An Overview of Princeton

1
An Overview of Princetons Program on Science and
Global Security Biodefense Activities

• Laura H. Kahn, MD, MPH, MPPResearch Staff
• Program on Science and Global Security, WWS,
  Princeton University
• 7th NJ Universities Homeland Security Research
  Consortium Symposium, New Brunswick, November,
  2006

2
Co-Principal Investigators

• Laura H. Kahn, MD, MPH, MPP Research Staff member
• Frank von Hippel, PhD, Professor of Public and
  International Affairs
• Christopher Chyba, PhD, Professor of
  Astrophysical Sciences and International Affairs.
  Professor Chyba recently served on the IOM/NRC
  panel on "Globalization, Biosecurity, and the
  Future of the Life Sciences."

3
Activities at Princeton University

• Biodefense Seminar Series supported by the
  Carnegie Corporation of New York
• Description of Series
• Papers from Series
• Four State Public Health Preparedness Study
  supported by the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation of
  New York
• Key Findings

4
Carnegie Biodefense Seminar Series

• Goals
• To engage leading university, biotech, and
  pharmaceutical industry scientists in discussions
  with security analysts of issues of biodefense,
  biothreats, biosecurity, biosafety, and
  bioethics.
• To help the life sciences community contribute to
  biodefense policy development.
• To develop collaborative relationships between
  policy and security experts and the bioscience
  community to deal with the dual-use dangers of
  modern biology.

5
2003-2004 Seminar Series

• Dr. David Franz, Vice President, Chemical and
  Biological Defense Division, Southern Research
  Institute, Biosafety Level 4 labs What
  research, how many and where?
• Dr. Mark Wheelis, Professor of Microbiology, UC
  Davis, The Role for International Transparency
  in Biodefense R D.
• Dr. Michael Moodie, President of the Chemical and
  Biological Arms Control Institute, Washington DC
  and Dr. Jonathan Tucker, Senior Researcher,
  Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
  Institute of International Studies,
  Strengthening the BWC Lessons Learned from the
  Failed Attempt to Agree on a Verification
  Protocol Where Next?
• Dr. Adel Mahmoud, President, Merck Vaccines,
  Merck and Co, Inc., Technical, Economic and
  Legal Obstacles to the Development of Vaccines
  and Other Therapeutics for Potential Bioterrorism
  Agents.

6
2006 Spring Seminar Series

• Dr. Richard Ebright, Rutgers University,
  'Biodefense Research NIH Role, NIH Management,
  Oversight of Safety, Oversight of Security, and
  Oversight of Dual-Use Implications.
• Dr. Nancy Connell, UMDNJ, 'Codes of Ethics and
  Whistleblowers in Biodefense Research.
• Dr. Alan Pearson, Center for Arms Control and
  Nonproliferation, 'Incapacitating Biochemical
  Weapons.
• Dr. Christopher Chyba, Princeton University,
  Proposed International Regimes for Regulating
  Biotechnology Research
• Dr. Scott Steele, FBI, Coordination on
  Bioterrorism Prevention, Preparedness, and
  Response Initiatives.
• Dr. Laura Donohue, Stanford University,
  Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free
  Expression.

7
Spring Seminar Series at University of Medicine
and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ) (Coordinated
by Dr. Nancy Connell)

• Dr. Malcolm Dando, University of Bradford, UK
  Dr. Brian Rappert, University of Exeter, UK, "The
  Life Sciences, Bio-security and Dual-Use
  Research."
• Dr. Michael Allswede, University of Pittsburgh
  Medical Center, "Forensic Epidemiology."
• Dr. Gigi Kwik-Gronvall, Center for Civilian
  Biodefense Studies, University of Pittsburgh,
  From Anthrax to Flu Preparing the Country for
  Biological Threats.
•  

8
Fall 2006 Seminar Series

• October 6 Dr. Stanley Lemon, Chair and Director
  of the Institute for Human Infections and
  Immunity, University of Texas Medical Branch.
  Biosecurity vs Bioinsecurity BSL4 Research in
  the 21st Century.
• October 13 Milton Leitenberg, Senior Research
  Scholar on Arms Control and Biological Weapons,
  School of Public Policy, University of Maryland.
  Assessing Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism
  Threat.
• October 20 Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Deputy
  Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export
  Controls, and Negotiations, U.S. Department of
  State. The Debate over the Role of the
  Biological Weapons Convention in Todays
  Bio-Defense Equation.

