Admin Notes, Reminders, Etc'

1
Admin Notes, Reminders, Etc.

• 1. Reading for Thursday
• E "Natural Law", 161-166
• CR Aristotle, Book I, Nicomachean Ethics, 25-37
• 2. Course syllabus available at
  http//webpages.csus.edu/freelove
• Then click "Philosophy 100"
• 3. Writing is an action. Words, sentences, and
  paragraphs are the means or instruments toward
  accomplishing certain ends or aims. Critical
  reading is judging what ends or aims a writer has
  in writing the sentences and paragraphs that she
  does, and judging whether the writer has achieved
  those ends or aims employing the sentences and
  paragraphs she did.
• 4. This is discussed a bit more fully in the
  document, "Reading", available on my website.

2
Is Virtue Teachable?

• virtue tr--gt ????? (arete) goodness or
  excellence
• virtue/vice
• virtuous/vicious

3
Is Virtue Teachable?

• virtue tr--gt ????? (arete) goodness or
  excellence
• virtue/vice
• virtuous/vicious
• Word applied to human beings, animals, and
  objects by the Greeks.
• I.e., a knife can be virtuous.

4
Is Virtue Teachable?

• virtue tr--gt ????? (arete) goodness or
  excellence
• virtue/vice
• virtuous/vicious
• Word applied to human beings, animals, and
  objects by the Greeks.
• I.e., a knife can be virtuous.
• virtue vs. virtues
• Standard Greek virtues wisdom/knowledge,
  courage, temperance, justice, and piety

5
Is Virtue Teachable?

• virtue tr--gt ????? (arete) goodness or
  excellence
• virtue/vice
• virtuous/vicious
• Word applied to human beings, animals, and
  objects by the Greeks.
• I.e., a knife can be virtuous.
• virtue vs. virtues
• Standard Greek virtues wisdom/knowledge,
  courage, temperance, justice, and piety
• Socrates No, it doesn't seem so.
• Protagoras Yes, and people pay me to do it.

6
Is Virtue Teachable?

• virtue tr--gt ????? (arete) goodness or
  excellence
• virtue/vice
• virtuous/vicious
• Word applied to human beings, animals, and
  objects by the Greeks.
• I.e., a knife can be virtuous.
• virtue vs. virtues
• Standard Greek virtues wisdom/knowledge,
  courage, temperance, justice, and piety
• Socrates No, it doesn't seem so.
• Protagoras Yes, and people pay me to do it.

7
Is Virtue Teachable?

• virtue tr--gt ????? (arete) goodness or
  excellence
• virtue/vice
• virtuous/vicious
• Word applied to human beings, animals, and
  objects by the Greeks.
• I.e., a knife can be virtuous.
• virtue vs. virtues
• Standard Greek virtues wisdom/knowledge,
  courage, temperance, justice, and piety
• Socrates No, it doesn't seem so.
• Protagoras Yes, and people pay me to do it.

8
No one does wrong or bad willingly

• p. 16, 345e, p. 21, 358d
• No one does wrong or bad willingly
• Whatever one does willingly, one believes is
  good.

9
No one does wrong or bad willingly

• p. 16, 345e
• No one does wrong or bad willingly
• Whatever one does willingly, one believes is
  good.
• "All action is for the apparent good."
• "All action is for the imagined good."

10
No one does wrong or bad willingly

• p. 16, 345e
• No one does wrong or bad willingly
• Whatever one does willingly, one believes is
  good.
• "All action is for the apparent good."
• "All action is for the imagined good."

11
Action

• action causing a change in your body or mind
  for purpose of, or with the intention of,
  bringing about a certain state of affairs.
• agent means/instrument end/goal/aim
  
• ?--------------------gt X ---------------------gt
  Y
• Sam looks at her watch knowledge of the time

12
Action

• action causing a change in your body or mind
  for purpose of, or with the intention of,
  bringing about a certain state of affairs.
• agent means/instrument end/goal/aim
  
• ?--------------------gt X ---------------------gt
  Y
• student takes Ph. 100 G.E. credit

13
Action

• action causing a change in your body or mind
  for purpose of, or with the intention of,
  bringing about a certain state of affairs.
• agent means/instrument end/goal/aim
  
• ?--------------------gt X ---------------------gt
  Y
• student takes Ph. 100 G.E. credit
• All action is for the apparent good any ends or
  goals someone tries to achieve must be regarded
  as good by the agent.
• All action is for the good any end that someone
  acts for must be regarded as good.

14
Intuitive Support

• Friend I'm enrolled at CSUS to get my accounting
  degree. But, there's nothing good about an
  accounting degree.

