Superstorm 93: A Case Scenario 1215 March 1993

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Superstorm 93 A Case Scenario12-15 March 1993

• The case scenario in the Cuban sector.
• Researcher Lino Naranjo Díaz
• MeteoGalicia, Spain.
• Project supported by
• NCAR/Dir, NSF/ATM, NCAR/ESIG

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Initial background ( Climate facts)

• Climate of Cuba is considered tropical oceanic
  with two well defined seasons A Wet season
  (from May to October) and a Dry season (from
  November to April).
• Extratropical winter storms influence over Cuba
  is not unusual in the dry season. Consequently,
  in the Western half of the island, this season is
  slightly cooler, that can be expected from a
  tropical climate.
• Their influence account more than 70 of the rain
  in this season over Western Cuba.
• Most of these system originate over the Gulf of
  Mexico and are young and weak, when affect Cuba.
• Occasionally, they can be associated to severe
  weather events capable of causing large damages
  and casualties

Rough sea battering the Havana shore during a
winter storm.

• On December 26, 1940 a winter storm from the Gulf
  of Mexico produced the most intense tornado ever
  recorded in Cuba , killing 40 people in the town
  of Bejucal near Havana.

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Initial background ( Societal awareness)

• Usually, severe weather associated with winter
  storms in Cuba are rather local and short lasting
  in time and only become significant to media when
  hit a big city
• There is a traditional conceptual framing that
  relates severe weather only with hurricanes. This
  perspective prevailed among meteorologist during
  decades, delaying research effort on the subject
• Consequently, there were no impact assessments in
  Cuba on winter storms before the Big Storm of
  1993
• As a main consequence, Cuban society did not have
  a real awareness about risk in this matter,
  becoming highly vulnerable. Even more than in the
  case of hurricanes.

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Initial background ( Preparedness)

• Regardless of hurricanes, Cubas preparedness
  plans are designed with respect to some key
  weather aspects such as strong winds, heavy
  rains, coastal flooding etc.
• Predictability is crucial to defining the scope
  of the plan.
• Coastal flooding conditions could be predicted 2
  or 3 days in advance, making possible the
  establishment of anticipatory action for
  protection.
• Usually, a fast moving squall line can be
  predicted only a few hours ahead and actions in
  the plans are mainly focused only in mitigation.
• Under this condition in the case of an early
  prediction of a squall line, the preparedness
  system would remain frozen until the risk
  became imminent

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1992-1993, hard years

• In 1993 the socialist bloc had crumbled and the
  Soviet Union had disappeared. Within just a few
  years Cuba had lost its main living source.
• In only 2 years, imported goods fell from 8.14
  billion to only 2.24 billion.
• Sugar production suffered from a severe deficit
  of fertilizer and from other problems.
• Former socialist countries threw their nickel
  reserves into the international market causing a
  drop in the price of one of Cubas main exporting
  minerals.
• Over the second half of 1992, the weather in Cuba
  was dry and a severe drought affected the Western
  half of the country.
• Thus, by March of 1993 Cuban society had become
  very vulnerable to any natural hazard.

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Characteristics of Superstorm 93 in the Cuban
sector
On 13 March 1993 a very strong extratropical
storm hit a broad area of the United States,
Canada and Cuba, causing considerable damage and
casualties. A significant portion of losses in
Cuba were caused by a prefrontal squall line with
severe weather that swept the whole country,
bringing straight-line hurricane force winds
(over 200 km/h) and hail to the western
provinces. Rains over 100 mm in 24 h fell over
the Eastern provinces.
Wind recorded by some Cuba stations Santiago de
las Vegas 168 km/h Playa Girón
145 km/h Sagua La Grande 152
km/h Artemisa 118 km/h
Although the observed severe phenomena were not
the most intense ever recorded in Cuba, the
extent of the area affected by significant
phenomena was greater than that of any other
severe prefrontal squall lines previously
reported in Cuba.
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Characteristics of Superstorm 93 in the Cuban
sector
Havana radar indicated that the squall line
consisted of a line-echo with a series of bow
echoes, indicating strong winds. These echoes
were very persistent and intense. The two bow
echoes that affected western Cuba and the Isle of
Youthcentral Cuba retained their comma shape and
identity during the entire 5 h they were observed
by Havana radar. The echoes reached heights up to
16.3 km during the period of maximum intensity
over the westernmost provinces of Cuba.
A detailed assessment of damage patterns
displayed by trees and different types of
construction helped to identify over Havana a
swath of 1020 km wide where maximum estimated
gusts ranged up to 215 Km/h . This damage
occurred between 0730 and 0900 UTC.
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Characteristics of Superstorm 93 in the Cuban
sector
In the afternoon of March 13 the cloud band
associated to the storm reached the eastern
Provinces of Cuba with a low movement producing
heavy rains. At this time, strong Northwesterly
winds were battering the North coast of Cuba,
producing coastal flooding in Havana and other
coastal settlements.
Havana street flooded by coastal sea water during
the Superstorm93
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The superstorm in the Cuban Newspapers
(Translated from Spanish)
Pinar del Río 300 tobacco houses severely
damaged or destroyed, 8500 hectares of bananas
damaged. (Granma, March 16, 1993).
The Ministry of Agriculture informed more than 6
millions of banana plants were destroyed.(Granma,
March 17, 1993)
Existence of an extratropical low in the Western
Gulf of Mexico and the entering of a cold front
were known since early in the morning but not
that they were join together to configurate a
cataclism. (Bohemia, 19 marzo 1993)
Atmospheric phenomena caused in Havana City
damages in hotels facilities for about 2
000,000. Ministry of Education said that 110
school were affected. (Granma, March 25, 1993).
The strong storm that affected western and
central Cuba caused more than 500 000 people from
Havana to be injured or affected directly in
some way. A Blackout was generalized. Some
thousands of people lost their homes and all
their properties. (Granma, March 26, 1993).
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Superstorm What it did in Cuba

