Principles for Designing International Environmental Agreements

1
Principles for Designing International
Environmental Agreements

• Edward L. Miles
• Bloedel Professor of Marine Studies and Public
  Affairs
• School of Marine Affairs
• University of Washington
• Seattle, WA.
• USA

2
The Outline

• Introduction
• Response to first three of major questions posed
  to the design panel 1. How design institutions
  most effectively to mitigate human impacts on the
  environment while achieving other goals? 2.Are
  benefits of particular design elements contingent
  on structure of problem addressed , if so, to
  what extent are they transportable? 3. Do problem
  structure political, economic, social
  realities context constrain design options
  available?
• Position argued Problem structure and context
  most powerful factors constraining choice of
  design, so one size does not fit all.
• No slate of generally applicable design
  principles available, but design elements
  available, some of which transportable

3
Approach to Regime Design

• Empirically-based questions derived from
  available theoretical comparative literature
• 1. What is the problem and what are the jobs to
  be done?
• 2. Without regard for constraints of any kind,
  what sort of design would best solve the
  problem(s) facing the present situation what
  insights can be derived from applicable theory?
• 3. Focus on context in 2-dimensional pattern
  a.what supports exist for moving in desired
  direction? B. what constraints work against
  moving in desired directions?
• 4.Can we adapt the ideal design to fit the
  observable patterns of supports constraints?
• 5. What strategies are available for moving from
  where we are to where we want to be?
• Can applicable theory yield insights for moving
  from where we are to where we want to be?

4
Moving Towards Negotiation

• 1. On what scale does regulation have to proceed?
  Group size an important consideration, so what
  can efficiently be done on regional vs global
  bases?
• 2. Who must be included who excluded in
  negotiations on problem X?
• 3. What strategies available for ensuring maximum
  participation with least potential for conflict?
• 4.How can states most effectively appraise
  performance of decentralized actions so they can
  have confidence that standards are being met?
• 5. How create mechanism for facilitating
  cumulative learning over time in face of
  complexity? Is independent scientific/technical
  review always required?
• 6. What are the specific, essential components of
  problem-solving capacity for this system?

5
Moving Towards Negotiation, contd.

• 7. How do we design an internal dispute
  settlement mechanism that is likely to be
  effective?
• 8. What are requisites of overall collaborative
  process designed to coordinate management
  strategies? a.What combination of incentives and
  penalties likely to facilitate agreement and
  ensure compliance?

6
Elements of Regime Design Drawn from Existing Lit.

• Olsons 3 questions Wiil there be cooperation?
  If so, how much? Will it be enough to solve the
  problem(s)?
• Analytic chain regime ? Outputs decisions
  actions ? Outcomes? Behavioral change ?
  Impacts on the problem. But reality not so
  simple. Moving from problem to impacts, the
  number of control variables increases very
  difficult to assess what proportion of impact to
  be ascribed to regime what to other exogenous
  variables.
• Haas, Keohane, Levy (1993) behavioral change a
  requisite for problem solution regime
  effectiveness a matter of degree--posing the
  counter-factual question ? inference that regimes
  matter even if problem(s) not solved regimes
  serve a lot of other functions.

7
Other Design Elements Monitoring, Compliance,
Learning Increasing National Capacity as
Pathways to Increasing Regime Effectiveness

• On Monitoring as Implementation Review ?
  Increasing Transparency Credibility of
  Commitment ? Compliance
• Combine with management emphasis or enforcement
  emphasis in face of non-compliance? Evidence
  overwhelmingly in favor of management approach
  (Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff, 1998
  Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn, 2006).
• Evidence mixed re effects of consensual
  knowledge. Where strong effect, learning via
  periodic assessments of status of problem, making
  national reports publicly available, facilitating
  independent assessments by NGOs, making
  transparent underlying assumptions re models,
  methods, data (Victor, Raustiala, Skolnikoff,
  1998).
• Building national capacity produces strong
  effects on impacts.

8
How Its Done Design Negotiation

• Need to manage large size and great complexity.
  Is the problem a truly global one? Even if yes,
  must it be dealt with all at once or is there
  some way of carving up the problem into separate
  packages of lesser scale (Sebenius, 1991 Miles,
  1998)? But if latter possible, watch out for
  proliferation of issue linkage strategies.
• Pathways around inertia in negotiating and
  implementing global agreements the fast track
  the club-within-a-club (Sand, 1989).

9
Design Errors in the Climate Regime The
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC),
Art. 2

• The ultimate objective of this Convention is to
  achievestabilization of greenhouse gas
  concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
  would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
  interference with the climate system. Such a
  level should be achieved within a time-frame
  sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally
  to climate change, to ensure that food production
  is not threatened, and to enable economic
  development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
• Severe problems with this formulation 1.
  Stabilization may not be the most appropriate
  objective 2. No single measure of dangerous
  interference exists 3. Assumptions about time
  to significant impacts false because ignoring
  internal feedbacks, nonlinearities, and
  thresholds in earths climate system.

10
Technical Implications of Kyoto Protocol
Comments of Prof. Bert Bolin, Chair of IPCC,
Nature,16 Jan. 1998

• Within basket, increase of CO2 alone accounting
  for 70 of total increase of radiative forcing.
  Not many measures available for decreasing CH4
  Nox. Other components contribute only few to
  radiative forcing.
• Even with full compliance of Protocol, by 2010
  AICs still contributing 4X CO2 emissions of LDCs.
• Even with full compliance, accumulated emissions
  of CO2 from 1990 to 2010 140Gt C, implying
  increase in atmospheric concentration by 29ppmv
  to 382ppmv.
• The Kyoto Conference did not achieve much with
  respect to limiting the buildup of GHG in
  atmosphere.
• US (Bush II) rejecting agreement. For Protocol to
  be functional, EU needing Japan Russia to sign
  ratify. Side deal made with Russia re admission
  to WTO. Japan requiring watering down of
  compliance provision. No penalties for
  non-compliance. By 2006 compliance low generally.

11
Additional Design Errors in Kyoto Protocol

• Lack of a viable architecture for international
  collaboration rigid targets timetables
  (Victor, 2001).
• Lack of technology focus which would have served
  to entrain the major firms provide platform for
  innovations in energy systems.
• OECD participants now convinced the Kyoto
  Protocol cannot produce effective solutions,
  perceive that urgency of problem has increased,
  are prepared to pursue less than global pathway.

12
Conclusions Transportable Design Elements

• Need for flexibility responsiveness in control
  structure. Utility of iterative assessments of
  state of problem and of regime performance in
  context of high transparency.
• Deliberate mechanisms which facilitate learning
  for linking that learning to policy formulation
  revision.
• NGOs should be able independently to evaluate
  governmental performance.
• Find the most appropriate architecture for
  international collaboration.
• Adopt a management approach to enforcement.
• Epistemic communities political entrepreneurs
  may be more important at the beginning but the
  importance of national and international
  administrative communities grows with time.

13
Conclusion, contd.

• Important to understand whether the critical
  interface with decision-makers is with
  technology, not science. Where this condition
  exists, including only those companies with
  technological options may be necessary. Who is
  excluded a very important question since it has
  implications for the framing of the issue and the
  urgency with which it is pursued.