Rational / Utilitarian Tradition

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Rational / Utilitarian Tradition

• James Coleman

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Last time

• March and Simon
• Optimizing is impossible or too costly, so people
  tend towards satisfactory solutions.
• Thomas Schelling
• Tacit coordination is possible despite lack of
  direction communication.

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James Coleman

• Events have consequences
• Consequences for those who control the event
  internalities
• Consequences for those who do not control the
  event externalities
• It is the latter that brings about need for
  social coordination.

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Roommate mess

• Messy kitchen costs x
• Cleaning kichen costs 3x
• Jim 3x gt x
• Jim after sanctioning 3x lt 4x
• Sanctioning Jim 2x
• Total benefit x lt 2x

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Problem of zeal

• Structure of the problem is the same common
  benefit enjoyed whether or not an individual
  contributes.
• But when positive sanctions are effective but
  cost little, can lead to zeal.

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Problem of voting

• B benefit
• P probability of positive outcome
• C cost
• Equation on whether to vote would be bp b(p
  (delta)p) c
• Conclusion dont vote

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Solution to voting problem

• Coleman p.185, conjoint norm among a group of
  people. (In effect you increase (delta)p by
  participating in a norm)
• Does it work?
• No b/c 100 person network would only increase p
  from, say, .00001 to .0001, still not enough.

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Overview Rational / Utilitarian tradition

• 2 fundamental characteristics
• 1. Methodological individualism.
• 2. Substantive emphasis on rationality.
• Rationality?
• Strong version indivduals pursue selfish
  interests through most efficient means.
• Weak version individuals pursue any intersts
  through most efficient means

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Evaluation of R / U theory?

• Good doesnt portray people as ignorant
• Weakness?
• Doesnt deal well with structural inequalities.
• Doesnt deal well with cultural differences.