13
Manual Key Management
  • Manual configuration at boot-up
  • SAD entries
  • SPD entries

14
Automated Key Management
  • Cannot use IKE
  • Could use GDOI
  • Could use GSAKMP

15
Communication Patterns
  • Each speaker represents a small group
  • All are sending on the same destination address
  • New rules in IPsec allow using sender address and
    interface ID tag to differentiate

16
Key Server Models
  • Go to regional KS for keys
  • Go to local KS (the speaking router) for keys
  • (allows continuing when path to regional KS is
    broken)

17
Neighbor Relationships
  • Managed by regional GC
  • Out of scope for this document

18
Number of Sas
  • Optional one SA for each neighbor plus one for
    outgoing
  • Mandatory one SA for all neighbors and one for
    outgoing

19
Rekeying
  • Procedure for doing it
  • Configurable KeyRolloverInterval
  • Rekeying Interval
  • Manual 90 days
  • Automatic Will be specified by the key server
    document

20
IPsec Protection Barrier and GSPD
  • Manual Keying
  • SAD entries
  • SPD entries

21
..2
  • Automatic Keying
  • SAD entries (created by the automatic procedure)
  • GSPD entries
  • Configured send only
  • Triggered by the automatic procedure
  • PAD entries
  • Filled by adjacency management
  • Out of scope for document

22
Security Association Lookup
  • Multicast lookup uses
  • Sender address (not unique because of link-local
    addresses)
  • Interface ID tag
  • SPI

23
Activating Anti-replay
  • Only recommended for automatic keying
  • Keep sequence number per SA
  • Keep SA per sender

24
SAD per interface
  • 4601 suggests it may be desirable
  • 4301 deprecates SAD per interface
  • Replaced with interface ID tags for lookup

25
Extended Sequence Number
  • Suggested for use with manual keying

26
Security Considerations
  • Limitations of manual keys
  • Impersonation in single-key group
  • Pointers to
  • 4593 (Generic Threats to Routing Protocols)
  • 5294 (Specific threats to PIM-SM)
  • 4601 (PIM-SM)

27
Plans
  • Tidy up a few housekeeping issues
  • Listen carefully for feedback during and after
    this meeting
  • Ask for WGLC, based on the next version of the
    draft

28
Questions?
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