Peninsula Campaign and Shenandoah Valley Campaign

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Peninsula Campaign and Shenandoah Valley Campaign

• Lesson 6

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Peninsula Campaign McClellan

• George McClellan
• Among the Armys best educated officers the
  Young Napoleon
• Excellent organizer and administrator
• The right man to rebuild the Federal Army after
  the defeat at First Manassas
• Extremely cautious always wants more troops and
  more time to prepare
• Prone to believe enemy is stronger than he really
  is
• Mutual distrust with Lincoln

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Peninsula Campaign McClellan

• One of McClellans formative experiences in the
  Mexican War was the siege of Vera Cruz
• After the war McClellan was part of a team of US
  officers sent to observe the Crimean War
• Studied the siege of Sevastopol there
• No one in the US Army knew more about conducting
  sieges than McClellan
• Advocated the limited war and the conciliatory
  approaches

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Peninsula Campaign Joe Johnston

• Reinforced Beauregard at First Manassas
• Highest ranking officer to leave the US Army for
  the Confederacy
• However the letter Davis sent to the Senate
  requesting confirmation of his full generals
  listed Johnston fourth
• This infuriated Johnston and from that day on he
  had a difficult and quarrelsome relationship with
  Davis
• Defensive-minded

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Peninsula Campaign Faulty Intelligence

• McClellan near Washington with 100,000 men
• Johnston near Centreville with 40,000
• Allan Pinkerton, McClellans intelligence
  officer, estimated Johnston had 150,000
• Pinkertons exaggerated estimate reinforces
  McClellans natural tendency toward caution

Pinkertons (left) skill in running a railroad
detective agency did not translate to being a
good military intelligence officer
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Peninsula Campaign Urbanna Plan

• McClellan preferred an amphibious operation to an
  overland one in order to avoid Johnston
• Developed the Urbanna Plan which involved a
  move by water from Annapolis, MD through the
  Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Rappahannock
  River
• The landing site of Urbanna was a small hamlet
  about 60 road miles northeast of Richmond

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Peninsula Campaign Urbanna Plan

• McClellan hoped to avoid attacking Johnston
  frontally
• Instead he would insert himself between Johnston
  and Richmond, forcing Johnston to evacuate his
  strong Manassas-Centreville line in order to
  defend the Confederate capital

The Urbanna Plan was designed to be a turning
movement
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Peninsula Campaign Confederate Withdrawal

• Before McClellan could launch his plan, Johnston
  began to feel vulnerable so far forward
• Johnston left only a 5,400 man force under
  Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and
  withdrew the rest of his force behind the
  Rappahannock River
• This move effectively negated the Urbanna Plan

When Federal forces inspect the abandoned
Confederate works at Centreville they find many
of the suspected defenses were merely Quaker
guns
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Peninsula Campaign McClellans Response

• By this time McClellan was mentally committed to
  an amphibious movement even though most of its
  advantages were gone
• He shifted his landing site to Fort Monroe which
  had remained in Federal hands after Virginia
  seceded

John Wool commanded a 10,000 man force at Fort
Monroe
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Peninsula Campaign
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Peninsula Campaign Security

• Lincoln was not overly enthusiastic about the
  Peninsula Campaign but he was happy that
  McClellan was at least doing something
• Among Lincolns concerns was the safety of
  Washington after McClellans army departed
• He asked McClellan to explain his plan for
  safeguarding the capital and McClellan never
  really gave Lincoln a straight answer
• McClellan was very condescending to Lincoln
• He seemed to think that as a professional soldier
  he did not need to bother sharing his plans with
  an amateur

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Peninsula Campaign Mass and Security

• Amphibious movement began March 17
• 121,500 men, 14,492 animals, 1,224 wagons, 200
  cannon
• One British observer describes it as the stride
  of a giant (mass)
• On April 3 Lincoln started asking serious
  questions about the safety of Washington and
  became convinced it was inadequate
• He ordered McDowells 30,000 man corps to remain
  in place rather than join McClellan (security)

McClellans failure to make Lincoln feel
comfortable about Washington came back to haunt
him
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Peninsula Campaign Confederate Defenses

• McClellan began his advance inland on April 4
• Facing him was a 13,000 man force commanded by
  John Magruder
• Magruder had a weak defensive line designed to
  trade space for time until a more solid defense
  could be formed
• Magruder was a very high strung personality and
  he started sending off panicky reports to Robert
  E. Lee who was serving as Daviss military
  advisor
• Lee tried to calm Magruder down and began a
  reconcentration of forces which would
  ultimately bring 53,000 Confederates into
  position to oppose McClellan (balance)

