Crafting Liberal Peace

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Crafting Liberal Peace
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• Kristian Stokke
• Department of Sociology and Human Geography
• kristian.stokke_at_sgeo.uio.no

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New Wars as Global Problem
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• Changing conflicts
• Old wars Interstate conflicts inscribed in
  geopolitical rivalry between Western capitalism
  and East Bloc socialism during the Cold War
• New wars Intrastate conflicts at the periphery
  of the liberal world order
• Changing perceptions in the North of New Wars
  in the South
• 1. Intrastate conflicts as a national
  development problem (1990s)
• New wars pose obstacles to development
  Crafting peace as a pre-condition for aid
  effectiveness and development as support for
  peace
• 2. Intrastate conflicts as a global security
  problem (post 9/11)
• Fear of instrastate conflicts generating
  international instability through transnational
  migration, spread of conflicts, criminal networks
  and international terrorism. Crafting peace to
  enhance security at home

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Internationalised Conflict Resolution
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• Contemporary emphasis within US-led world order
  on enhancing global security
• Military intervention in intrastate conflicts
  that are perceived as global security threats
  (e.g. Afghanistan)
• Diplomatic crafting of peace in conflicts where
  there are willing partners and a ripe moment for
  negotiations
• Global and national governance of security and
  development through strategic security/development
  complexes (state actors, multilateral and
  regional organisations, international financial
  institutions, armed forces, businesses,
  non-governmental organisations)

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Liberal Peace
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• What kind of peace? What is the underlying
  conceptualisation of peace? The answer Liberal
  Peace
• The democratic peace thesis democratic
  governments are more peaceful both in internal
  politics and in international relations than
  other forms of government. Kofi Annan (former
  UNSG, 2000) Democracy is a highly effective
  means of preventing conflict, both within and
  between states
• Woodrow Wilson Make the world safe for and
  through liberal democracy. This Wilsonian
  remedy was first applied in international
  relations after World War I but has been
  rearticulated in the post-Cold War period
• Counterpoint While the liberal peace thesis may
  hold true for established liberal democracies,
  transitions into liberal market democracies may
  have a much more complex relationship with
  conflict.

Roland Paris (2004) At wars end Building peace
after civil conflict
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Liberal democracy/Neo-liberal development
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• Despite lack of central coordination, a
  remarkable convergence in peace-building
  operations around neo-liberal development and
  liberal democracy

• Constructing liberal democracy
• Promote political stability and liberalism within
  existing states
• Cessation of hostilities, demobilisation
• Promoting law and order. Training police and
  justice officials
• Promoting power-sharing through devolution and
  consociationalism
• Promoting and administering liberal democratic
  elections
• Promoting liberal human rights (civil and
  political freedoms)
• Promoting civil society

• Promoting neoliberal development
• Encouraging the development of free-market
  economies, stimulate growth of private enterprise
• Reducing the role of the state, supporting the
  development of neo-liberal governance

• Key features of state market reforms
• Externally facilitated elite negotiations
• Political and social exclusion
• Rapid deployment of reforms

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Merging Development and SecurityPeacebuilding
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• UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghalis 1992
  report to the Security Council (Agenda for Peace)
  presented peacebuilding as an important addition
  to UN efforts at peacekeeping and peacemaking.
• While peacekeeping implies containment of armed
  conflict (conflict management), peacemaking means
  diplomatic actions to bring hostile parties to a
  peace agreement (conflict resolution).
• Peacebuilding refers to a broader process of
  supporting peace through social and economic
  development (conflict transformation).
• Peacebuilding was initially conceptualised as
  post-conflict development interventions to
  prevent the recurrence of violence after a peace
  agreement, but the term has later been broadened
  to include peace-supporting initiatives before
  and during a violent conflict. Now peacebuilding
  is seen as interventions aimed at preventing the
  outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of
  armed conflicts.

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Doing development differentlyWorking around, in
and on conflict
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• Multilateral agencies and major donor nations are
  increasingly concerned with crafting transitions
  from war to peace in order to mainstream
  post-conflict development.
• Development aid has undergone a (partial) shift
• from working around conflict (i.e. providing
  development aid without taking conflicts into
  account),
• through working in conflict (i.e. offering
  humanitarian relief and development aid in a
  conflict-sensitive manner),
• to working on conflict (i.e. providing
  development assistance towards reducing and
  managing conflicts).

