The United States, China, Taiwan: the Historical Background of a Potential Conflict

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The United States, China, Taiwan the Historical
Background of a Potential Conflict
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while our military relations present a sound
momentum of development, the US decides to sell
weapons to Taiwan despite China's solemn position
and strong opposition. This has undoubtedly
contaminated the sound atmosphere for the
bilateral relations and military relations,
grossly jeopardized China's national security,
undermined China's interest and China-US
relations, and hindered exchanges and cooperation
between the two countries and two militaries. It
is the US to blame for all these. Qin Gang,
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman, October 7,
2008
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Ma Ying-jeou President of the Republic of China
(Taiwan) 2008-
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Sovremenny-class destroyer Fuzhou
Type 072-II (Yuting Class) Large Landing Ship
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Missile Ranges Indicated by Circles Shantou
Northeast Airfield Dark Blue 100 miles (160.9
km) Red 200 miles (321.8 km) Purple 300 miles
(482.7 km) Green 350 miles (563.15 km)
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2 ships of the U.S. 7th Fleet
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• Who does Taiwan belong to anyway?
• How did we get to where we are today?
• How did the United States get involved?
• Does the United States have a legal obligation to
  defend Taiwan?
• Does the United States have a compelling
  strategic interest in defending Taiwan?
• Does the United States have a moral obligation to
  defend Taiwan?

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TAIWAN AND MAINLAND GOVERNMENTS

• 230 Kingdom of Wu sends military expedition to
  Taiwan.
• 610 Sui Empire sends military expedition to
  Taiwan.
• Mid-12th century Song Empire establishes
  military outposts on Penghu Islands and possibly
  Taiwan
• Late 13th century Yuan Empire establishes
  military outposts on Penghu Islands and possibly
  Taiwan.

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The Dutch period 1624-1661
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Shi Lang (1621-96) Conquered Taiwan for the Qing,
1683
Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga) (1624-62) Drove Dutch
from Taiwan,1661
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The Great Qing Empire
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The Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95
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China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full
sovereignty the following territories, together
with all fortifications, arsenals, and public
property thereon     (b) The island of
Formosa, together with all islands appertaining
or belonging to the said island of Formosa.    
(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all
islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees
of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and
24th degrees of north latitude. The Treaty of
Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895 (took force on
May 8, 1895)
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The Cairo Conference, November 1943 all the
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese,
such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores,
shall be restored to the Republic of China.
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Treaty of Peace with Japan Signed at San
Francisco, 8 September 1951Initial entry into
force 28 April 1952 CHAPTER II
TERRITORY Article 2 (b) Japan renounces all
right, title and claim to Formosa and the
Pescadores.
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Policy Information Paper-Formosa. Special
Guidance No. 28, December 23, 1949. I.
Problem To formulate information policy which
will minimize damage to United States prestige
and others' morale by the possible fall of
Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces. C.
Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the
subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the
following main points 1. Formosa is exclusively
the responsibility of the Chinese Government
(a) Historically and geographically a part of
China (b) The national government has run the
island's affairs since the takeover and is
responsible for present conditions there (c) The
United States has assumed no responsibilities or
obligations, actual or moral. 2. Formosa has no
special military significance (a) It is only
approximately 100 miles off the China coast (b)
Other potential objects of Communist aggression
are closer to points on the Chinese mainland than
to Formosa (c) China has never been a sea power
and the island is of no special strategic
advantage to the Chinese Communist armed forces.
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Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975
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The 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• 1953 Eisenhower sings order that US Seventh
  Fleet will no longer be used to prevent CKS from
  attacking the mainland unleashing Chiang.
• Use of Seventh Fleet to support GMD harassment of
  coast, shipping, fishing vessels

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The 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• Decision deal with Washington diplomatically,
  deal with Taiwan militarily
• Milltary target East China Sea group of islands
• 12 islands, including the Dachen Islands
• East of Zhejiang
• Still occupied by GMD

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General Zhang Aiping (r.) on telephone on 16
October 1964, reporting success of atomic bomb
test
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The 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• General Zhang Aiping
• In charge of offshore operations along 1,400-mile
  Zhejiang coast in 1954-55.
• Develops active defense plan to attack and occupy
  GMD-held islands
• Shelling of Jinmen, September 1954
• Naval-air campaign March-May 1955
• 12 naval battles with GMD navy 9 GMD ships
  damaged
• 6 air engagements with GMD air force
• 2nd Division, with Korean experience MiG-15 jet
  fighters
• GMD loses 6 fighers PRC, 2