15
Intuitive Support

• Friend I'm enrolled at CSUS to get my accounting
  degree. But, there's nothing good about an
  accounting degree.
• You Huh?

16
Intuitive Support

• Friend I'm enrolled at CSUS to get my accounting
  degree. But, there's nothing good about an
  accounting degree.
• You Huh? (It doesn't make sense to act for an
  end, an accounting degree, but not to value it.
  Why? Is not the assumption made that all action
  aims at the apparent good?)

17
Intuitive Support

• Friend I'm enrolled at CSUS to get my accounting
  degree. But, there's nothing good about an
  accounting degree.
• You Why are doing it?

18
Intuitive Support

• Friend I'm enrolled at CSUS to get my accounting
  degree. But, there's nothing good about an
  accounting degree.
• You Why are doing it? (There must be some reason
  why you are doing it, if you don't value an
  accounting degree. I.e., there must be something
  you believe is good that will result from it.
  Does not this assume that all action aims at the
  apparent good?)

19
Intuitive Support

• Friend I'm enrolled at CSUS to get my accounting
  degree. But, there's nothing good about an
  accounting degree.
• You Why are you doing it?
• Friend I wanted to join the Peace Corps. That
  would have been best.

20
Intuitive Support

• Friend I'm enrolled at CSUS to get my accounting
  degree. But, there's nothing good about an
  accounting degree.
• You Why are you doing it?
• Friend I wanted to join the Peace Corps. That
  would have been best.
• You Why didn't you?!

21
Intuitive Support

• Friend I'm enrolled at CSUS to get my accounting
  degree. But, there's nothing good about an
  accounting degree.
• You Why are you doing it?
• Friend I wanted to join the Peace Corps. That
  would have been best.
• You Why didn't you?!
• Friend I don't want to upset my parents. They'd
  have disowned me.
• You Ahh. I see now. You think that your
  inheritance is more valuable than service in the
  Peace Corps.

22
Ends and the Good

• Why such emphasis on this point?
• agent means/instrument end/goal/aim
  
• ?--------------------gt X ---------------------gt
  Y
• student takes Ph. 100 G.E. credit
• All action aims at the apparent good any
  end/goal/aim of an action
• must be regarded by the agent as good.
• Gives us a grip on the nature of the good.

23
The Unity of the Virtues

• No one does wrong willingly.
• Hedonism the good is pleasure what is bad is
  pain.
• All virtues are one.
• (virtue is knowledge)
• 351B

24

• "good painful things" "bad pleasant
  things"
• -studying -smoking
• -reading Kant -deep-fried foods
• -exercise/athletic training dripping in
  transfat
• -schadenfreude
• hedonism lt-- ????? (hedone)
• What is good is pleasure.
• What is bad is pain.
• Studying is painful --gt studying is bad.
• deep-friend foods are a pleasure to eat --gt
  eating deep-friend foods is good.

25

• agent means/instrument end/goal/aim
  
• ?--------------------gt X ---------------------gt
  Y
• student takes Ph. 100 G.E. credit
• All action aims at the apparent good any
  end/goal/aim of an action
• must be regarded by the agent as good.
• If you know that G.E. credit is the good, then
  you regard it as the good.
• If you regard it as the good, then that's what
  you'll act for.

26
"akrasia"

• aka "weakness of will", "incontinence"
• Someone acts incontinently doing X, provided
  that,
• a. He intentionally does X
• b. He believes that another option, Y is
  available.
• c. He believes that it would be better to do Y
  than X.

27
"akrasia"

• aka "weakness of will", "incontinence"
• Someone acts incontinently doing X, provided
  that,
• a. He intentionally does X
• b. He believes that another option, Y is
  available.
• c. He believes that it would be better to do Y
  than X.
• A student acts incontinently in going to a club
  on Monday night, provided that,
• a. He intentionally goes to the club.
• b. Believes he could spend the night studying.
• c. Believes studying would be better than
  drinking at the club

28
"akrasia"

• aka "weakness of will", "incontinence"
• Someone acts incontinently doing X, provided
  that,
• a. He intentionally does X
• b. He believes that another option, Y is
  available.
• c. He believes that it would be better to do Y
  than X.
• A student acts incontinently in going to a club
  on Monday night, provided that,
• "All action aims at the good"
• a. He intentionally goes to the club. Going
  to the club is the good
• b. Believes he could spend the night studying.
• c. Believes studying would be better than
  drinking at the club

29
"akrasia"

• aka "weakness of will", "incontinence"
  Donald Davidson,
• "Is Weakness of Will
• Someone acts incontinently doing X, provided
  that, Possible?" 1970
• a. He intentionally does X
• b. He believes that another option, Y is
  available.
• c. He believes that it would be better to do Y
  than X.
• A student acts incontinently in going to a club
  on Monday night, provided that,
• "All action aims at the good"
• a. He intentionally goes to the club. Going
  to the club is the good
• b. Believes he could spend the night studying.
• c. Believes studying would be better than
  drinking at the club

30
For Hedonism

• Logical conflict
• The many food, drink, and sex are ruinous, i.e.
  bad, but also pleasurable.
• Hedonism what is bad is pain.
• ----------
• Food, drink, and sex are painful but
  pleasurable.