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Peninsula Campaign Deception

• Magruder was not a particularly distinguished
  combat general but he was an amateur thespian
• He put his acting talent to work to deceive
  McClellan
• Magruder marched a coupler of his regiments out
  of a thicket into clear view of the Federal
  advanced guard
• The Confederates then disappeared into another
  woods, doubled back around while they were out of
  sight, and then repeated the process

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Peninsula Campaign Deception

• The target of a military deception operation is
  the mind of the enemy commander
• It is always easier to make someone believe what
  they were already predisposed to believe
• Thanks to Pinkertons exaggerated estimates and
  McClellans natural caution, McClellan was
  predisposed to believe the Confederates
  outnumbered him
• Magruders ruse worked perfectly

Magruders nickname was the Great Demonstrator
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Peninsula Campaign Yorktown

• Magruders deception, poor maps, difficult
  terrain, uninspired actions by subordinates, and
  McClellans natural caution led him to stop his
  advance within 24 hours and begin siege
  operations against Yorktown (maneuver?)
• Joe Johnston said, Nobody but McClellan would
  have hesitated to attack. (offensive?)

Mortars used in the Federal siege of Yorktown
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Peninsula Campaign Ironclads

• The Confederates had converted the old USS
  Merrimack into an ironclad and rechristened it
  the CSS Virginia
• The casemate walls contained 24 inches of oak and
  pine timbers which were then covered with four
  inches of armor plating

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Peninsula Campaign Ironclads

• The presence of the Virginia posed a serious
  threat to the Federal fleet
• On March 8, the Virginia made its trial run and
  wreaked havoc among the five Federal blockade
  ships anchored in Hampton Roads
• As the tide ebbed the Virginia withdrew to deeper
  waters, intended to finish her work the next day

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Peninsula Campaign Ironclads

• By then however, the Federal ironclad, the
  Monitor, had arrived on the scene
• The two fought to a tactical draw, but again the
  Virginia had to withdraw to deeper waters giving
  the Monitor a strategic victory
• The Virginia remained a threat, but fears that
  she would single-handedly destroy the Federal
  fleet were now abated

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Peninsula Campaign Confederate Withdrawal

• On May 3 Johnston began to evacuate Yorktown and
  withdraw up the Peninsula
• This opened up the York and James River to
  Federal gunboats
• It also forced the abandonment of Gosport Naval
  Yard and scuttling of the Virginia which opened
  up the James River to the Federals

Currier and Ives print of the destruction of the
Virginia
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Peninsula Campaign Williamsburg and Drewrys
Bluff

• Johnstons strategy was to withdraw to the
  immediate vicinity of Richmond in order to
  strengthen his defenses and prevent McClellan
  from outmaneuvering him
• The Confederates fought a rear guard action at
  Williamsburg to cover the retreat

Williamsburg favored the defense. The Peninsula
is only seven miles wide there and Longstreet
positioned himself between Queens and College
Creeks which further narrowed the distance to
three miles.
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Peninsula Campaign Williamsburg and Drewrys
Bluff

• Williamsburg indicated several themes that would
  repeat themselves throughout the Peninsula
  Campaign
• The terrain favored the defense
• Frontal attacks would prove very costly
• Synchronizing in order to achieve mass at the
  decisive point would be difficult
• McClellan would absent himself for the tactical
  battlefield and not provide the necessary command
  and control

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Peninsula Campaign Williamsburg and Drewrys
Bluff

• Without the Virginia blocking the way, McClellan
  also had a potential water approach to Richmond
• On May 15, five Federal ships including the
  Monitor advanced up the James River only to be
  blocked by the Confederate fort at Drewrys
  Bluff, just seven miles below Richmond

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Peninsula Campaign Williamsburg and Drewrys
Bluff

• Drewrys Bluff was indicative of problems the
  Federals had throughout the campaign of achieving
  joint unity of effort
• The Navy had requested a cooperating land force
  but McClellan had answered that he was not yet
  ready to cooperate with them

Naval commander Louis Goldsborough said, Without
the Army the Navy can make no real headway
towards Richmond. This is as clear as the sun at
noonday to the mind. Goldsborough and McClellan
would fail to achieve unity of effort on the
Peninsula.
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Jacksons Valley Campaign