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The 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• 1955 landing campaigns
• Decision to take one island at a time
• Mao delays operation while Nehru visits Shanghai
  Hangzhou in September
• Assault begins 1 November 1954
• Air raids naval operations achieve control of
  air and seas around Yijiangshan Dachen Islands
• Landing at Yijiangshan delayed while China awaits
  signing of US-ROC defense treaty on 2 December
  1954
• Treaty does not explicitly include offshore
  islands

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The 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• 21 December 1954-10 January 1955 further heavy
  air raids on Dachen islands, Dachen harbor
• 18 January attack on Yijiangshan
• Instructions not to engage with any American
  forces
• Attack timed for after US 7th Fleet had left
  Taiwan Strait for typhoon season
• 10,000 PRC troops vs. 1,000-man GMD garrison
• 6 hours of bombing 127 tons of bombs
• 2-hour bombardment from coastal battery
• 1430-1500 hours, 3,000 troops landed
• Island under PRC control by 1730 hours

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The 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• The Dachen Islands
• 19 January 200 bombers attack Dechen Islands
• GMD command badly shaken by loss of Yijiangshan
• Eisenhower persuades CKS to withdraw from Dachen
  Islands
• 8-12 February, US 7th Fleet assists in evacuation
• 26 February all East China Sea offshore islands
  aling Zhejiang coast controlled by PLA

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The 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• April 1955 Zhou Enlai offers to negotiate with
  USA to reduce tension in the Far East.
• US reaction
• Ambassadorial talks in Geneva
• Demands China renounce use of force on Taiwan
  issue
• Dulles refuses further negotiations
• Increased determination to defend Jinmen and Mazu
  (Quemoy and Matsu)
• Use of nuclear threats to make American position
  clear.

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US administration considers atomic weapons
interchangeable with conventional
weapons --John Foster Dulles, televised speech,
8 March 1955 Yes, of course they could be
used. In combat where these things can be used
for strictly military purposes, I see no reason
why they shouldnt be used just exactly as you
could use a bullet or anything else. -- Dwight
Eisenhower, in response to a question on whether
or not nuclear weapons could be used in the
Taiwan Strait, 8 March 1955. tactical atomic
weapons are now conventional and will be used
against the targets of any aggressive
force. -- Richard Nixon, 17 March 1955
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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• Planning
• The shelling of Jinmen
• US escorts
• Resolution
• Interpretations

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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• Planning
• US occupied with war in Lebanon
• PRC conducting Great Leap Forward
• 17-18 July 1958 Mao Central MAC (CMC) decide
  to bombard Jinmen
• Bombardment of Jinmen to begin on 25 July
• Air force units to be deployed in Fujian
  Eastern Guangdong by 27 July
• CKS response GMD troops on Jinmen, Mazu, Penghu
  islands put on alert

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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• Situation on Jinmen (9 islands in all)
• 6 GMD infantry divisions
• 2 tank battalions
• 88,000 troops, 50,000 residents
• 400 tons of supplies per day shipped from Taiwan
• PRC goal cut off supplies
• Shore batteries
• Naval attacks
• Air raids

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I could not sleep and have thought about the
question again. IT seems more appropriate to hold
the shelling of Jinmen for several more days.
While holding our operations, we will observe the
development of the situation. . . . We will wait
until the other side launches a provocative
attack and then respond with our counterattack.
The solution of the problem in the Middle East
will take time. Since we have time, why should we
be in a big hurry? We will hold our attack plan
for the moment, but one day we will implement it.
If the other side invades Zhangzhou, Shantou,
Fuzhou, and Hangzhou, that is the best scenario.
. . It is extremely beneficial to have politics
in a commanding position and to make a decision
only after repeated deliberations. . . . Even if
the other side attacks us, we can still wait for
a few days to make calculations and then start
our counterattack. . . We must persist in the
principle of fighting no battle we are not sure
of winning. -- Mao to Peng Dehuai and Huang
Kecheng, 27 July 1958
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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• After hesitation ( after Kruschevs visit on 31
  July-3 August) bombardment begins at 1730 hours
  23 August
• 459 artillery pieces in 24 artillery batteries
• 24,000 shells in 35 minutes
• Over 30,000 shells in 80 minutes
• 600 GMD troops killed
• Taiwan switches to night-time shipments
• PLA responds with nighttime shelling, aided by
  long-range lights