31
For Hedonism

• Logical conflict
• The many food, drink, and sex are ruinous, i.e.
  bad, but also pleasurable.
• Hedonism what is bad is pain.
• ----------
• Food, drink, and sex are painful but
  pleasurable.
• Two options
• A. Food, drink, and sex are bad because of
  themselves.
• B. Bad because of latter effects, diseases,
  poverty, i.e., pain.

32
For Hedonism

• Logical conflict
• The many food, drink, and sex are ruinous, i.e.
  bad, but also pleasurable.
• Hedonism what is bad is pain.
• ----------
• Food, drink, and sex are painful but
  pleasurable.
• Two options
• A. Food, drink, and sex are bad because of
  themselves.
• B. Bad because of latter effects, diseases,
  poverty, i.e., pain.
• I.e., on the whole, the "bad pleasurable things"
  are in fact painful, and the fact that they are
  on the whole painful is the only reason we judge
  they are bad.

33
For Hedonism

• Logical conflict
• The many athletic training is painful but good.
  
• Hedonism what is good is pleasurable.
• ------------
• Athletic training is painful and pleasurable.
• Options
• A. Athletic training is good because it brings
  about pain and suffering.
• B. It is good because it brings about health,
  power, wealth, i.e., pleasure.
• I.e., the "good painful things" are on the whole
  pleasant, and it is for this reason that we judge
  they are good.

34
Argument?

• Does Socrates offer anything that would establish
  that the good is
• pleasure and bad is pain?

35

• 1. The many sometimes people act incontinently,
  "overcome by pleasure"
• 2. The many the good is pleasure and the bad is
  pain.

36

• 1. The many sometimes people act incontinently,
  "overcome by pleasure"
• 2. The many the good is pleasure and the bad is
  pain.
• 3. Suppose that someone, John, willingly does
  what he regards as bad, say, going to a club,
  because he was overcome by pleasure, i.e., he
  anticipated that by going to the club, he'll
  experience pleasure, and it is this, that is the
  cause of him going to the club.

37

• 1. The many sometimes people act incontinently,
  "overcome by pleasure"
• 2. The many the good is pleasure and the bad is
  pain.
• 3. Suppose that someone, John, willingly does
  what he regards as bad, say, going to a club,
  because he was overcome by pleasure, i.e., he
  anticipated that by going to the club, he'll
  experience pleasure, and it is this, that is the
  cause of him going to the club.
• 4. John willingly does what he regards as bad,
  because he was overcome by the good, i.e., he
  goes to the club because doing so is good.

38

• Suppose John acts incontinently, overcome by
  pleasure. Then, (i) he willingly does an action,
  say,going to the club, (ii) he believes he has
  another alternative, and (iii) the alternative he
  believes is better, and (iv) he goes to the club
  because he is "overcome by pleasure". To say he
  believes it is bad is to say that on balance, it
  results in greater pain than pleasure.
  Nevertheless, he does it anyway, and the
  explanation for his doing it, despite the fact
  that he believes on balance it leads to more pain
  than pleasure, is that he is overcome by
  pleasure. Since pleasure just is the good, that's
  to say that he is overcome by the good. What is
  this, "overcome by the good," supposed to amount
  to? Answer it amounts to the good having a
  greater weight than the bad, in John's mind, and
  hence forcing John by its weight. But, if so,
  John actually does what he believes better. So,
  it is false after all that he does what he
  regards as bad. If so, cases reported to be
  cases of incontinence, in virtue of being
  overcome by pleasure, are not actually cases of
  incontinence.
• We all regard the "pleasant bad things" as on
  balance promoting more pain than pleasure. Hence,
  I say that John simply made a mistake. He's
  miscalculated what pleasure and pain result from
  going to the club.

39

• By adopting hedonism, this allows Socrates to say
  that it is the good that has greater weight in
  John's mind, rather than simply pleasure. Given
  it's the good that has greater weight in John's
  mind, than pleasure, Socrates can say that John
  does what he does because he regards it as good.
  If so, then he can deny that John regards going
  to the club as bad, and hence deny the
  incontinence.
• Without hedonism, Socrates would have to say, he
  goes to the club, judging it to be bad, overcome
  by pleasure. But, it's possible the action
  results in huge amounts of pleasure, this is the
  cause of John's doing it, but that also John
  regards it as bad.