• While all this is going on on the Peninsula,
  Stonewall Jackson was having a big effect in the
  Shenandoah Valley
• The Valley represented a potential Confederate
  avenue of approach to Washington, which concerns
  Lincoln
• Still in his capacity as Daviss military
  advisor, Lee began coordinating with Jackson to
  help relieve pressure on the Peninsula
• While the Confederates were concentrating
  coastal troops at Richmond, their immediate
  response to McClellans Peninsula Campaign
  began with Jascksons important Valley campaign
• Hattaway and Jones, 176

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Jacksons Valley Campaign

• Shenandoah Valley
• Agricultural support for Confederacy
• Controlled Baltimore Ohio Railroad
• Avenue of approach into Maryland and Pennsylvania
• Originally Jackson faced 38,000 Federals with
  only 4,500 of his own men
• Federal force grew to nearly 60,000 which Jackson
  kept from threatening the Peninsula

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Jacksons Valley Campaign

• Jomini (1779-1869) Swiss military theorist who
  influenced many Civil War generals through his
  Summary of the Art of War
• Very geometrical and scientific approach to war
• Stressed interior lines

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Jacksons Valley Campaign

• Jackson neutralized Federal forces three times
  larger than his own.
• Fought six battles between March 23 and June 9
  Kernstown, McDowell, Front Royal, Winchester,
  Cross Keys, and Port Republic.
• Jacksons foot cavalry
• 676 miles in 48 marching days an average of 14
  miles a day

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Jacksons Marches

•  22 March Mount Jackson-Strasburg
  22
•  23 March Strasburg-Kernstown-Newtown
  18
•  24-26 March Newtown-Mount Jackson
  35
•  17-19 April Mount Jackson-Elk Run Valley
  50
•  30 April-3 May Elk Run Valley-Mechums
  River Stn. 60
•  7-8 May Staunton-Shenandoah Mount
  32
•  9-11 May Bull Pasture Mount-Franklin
  30
•  12-15 May Franklin-Lebanon Springs
  40
•  17 May Lebanon Springs-Bridgewater
  18
•  19-20 May Bridgewater-New Market
  24
•  21 May New Market-Luray
  12
•  22 May Luray-Milford
  12
•  23 May Milford-Front
  Royal-Cedarville 22
•  24 May Cedarville-Abrahams Creek
  22

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Jacksons Marches

•  25 May Abrahams Creek-Stevensons
  7
•  28 May Stevensons-Charlestown
  15
•  29 May Charlestown-Halltown
  5
•  30 May Halltown-Winchester
  25
•  31 May Winchester-Strasburg
  18
•  1 June Strasburg-Woodstock
  12
•  2 June Woodstock-Mount Jackson
  12
•  3 June Mount Jackson-New Market
  7
•  4-5 June New Market-Port Republic
  30
•  8 June Port Republic-Cross Keys
  5
•  9 June Cross Keys-Browns Gap
  16
•  12 June Browns Gap-Mount Meridian
  10
•  17-25 June Mount Meridian-Ashland
  Station 120
•  (one rest day)

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Jacksons Marching RulesIssued May 13, 1862

• Instructions on filling canteens which would
  prevent straggling for this purpose,
• Hourly rest breaks of ten minutes in duration,
• Mess times,
• Location of commanders during the march,
• Procedures for safeguarding weapons,
• Personnel accountability procedures,
• Guidance for transporting baggage, and
• Medical and ambulance support procedures.
• Frank Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, McGraw-Hill
  NY, 1957, p. 232-233.

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Soldiers Load

• As a general rule, commanders should limit a
  soldiers load to an amount equal to 45 of his
  body weight in order to retain agility, stamina,
  alertness, and mobility.
• For the average soldier this is 72 pounds.

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Soldiers Load

• In the interest of being able to move rapidly,
  Jackson kept his soldiers load to the minimum.
• Jacksons men did not carry extra clothing,
  overcoats, or knapsacks.
• They marched with their rifles, ammunition, and
  just enough food to keep going.
• Each man carried one blanket or rubber sheet and
  slept with a comrade for extra warmth.
• The cooking was done at a common mess so that not
  everyone had to carry individual frying pans and
  skillets. Even the skillet handle had been
  spiked so that on the march it could be stuck in
  a rifle barrel.
• Marshall, S. L. A. The Soldiers Load and the
  Mobility of a Nation, The Marine Corps
  Association Quantico, 1980, p. 25

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A. P. Hills Light Division

• One soldiers explanation of how Hill picked the
  name
• Why it was called the Light Division I did not
  learn but I know that the name was applicable,
  for we often marched without coats, blankets,
  knapsacks, or any other burdens except our arms
  and haversacks, which were never heavy and
  sometimes empty.
• W. F. Dunaway quoted in William Hassler, A. P.
  Hill Lees Forgotten General, Garrett and
  Massie Richmond, 1962.

