Katrin Meder

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Katrin Meder
Presentation on June 25th

• Golle, Leyton-Brown, Mironov Incentives for
  Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks

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The paper by Golle et al. describes

• A variety of architectural designs of P2P systems
  in search of an optimal way to overcome the
  free-rider problem using incentives
• Analyses game theoretic equilibria under certain
  assumptions and under several payment mechanisms

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Problems with this approach

• Assumptions with respect to the
• individual utility functions
• incentive systems
• rules of the game
• a centralized vs. a decentralized network
• etc.

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Solution

• Design of experiments for real P2P networks in
  order to test
• the assumptions in question
• reputation as another possible incentive
• potential evaluation schemes for peers
• effect of centralization of the network
• etc.

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Summary of the content

• 1. Description of the paper
• 2. Analysis of its weak points
• 3. Design of experiments to test these points
• 4. Conclusion Do monetary incentives work in
  file-sharing networks? What other incentives are
  possible? What rules and assumptions of the game
  are most realistic?