40

• Suppose John acts incontinently, overcome by
  pleasure. Then, (i) he willingly does an action,
  say,going to the club, (ii) he believes he has
  another alternative, and (iii) the alternative he
  believes is better, and (iv) he goes to the club
  because he is "overcome by pleasure". To say he
  believes it is bad is to say that on balance, it
  results in greater pain than pleasure.
  Nevertheless, he does it anyway, and the
  explanation for his doing it, despite the fact
  that he believes on balance it leads to more pain
  than pleasure, is that he is overcome by
  pleasure. Since pleasure just is the good, that's
  to say that he is overcome by the good. What is
  this, "overcome by the good," supposed to amount
  to? Answer it amounts to the good having a
  greater weight than the bad, in John's mind, and
  hence forcing John by its weight. But, if so,
  John actually does what he believes better. So,
  it is false after all that he does what he
  regards as bad. If so, cases reported to be
  cases of incontinence, in virtue of being
  overcome by pleasure, are not actually cases of
  incontinence.
• We all regard the "pleasant bad things" as on
  balance promoting more pain than pleasure. Hence,
  I say that John simply made a mistake. He's
  miscalculated what pleasure and pain result from
  going to the club.

41
Objection

• "But Socrates, the immediate pleasure is very
  much different than the pleasant and the painful
  at a later time."

42
Objection

• "But Socrates, the immediate pleasure is very
  much different than the pleasant and the painful
  at a later time."
• I.e., he judges that on balance going to the club
  results in greater pain, but the pleasure to be
  gotten from going to the club has an immediate
  lure, or power, that leads him despite his
  judgment that it will result in greater pain, to
  go to the club.
• Socrates it's precisely then that John regards
  going to the club as being on balance more
  pleasurable. That immediate lure makes him
  believe that more pleasure than is actually
  provided on balance will result than in fact
  will.
• There are no other differences between pleasures
  than their quantities.

43
Making Mistakes about the Good

• 357d We make mistakes about what things maximize
  pleasure or minimize pain.
• But, if pleasure good and pain bad, then we
  make mistakes about what is good and bad.
• If mistakes are possible, then this contemporary
  idea appears to be very wrong
• If someone believes/thinks/judges that X is
  good, then X is in fact good (or is in fact good
  for that person).

44
Making Mistakes about the Good

• 357d We make mistakes about what things maximize
  pleasure or minimize pain.
• But, if pleasure good and pain bad, then we
  make mistakes about what is good and bad.
• If mistakes are possible, then this contemporary
  idea appears to be very wrong
• If someone believes/thinks/judges that X is
  good, then X is in fact good (or is in fact good
  for that person).

45

• Some lessons and ideas

46
Lesson 1

• The thesis that all actions aim at the good gives
  us a grip on the nature
• of the good.
• If in any case of action, the end of the action
  must be regarded as good
• by the agent, then we've located a place where
  the good emerges with
• some degree of clarity.

47
Lesson 2

• It appears there's an important distinction
  between
• A. What is regarded as good.
• B. What really is good.
• I.e., we believe we can make mistakes about the
  good.
• If so, then there's some objective element to
  goodness or value.
• I.e, these two theses seem to be incompatible
• i. If someone regards X as good, then X is in
  fact good (or good for him/her).
• ii. It is possible to make mistakes about what is
  good.

48
Lesson 3

• If hedonism is true, then living the good life
  for a human being pretty
• much amounts to
• i. judging correctly, i.e., knowledge of, what
  actions will maximize pleasure and minimize pain
• ii. having the power to do them
• iii. making the choice to exercise that power.

49
Lesson 3

• If hedonism is true, then living the good life
  for a human being pretty
• much amounts to
• i. judging correctly, i.e., knowledge of, what
  actions will maximize pleasure and minimize pain
• ii. having the power to do them
• iii. making the choice to exercise that power.
• But, people have resisted this for millennia.
• What about the virtues?
• What about doing your duty?
• What about moral or ethical obligations?

50
Lesson 4

• Good as a means/instrument vs. good in itself
• agent means/instrument end/goal/aim
  
• ?--------------------gt X ---------------------gt
  Y
• taking Ph 100 G.E. credit
• All action aims at the apparent good all action
  aims at what is good as a means or good in
  itself.

51
Lesson 4

• Good as a means/instrument vs. good in itself
• agent means/instrument end/goal/aim
  
• ?-----gt X --------------gt Y ------------gt Z
• taking Ph 100 G.E. credit accounting degree
• All action aims at the apparent good all action
  aims at what is good as a means or good in
  itself.