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Jacksons Valley Campaign

• Jacksons success in the Valley effected things
  on the Peninsula
• On May 18, McClellan had been told by Secretary
  of War Stanton that McDowells Corps would be
  marching from Fredericksburg where it had been
  held previously for fear of Washingtons safety
• Jacksons new threat caused Lincoln to change his
  mind and on May 24 he telegraphed McClellan, In
  consequence of Gen. Banks critical position I
  have been compelled to suspend Gen. McDowells
  movement to join you.
• McDowell complained, If the enemy can succeed so
  readily in disconcerting all our plans by
  alarming us first at one point then at another,
  he will paralyze a larger force with a very small
  one. (simultaneity and depth)

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Peninsula Campaign Seven Pines

• On May 28 Johnston received a report from Jeb
  Stuart that McDowell was not moving toward
  Richmond but was instead returning to
  Fredericksburg
• With McDowell held in place thanks to Jackson,
  the Confederates could act more aggressively
• Johnston learned from other reconnaissance that
  McClellans army was divided by the Chickahominy
  River

Jeb Stuarts cavalry gave the Confederacy an
incredible intelligence advantage over McClellan
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Peninsula Campaign Seven Pines

• Johnston tried to crush the isolated southern
  wing of the Federal army in the Battle of Seven
  Pines May 31
• Johnston mismanaged the battle, issued vague
  orders, and was wounded
• Robert E. Lee replaced him

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Robert E. Lee

• Johnston was well-liked by the soldiers and Lee
  was initially looked at with suspicion
• However, even Johnston admitted, The shot that
  struck me down is the very best that has been
  fired in the Confederate cause yet.

Lee Takes Command by Mort Kunstler
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Robert E. Lee

• Lee completely changes the situation
• Good relationship with Davis
• Offensive-minded and extremely audacious
• Makes excellent use of intelligence and cavalry
• Strong advocate of the turning movement

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Seven Days

• Jacksons success allowed Lee to concentrate his
  forces against McClellan
• Lee will defend Richmond with 20,000 and use
  60,000 to attack
• Plan depended on the timely arrival of Jackson
  who was to attack Porter from the flank and rear
• Jackson was inexplicably late
• Result was Mechanicsville (June 26) turned out to
  be an unsupported frontal attack rather than an
  envelopment

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Seven Days

• Gainess Mill (June 27)
• Another poor performance by Jackson limits
  Confederate victory, but Lee succeeded in causing
  McClellan to go on the defensive
• Savage Station (June 29)
• Fraysers Farm (June 30)
• Malvern Hill (July 1)
• Federal artillery defeated Confederate frontal
  assault
• McClellan withdrew to Harrison Landing under
  protection of Federal gunboats on the James River

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Seven Days
It would be 1864 before the Federal army again
got as close to Richmond as it did during the
Seven Days
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Critique of Jacksons Performance on the Peninsula

• Historians have closely scrutinized Jacksons
  poor performance on the Peninsula in contrast
  with his brilliant performance in the Valley
• Explanations include
• He did not receive orders to act more
  aggressively
• He was unfamiliar with the geography
• He could operate better independently than in
  close cooperation with others
• He felt other units to bear more of the fighting
  burden

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Critique of Jacksons Performance on the Peninsula

• The main reason was that by the time Jackson got
  to the Peninsula he was physically and mentally
  was exhausted
• Jackson usually required much sleep and he just
  did not get it during the rigors of the Valley
  Campaign and his subsequent march to the
  Peninsula
• His aide Sandie Pendleton wrote on June 7,
  Jackson is completely broken down.

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Principles of War and Elements of Operational
Design in the Peninsula Campaign

• Objective
• Offensive
• Mass
• Economy of force
• Maneuver
• Unity of command
• Security
• Surprise
• Simplicity

• Forces and functions
• Arranging operations
• Centers of gravity
• Direct versus indirect
• Decisive points
• Culmination
• Termination

• Synergy
• Simultaneity and depth
• Anticipation
• Balance
• Leverage
• Timing and tempo
• Operational reach and approach

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