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Military-territorial Balance of Power
Preconditions for Sri Lankas peace process
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• The Eelam War III ended in a mutually hurting
  stalemate between the government of Sri Lanka
  (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
  (LTTE)
• This balance of power was the basis for the peace
  process and territorial power-sharing was the
  main contentious issue in the process
• Incompatible territorial agendas of rebuilding
  the unitary state (GOSL) and constructing a
  separate state (LTTE)
• Reluctant agreement to explore a federal
  solution, but little progress towards
  power-sharing

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Crises of Governance
Preconditions and characteristics of the 5th
peace process
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• Political fragmentation
• The government was based on a weak coalition with
  only a small majority in Parliament
• The government was further constrained by the
  fragmentation within the political elite, and
  entrenched practices of ethnic outbidding and
  instrumental opposition to peace
• Postponed core political issues
• The GOSL had limited prospects for political
  conflict resolution through constitutional
  reforms
• It therefore sought conflict management and
  resolution within limits set by existing
  constitutional and institutional arrangements
  (which were marked by majoritarianism and
  centralization of state power)

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Exclusion of Stakeholders
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Preconditions and characteristics of the 5th
peace process

• Exclusion of stakeholders
• Formal negotiations between LTTE and GOSL,
  combined with consultations with the Sri Lankan
  President, and India
• No institutionalised arenas for other
  stakeholders (e.g. Muslim minority , Tamil and
  Sinhalese opposition, civil society
  organisations)
• This exclusion of stakeholders from the peace
  process (in the context of political
  fragmentation and intense political rivalry)
  produced a number of potential spoilers within
  the political elite

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Crises of Development
Preconditions and characteristics of the 5th
peace process
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• Development as a forerunner for peace
  Convergence around humanitarian needs and
  rehabilitation as a trust-building precursor to
  negotiations over core issues
• Government of Sri Lanka High cost of warfare and
  rising costs of living (likely to yield electoral
  losses), convergence of interests with business
  community, promises of peace dividends
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Destroyed lives
  and livelihoods in war-affected areas, need for
  and benefits of humanitarian relief
• International aid donors Increased attention to
  aid effectiveness, war understood as a cost to
  development and peace as an prerequisite for
  governance and development

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Neo-liberal Development and Exclusion
Preconditions and characteristics of the 5th
peace process
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• Normalising economic liberalisation
• Little discussion about what kind of development,
  but convergence around a technocratic and
  neo-liberal approach to development
• Social exclusion
• This development model ran counter to the
  interests of the key electoral constituencies of
  intermediate Sinhalese classes
• Social exclusion produced increased popular
  frustration
• The development model of the GOSL and their
  donors provided a social basis for oppositional
  mobilisation against liberal peace and
  neo-liberal development

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Resumption of Warfare
The 4th Eelam War
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• In the absence of substantive conflict
  resolution, hardliners on both sides of the
  conflict turned to war for peace (victors peace
  rather than liberal peace)
• They also had a certain popular support or
  acceptance for this, due to frustration with the
  failed peace process and the lack of delivery on
  humanitarian/development issues (both in the
  North-East and in the South)
• Both sides were using war and peace
  strategically. By 2006/2007 it was clear that
  both sides were preparing for war rather than new
  peace negotiations
• International actors were either pacified or
  became de facto supporters of the GOSL

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Lessons from Sri Lanka
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• Constellations of power producing a peace process
  with distinct characteristics
• Elite negotiations with political exclusion of
  stakeholders in political and civil society and
  of core conflict issues
• Internationalised securitisation of aid, but weak
  strategic links to political transformations
• Neoliberal rehabilitation and development
  furthering uneven development and social
  exclusion
• Combination of political and social exclusion
  producing a significant opposition to liberal
  peace/neo-liberal development and increased
  popular support for militant struggles for either
  Tamil Self-determination or Sinhalese-Buddhist
  Sovereignty.