5' Combining simultaneous and sequential moves' - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 12
About This Presentation
Title:

5' Combining simultaneous and sequential moves'

Description:

How to understand games that involve both sequential and simultaneous moves. ... But the two games occur sequentially and thus the solution requires the use of ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:75
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 13
Provided by: johnsu5
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: 5' Combining simultaneous and sequential moves'


1
5. Combining simultaneous and sequential moves.
  • In this section we shall learn
  • How the tools used to analyze sequential games
    can be used on simultaneous games and vice versa.
  • How to understand games that involve both
    sequential and simultaneous moves.
  • How a switch from simultaneous to sequential (or
    vice versa) moves may be used by a player to gain
    an advantage.

2
Combining simultaneous and sequential moves.
  • Many games involve both simultaneous and
    sequential moves.
  • The use of game trees (extensive form) and payoff
    matrices (strategic form) are interchangeable.

3
Combining simultaneous and sequential moves.From
extensive form to strategic form
  • Recall the senate race game.
  • The key to converting this from extensive to
    sequential form is to recognize that Gary has two
    types of strategy.
  • Simply play in or out.
  • Play a contingent strategy. For example If
    Arnold plays ads I play out.

4
Combining simultaneous and sequential moves.From
extensive form to strategic form
Strategies. In, In - always enter. In, Out
enter if ads, dont enter otherwise. Out, In
enter if no ads, dont enter otherwise. Out,
Out Never enter.
5
Combining simultaneous and sequential movesFrom
strategic form to extensive form
  • To convert from strategic to extensive form
    representation requires the use of information
    sets.
  • Consider the chicken game

6
Combining simultaneous and sequential moves.From
strategic form to extensive form.
7
Combining simultaneous and sequential
moves.Games with both sequential and
simultaneous moves.
  • Product development and pricing game.
  • Consider a game in which two firms are deciding
    on their future product lines.
  • Each must first choose whether to develop and
    produce one of two similar goods, a fancy
    expensive to manufacture high-tech model, or a
    cheaply produced low-tech version.
  • Their decisions are unknown to each other up
    until the point the new models are unveiled.
  • Once the models are unveiled each must then
    choose a pricing strategy. For simplicity they
    may choose a high or low priced for each model.

8
Combining simultaneous and sequential
moves.Games with both sequential and
simultaneous moves.
Product development and pricing game. Game tree.
9
Combining simultaneous and sequential
moves.Games with both sequential and
simultaneous moves.
  • Product development and pricing game.
  • The players first play a simultaneous product
    development game.
  • They then play simultaneously play the pricing
    game.
  • But the two games occur sequentially and thus
    the solution requires the use of backwards
    induction.

10
Combining simultaneous and sequential
moves.Games with both sequential and
simultaneous moves.
  • Rules Change.
  • Switching from a sequential move to a
    simultaneous move game.
  • Sometimes this switch can be used as a strategy.
  • Consider the senate race game as in simultaneous
    form.

11
Combining simultaneous and sequential
moves.Games with both sequential and
simultaneous moves.
Senate race game in simultaneous form. We see
that no ads is a dominant strategy for Arnold.
Hence Gary chooses in. In the sequential version
Arnold chose ads and Gary stayed out.
12
Combining simultaneous and sequential
moves.Games with both sequential and
simultaneous moves.
  • Subgame perfection.
  • Suppose that gateway could commit to playing
    Foreign. The equilibrium would be U,U,F. But
    the commitment is not credible.
  • Where the U, U node to be reached Gateway would
    play U.
  • At each node the players will maximize.
  • The continuations of the game from each node must
    be equilibria.
  • This implies that the subgame perfect equilibrium
    is F,U,U.
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com