9
Fall 2006 Seminar Series (continued)

• October 27 Dr. Jens Kuhn, Research Scholar,
  Division of Tumor Virology, New England Primate
  Research Center, Harvard Medical School.
  Integration of Former Soviet Bioweapons
  Facilities into the International Research
  CommunitySuccess or Failure?
• December 1, 2006 Dr. Dennis Kasper, Director
  Channing Laboratory, William Ellery Channing
  Professor of Medicine, Professor of Microbiology
  and Molecular Genetics, Harvard Medical School.
  Chair of the National Science Advisory Board for
  Biosecurity. What is the NSABB all about?
• December 8, 2006 Dr. W. Ian Lipkin, Jerome L and
  Dawn Greene Professor of Epidemiology and
  Director of the Infectious Disease Laboratory
  Mailman School of Public Health Principal
  Investigator and Scientific Director, Northeast
  Biodefense Center, College of Physicians and
  Surgeons, Columbia University. Pathogen
  Surveillance and Discovery.

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Papers from Series

• LH Kahn, Biodefense Research Can Secrecy and
  Safety Co-Exist? Biosecurity and Bioterroism
  2004, Volume 2. http//www.scienceboard.net/commun
  ity/perspectives.110.html
• J Tucker, Biological Threat Assessment Is the
  Cure Worse than the Disease? Arms Control Today,
  October 2004. http//www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_
  10/Tucker.asp
• S Wright, Taking Biodefense Too Far, Bulletin
  of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2004.
  http//www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofnnd0
  4wright

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Biodefense Research Can Secrecy and Safety
Co-Exist?

• Paper examined the interface between secrecy and
  safety.
• Transparency of Select Agent Research to First
  Responders (physicians and public health
  professionals)
• A National Surveillance System of
  Laboratory-acquired infections
• Provide epidemiologic data on the incidence,
  severity, and community impact, if any, of these
  infections.

12
Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation Supported Four State
Public Health Preparedness Study

• Goals of study
• To assess how state and local health departments,
  and state agriculture departments, are responding
  to the threats of emerging infectious diseases
  and bioterrorism.
• To assess leadership, disease surveillance,
  clinical capabilities, laboratory capabilities,
  communications, funding, and attitudes.
• Four states were studied New Hampshire, New
  Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Surveyed all
  local health departments and over 4000 physicians
  and 4000 veterinarians.

13
Key Findings

• For human public health, there is confusion
  between political and professional leadership.
  Confusion did not exist for animal health.
• Minimal physician and veterinarian engagement
  with local public health organizations. Over a
  quarter of the respondents did not know if their
  community had a local public health agency or
  not.
• Physicians and veterinarians opinions of local
  public health agency capabilities during a crisis
  were uniformly low.

14
Key Findings

• There is minimal communication between physicians
  and veterinarians. In an era in which the vast
  majority of emerging infectious diseases are
  zoonotic, communication and collaboration between
  these professionals is critical.
• With the exception of New York State, few of the
  local public health agencies were able to provide
  incidence-rate data for many vaccine-preventable
  diseases in human populations.

15
Key Findings

• In a crisis situation, public health would be
  almost entirely dependent on volunteers, local
  clinics, physicians offices, and the National
  Guard for out-of-hospital clinical and preventive
  services.
• Vaccination and disease statistics for all
  species of animals were not available in all four
  states.

16
Key Findings

• Local public health agencies that depended upon
  local sources for primary funding were 11 times
  less likely to have received federal biodefense
  funds than agencies that received most of their
  funding from the state.
• Local public health agencies that had received
  federal biodefense funding were more likely to
  have hired new surveillance staff and new
  equipment than those that did not receive these
  funds.

17
Thank you!

• Carnegie Biodefense Seminar Series
  http//www.princeton.edu/globsec/BW_series/index.
  html
• Four State Public Health Preparedness Report
  http//www.princeton.edu/globsec/Macy/index.html