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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• Results
• After 10 days of shelling, Jinmen garrisons
  getting only small percentage of required
  supplies
• PLA radio station in Fujian broadcast our
  armys landing operation on Jinmen is imminent
• 27 August US puts GMD-controlled offshore
  islands inside US defense perimeter
• Maos decision
• Stern criticism of PLA Fujian radio
• 3 September orders shelling stopped for 3 days
• In order to gauge American response

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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• 6 September Zhou reassures Soviets
• US Escorts
• Begin 7 September when US warships accompany 2
  GMD supply ships
• Maos orders shell the Taiwan vessels, not the
  Americans, dont return American fire.
• Difficulty I distinguishing the ships in time
  resultno shelling
• September
• Further American naval and air escorts make
  continued enforcement of blockade difficult

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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• Next steps
• September Mao articulates the noose policy
• Leave Jinmen Mazu in CKS hands as a burden to
  the USA
• China can tighten the noose by raising pressure
  (bombarding Jinmen)
• Or decrease tension (by stopping bombardment)
• 5 October
• Mao orders shelling slowed down
• Justifies the move by saying that if PRC had
  captured Jinmen, that would have given USA
  Taiwan a pretext to instigate a 2-China policy

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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• 6 October Message to Compatriots on Taiwan
• PLA will halt shelling for 7 days, allow GMD
  garrison to receive supplies
• Points out all sides agree that there is one
  China
• Proposes peaceful resolution of 30-year Chinese
  civil war
• 13 October suspension of shelling for 3 weeks
  further to deal with the Americans.

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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis

• 25 October Second Message to Taiwan
  Compatriots.
• PLA batteries will not shell on even-numbered
  days
• Intermittent shelling continues until 1 January
  1979
• 23 August-6 October
• 474,000 rounds at Jinmen islands surrounding
  waters

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1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis Interpretations

• The shelling allowed Mao to assess Nationalist
  strength American resolve
• Mao was using the crisis in order to generate
  support for the Great Leap Forward
• Hardening of PRC policy toward Taiwan part of
  general ideological move to the left
• Mao was testing the limits of Soviet support for
  action against Taiwan

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In our propaganda, we say that we oppose tension
and strive for détente, as if détente is to our
advantage and tension is to their the Wests
advantage. But can we or cant we look at the
situation the other way around is tension to
our comparative advantage and to the Wests
disadvantage? Tension is to the Wests advantage
only in that they can increase military
production, and it is to our advantage in that it
will mobilize all our positive forces. . .
Tension can help gain membership for Communist
parties in different countries. It can help
us increase steel as well as grain production.
. . . To have an enemy in front of us, to have
tension, is to our advantage. -- Mao, Talk at
the Beidaihe Conference 17 August 1958
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The Americans have bullied us for many years, so
now that we have a chance, why not give them a
hard time? we did not put the Americans in the
wrong they did it by themselvesthey have
stationed several thousand troops on Taiwan, plus
two air force bases there. --Mao, 23 August 1958
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In the wake of the crisis, the conflict between
China and the United States intensified, the
distrust between Beijing and Moscow deepened
continuously, and the hostility between the
mainland and Taiwan, especially in a
psychological sense, increased dramatically.
However, from Maos perspective, his initiation
and management of the crisis remained a
successful case of promoting domestic
mobilization by provoking international
tension. -- Chen Jian
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The Shanghai Communique, 1972 The United States
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of
the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China
and that Taiwan is a part of China.The United
States Government does not challenge that
position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themselves.
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Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations between the United States of
America and the Peoples Republic of China, 1
January 1979 The Government of the United
States of America acknowledges the Chinese
position that there is but one China and Taiwan
is part of China.
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Taiwan Relations Act (1979) Public Law 96-8 96th
Congress It is the policy of the United States
(4) to consider any effort to determine the
future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific
area and of grave concern to the United States
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character and (6) to maintain the capacity of
the United States to resist any resort to force
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize
the security, or the social or economic system,
of the people on Taiwan.
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Sino-US Joint Communiqué 17 August 1982 the
United States Government states that it does not
seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms
sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan
will not exceed, either in qualitative or in
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied
in recent years since the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the United States
and China, and that it intends to reduce
gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading
over a period of time to a final resolution.
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Chiang Ching-kuo, 1910-1988 President of the
Republic of China, 1978-1988
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Lee Teng-hui, 1915- President of the Republic of
China, 1988-2000 First directly elected President
of the ROC, 1996
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The United States acknowledges that all Chinese
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain
there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part
of China. Shanghai Communique,
1972 Taiwans ethnic groups Aboriginal 2 Ma
inland Chinese 14 Taiwanese 84
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President Lee Teng-hui at Cornell University,
June 9, 1995
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Taiwan Straits Crisis, July 21 1995-March 23 1996
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The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96

