Accessing the utility of Free Basic Water?

1
Accessing the utility of Free Basic Water?

• Julie Smith
• University of Natal and Water Action Campaign
• South African Civil Society Water Caucus
• June 2003

2
Introduction

• Access to the utility of Free Basic Water
• Experience on the ground
• Policy
• Recommendations

3
Access to FBW

• FBW policy entitles all people to a free lifeline
  supply of 6000 litres/6 kilolitres (kl) of water
  per household per month or 200 litres per
  household per day or 25 litres per 8-member
  household (DWAF, 2002)
• 26.8 million people have access to FBW (Muller,
  2003)
• Access to the utility of FBW?
• Low-income households consume 20-25kl per month
  and are not accessing the utility of FBW, as they
  require more water than 6kl to satisfy basic
  needs.

4

• 2 fundamental flaws
• Basic water requirements
• Per household versus per capita
• Basic water requirements (BWRs)-
• FBW provides 200l per household per day
• 8-member household 25l/person/day
• 25l/person/day does not meet BWRs for health and
  well being of households (DWAF acknowledges this)
• Why is DWAF providing a minimum that does not
  meet health and productive life objectives?
• Short-term goal 25l and medium-term goal 50-60l.
  Surely 9 years is already medium-term?
• What steps are being implemented to ensure
  medium-term goal?

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• Studies on BWRs not comprehensive
• SAMWU (2002), AIDC (2002) and Gleitch (1996)
  suggested that the BWRs should be 63l but ignore
  children, the aged and HIV/AIDS influences on
  consumption.
• Hence research is suggesting the BWR be raised
  above 63l.
• Current consumption patterns stand at 89-111
  litres per person (20-25kl/month- Municipal
  figures for low-income urban households).
• Urgent that BWRs be ascertained.
• FBW standard bears no relationship to the basic
  water requirements of households (AIDC, 2002).

6

• Per capita FBW allocation
• Ignores the fact that proportionally large number
  of low-income households with more than 8
  members, especially if households are billed for
  their backyard shack rental residents (Bond,
  2003). 
• The bias in the use of the term household as
  the unit of analysis has the implication that the
  FBW benefits are inequitably captured by wealthy
  small member households.
• HOW? Per capita FBW allocation adding additional
  record to the bill, so that the number of people
  per household is recorded e.g. using I.D. numbers
  or other confirmation of household members and
  checking it annually with a national data base
  preventing people from abusing the system (Bond,
  2003).

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Experience on ground

• FBW policy is based on the incorrect assumption
  that low-income households use less water because
  of their low-income status.
• The FBW policy allocation of 6kl fails to account
  for the BWRs and significant factors influencing
  consumption
• Household size
• Number of dependants
• Illness status of household (HIV/AIDS)
• Flush toilets
• Differentiation between weekday and weekend
• Rural/urban location
• Water for productive use (food security)

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• Many low-income households face significant
  access and affordability constraints as a result
  of a policy purported to increase the
  accessibility to water for all South Africans
• Assumption that low-income households accessing
  FBW-using more so
• Pushed into higher 2nd blocks (affordability?)
• Not subsidised
• Face punitive measures for inability to pay.

9
Policy

• Inability to pay (over 6kl) brands households
  irresponsible and absolute right to access
  water waived and minimum core right comes into
  effect.
• Minimum core right might be acceptable if basic
  water requirements were met by FBW but they are
  not.
• The FBW policy is in breach of the constitutional
  right of households to access adequate and
  affordable water to meet basic domestic needs and
  water required to satisfy productive life
  imperatives.

10
Recommendations

• The FBW policy should be fundamentally re-worked.
• A national FBW evaluation should be implemented
  (parallel process to create platforms whereby
  community experiences to FBW elicited and
  municipal accessing utility of FBW statistics.
• The basic water requirements for health, well
  being and satisfying productive, sustainable
  livelihoods should be scientifically calculated
  and socially assessed.

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• The amended policy should incorporate all factors
  affecting consumption (diverse and integrated
  approach).
• Per capita versus per household FBW allocation
• Access to water should take into account the
  following factors
• Household demographics and household water usages
• Income and service expenditure statuses
• Willingness and ability to pay
• Tariff structures

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• Tariffs
• 1st block amended FBW (BWRs)
• 2nd block lifeline tariff (20-25kl)
• then steep rising block tariff-based on
  conservation incentives (the higher the marginal
  cost for high consumption, the more customers
  will be aware of the merits of conservation and
  the fewer dams will have to be built (Bond, 2003).

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• Ease in which households can convert to lower
  consumption allocations
• Outcomes of evaluation, basic water requirements
  and low-income experiences should be integrated.
• IMPORTANT caution against advocating for a
  fixed volumetric allocation rather should
  advocate for the integration of all factors
  necessary for a amicable policy changes.

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• 3 Financing options for FBW 
• Increase internal cross-subsidies mobilised
  WITHIN municipalities that have sufficient
  surpluses
• specifically through businesses (tariff blocks
  have remained unchanged- they should take the
  appropriate concave shape).  
• b) Mobilise internal cross-subsidies WITHIN the
  water sector
• so that huge potential funding available through
  DWAF's charging wealthy white farmers, Eskom,
  mines/ industry and other (non-municipal) users
  of water can be made available to municipalities
  that don't have large water consumers within
  their boundaries.
•  

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• c) Substantially increase equitable share grants
  through the National Treasury to municipalities,
  given that national to local grants for operating
  expenses fell 85 in real terms during the 1990s
  (according to Finance and Fiscal Commission) and
  the 1991 levels have not been reached in spite of
  massive 'unfunded mandates' that central
  government placed on municipalities after 1994.

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• Some of the equitable share should go to boost
  the operating/ maintenance revenues for the
  municipal water sector in areas where internal
  cross-subsidisation is not high enough and other
  national funds should go to capital investments
  in water/sanitation, as well as other services
  that municipalities struggle to maintain e.g.
  township infrastructure (Bond, 2003).