• The first half of 1993, from a climatic point
  of view, was really hellish. The so-called Storm
  of the Century swept through the island, from one
  end to the other, during a season that is not a
  storm or hurricane season................The
  storm of the century had already affected us for
  an estimated 1 billion. It swept away a sizable
  portion of the tobacco harvest, plantain farms,
  and other crops. It caused considerable damage to
  homes and industrial, agricultural, and social
  facilities. That compounded the situation even
  more
• ( From Fidel Castros speech marking the 40th
  anniversary of the assault on the Moncada
  Garrison. July 26, 1993)

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Superstorm What it did in Cuba

• Estimated economic losses about 1.0 billion.
• 10 deaths.
• 30 thousand houses and 2500 other buildings
  damaged.
• Sugar plantations and industry were severely
  affected in the harvest peak season. Sugar
  production of 1993 fell in about 3 million of
  tons. Almost a half of this loss could be
  associated with the Superstorms impact.
• Severe damage in agriculture. Most of the banana
  and tobacco production were swept away.
• 600 cattle and 23 600 poultry were lost.

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Response to Forecast
In 1993, the Cuban Meteorological Service did not
have full access to operational prediction models
from NWS. Only the National Meteorological
Centers Nested Grid Model forecasts for 24 and
48 h were available from open radio fax
broadcast from the U.S. Navy. Satellite pictures
availability was restricted to low resolution
images.
Based on the available information and on the
previous knowledge acquired in Cuba regarding
prefrontal squall line formation and displacement
over the Gulf of Mexico, meteorologists at the
Forecast Center issued a special warning on the
possible occurrence of the squall line at 2000
EST, on 12 March. This information was urgently
released to Civil Defense, and to Radio and TV
stations.
There were no responses
Finally, TV agreed to transmit a warning about a
severe squall line was coming only in the early
morning News after the Midnight Saturday Movie
program.
As a result only a few people heard about the
warning and besides, too late. Only less than
one hour later, everybody was surprised by
unusual thunder activity and very strong winds.
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Response to impact
12 hours later, confusion remained high among
people, politics and the government.
However, all protective measures for mitigation
were activated urgently and all resources
including military facilities were put to save
lives, crops and properties.
Ten peoples lost their lives. This was a record
too high for the Cuban protective system which
was designed basically to save lives.
Some days later, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, headed by President Castro,
developed a meeting with the head of the
Meteorological Service and the main economical
sectors. Important measures to improve the
protective capacity of the nation against severe
weather events were taken. The relationship
between the Meteorological Service and the media
was revised, improving the capacity of the
service to release warning to TV and radio
programs.
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Implications for a Climate Change

• Of the five most devastating meteorological
  events in the winter season in Cuba between 1940
  and 1995, two of them occurred in 1983 and one
  (The Superstorm) in 1993.
• Three major winter extreme events in 10 years and
  an abnormally quiet hurricane seasons during
  these years became very suspicious to
  forecasters.
• Initially the idea of a possible meteorological
  war by U.S. was early considered. Soon, research
  developed by the Cuban Met. Service and other
  institutions, indicated that anomalies were
  related with changes in the frequency and impact
  modes of an ENSO event. A possible indication of
  Climate Change in Cuba began to be accepted.
• From 1995 many institutions began to consider
  scenarios with a more rainy and stormy winter
  season, in addition to a drier summer.
  Agriculture research institutions began to find
  out about varieties of cultivations with higher
  resistance to these new climate conditions.
• Early warning plans were improved and re-adapted
  to a new scenario to make possible a more
  efficient response to a wide range of severe
  events.

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Implications for a Climate Change

• Experience and measures taken after 1993 were
  crucial in the effective preparedness of Cuban
  society in facing the 1997-98 El Niño event.
  However, this winter was not as severe as
  expected.
• By the end of the 90s, it was evident that a
  final conclusion about trends in Cuban climate
  was still unclear. The term Climate Variability
  began to be more popular.

Superstorm93 had a direct influence in the
development of strong societal awareness about
Climate change, climate variability and changing
the perceptions of decision makers about their
possible impacts and risks. Since March of 1993
many efforts were devoted to the study of Cuban
climate. El Niño and its influence and events
such as tornadoes or squall lines became as
popular as the seasons hurricane names.
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Other implications

• The Superstorm of March of 1993 hit Cuba when the
  country was in the midst of a severe economic and
  social crisis. Its impact swept away much of the
  government hope to ameliorate severe food and
  energy shortages, increasing the risk of famine.
  In April a severe neuropathy due to vitamin
  deficiencies which had appeared in Cuba by the
  end of 1992 reached epidemic proportions,
  affecting more than 50,000 people during 1993.

Damages to cultivation, not only destroyed
harvests in 1993 but winds, hail and floods
severely affected seeds, soils and
infrastructure, influencing many of the
agricultural production outputs in the following
year.