• Probable PRC goals
• Persuade USA not to support Taiwan independence
• Intimidate Taiwan leaders from advocating
  independence
• Method of achievement
• Four rounds of military exercises in Strait,
  July-October1995
• Combined air-naval ops
• Missile tests
• Simulation of naval blockade US response
• Practice amphibious assaults

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The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96

• Second round of military exercises, March 1996
• Just prior to Taiwan presidential election
• Accompanied by editorials
• Warning against Taiwan independence
• And noting that Beijing would responde to
  independence moves with military force
• 100,000 troops on exercises in Fujian
• Missiles launched, landing in ocean 20 miles off
  coast of major Taiwan cities

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The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96

• Results
• US (President Clinton) sends 2 carrier battle
  groups toward Taiwan Strait
• PLA continues missile tests
• Warnings against foreign interference in Chinas
  internal affairs
• Taiwan electorate return Lee Teng-hui for second
  term
• In 2000 elections, Democratic Progressive Party
  candidate Chen Shui-bian is elected

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Chen Shui-bian, 1950- President of the Republic
of China, 2000-2008
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John Bolton Arthur Waldron Norman
Podhoretz Wm. F. Buckley, Jr.
the United States should . . . declare
unambiguously that it will come to Taiwan's
defense in the event of an attack or a blockade
against Taiwan, including against the offshore
islands of Matsu and Kinmen. Statement on
the Defense of Taiwan, Project for the New
American Century, August 20, 1999.
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If China decides to use force, the United States
must help Taiwan defend itself. . . . The Chinese
can figure out what that means, but that's going
to mean a resolute stand on my part.
candidate George W. Bush, 2 March 2000
If the PRC should attack Taiwan, the United
States would do "Whatever it took to help Taiwan
defend herself. President George W. Bush
24 April 2001
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"We oppose any unilateral decision by either
China or Taiwan to change the status quo, George
Bush, December 9, 2003
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Transcript President Bush on Your World, Wed.,
June 08, 2005, Fox News. CAVUTO Do we still
stand by an agreement, Mr. President, that if
Taiwan is ever invaded, we will defense sic
Taiwan? BUSH Yes, we do. It's called the Taiwan
Relations Act. The policy of the U.S. government
is this We're for a One China policy based upon
what they call the Three Communiqués, and that we
adhere to the Taiwan Relations Act, which means
this Neither side will unilaterally change the
status quo. In other words, neither side will
make a decision that steps outside the bounds of
that statement I just made to you. If China were
to invade unilaterally, we would rise up in the
spirit of Taiwan Relations Act. If Taiwan were to
declare independence unilaterally, it would be a
unilateral decision that would then change the
U.S. equation. My attitude is, is that time will
heal this issue. And therefore we're trying to
make sure that neither side provokes the other
through unilateral action.
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• Zogby International poll, March 2008
• 63 of those polled said they view the current
  status of Taiwan as a sovereign and independent
  country
• 31 said they view Taiwan's sovereignty as
  undetermined
• just 5 believe China's sovereignty extends over
  Taiwan.
• When specifically asked whether they agree that
  Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation, 89
  agreed.

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• Zogby International poll, March 2008
• 71 said they would describe themselves as
  Taiwanese when speaking with someone from another
  country
• 5 said they would say they were Chinese
• 21 said they would identify themselves as being
  both Chinese and Taiwanese.