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The European Union

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Title: The European Union


1
The European Union
  • Osvaldo Croci

2
What Exactly Is the EU?
  • ECSC, EEC or Common Market , EC, EU.
  • Neither an international organization nor a
    federation.
  • A different beast depending on who is looking, at
    what one looks, and from where one is looking.
  • A single market, a common currency, a kind of
    common passport, but some peculiar political
    institutions, and a very peculiar budget
  • Why should one be interested in studying it?

3
How to study it?
  • Economic and Political integration
  • Why do states come together and cooperate?
  • Comparative politics
  • How does it function (as opposed to why it is
    formed, its relation to the nation state and
    where it is going)?
  • Example of regional governance
  • Robert Cooper The EU as a post-modern region
  • Europeanization

4
How the course is organized
  • Theories of economic and political integration
  • History (from before Paris to after Lisbon)
  • Institutions
  • Policy-making and policies
  • Where is it going and what does it all mean?

5
Degrees of Economic Integration
  • Autarchy
  • Free trade area
  • Customs Union
  • Common market
  • Economic Union

6
Economic Integration (1)
  • Theory of absolute (Adam Smith) and relative
    (David Ricardo) advantages
  • Integration as a movement towards free trade? Why
    not global free trade?
  • Customs Union Theory (Jacob Viner)
  • Trade creation vs. trade diversion

7
Economic Integration (2)
  • 1960s Economists such as Johnson, Cooper and
    Massell turned the prevailing wisdom about why
    countries form customs union around.
  • Integration as protectionism at a higher,
    regional level?
  • If the objective of a customs union is to gain
    from increased trade why not pursue it at the
    global level (i.e. not to discriminate against
    any foreign supplier) and hence benefit from
    trade creation and not suffer the shortcomings of
    trade diversion?
  • Since this does not happen and customs union are
    formed at a regional level, it follows that the
    preoccupation of those who form customs union
    might not be trade liberalization but
    protectionism.
  • Customs union, in other words, could be seen as a
    special mechanism of protection. To understand
    this one needs to compare customs union to
    alternative instruments of protection as opposed
    to seeing it as an intermediate step towards
    global free trade.

8
Economic Integration (3)
  • Customs union are a form of government
    intervention to achieve politically preferred
    objectives, which the market alone cannot
    achieve.
  • Take the case for instance of a country that
    wants to develop a certain type of industry which
    the market has failed to give life to. It could
    introduce a huge tariff on competing imports and
    production subsidies.
  • The local market, however, could be too small to
    sustain that particular industry. The goal could
    be achieved but might be expensive.
  • A Customs Union is a way of enlarging the market
    so that the promotion of the local industry does
    not become too expensive.

9
Degrees of Political Integration
  • Isolated nation states
  • International organization
  • Confederation
  • Federation
  • Unitary state

10
Political Integration (1)
  • Federalism (Spinelli) - normative
  • Functionalism (Mitrany) hollowing out the state
    - normative -
  • Neo-functionalism (Haas, Lindberg, Schmitter)
  • Role of economic and political elites, and then
    of centrally established institutions
    (Commission, ECJ
  • Concept of spill-over

11
Political Integration (2)
  • Intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann Moravcsik
    Milwards rescue of the nation state), Putnams
    two level game
  • Governments are the key actors
  • Other actors have some influence, especially in
    low-politics sectors
  • Action reflects preferences of national
    governments which in turn reflect the balance of
    domestic economic interests
  • Outcome of negotiations reflect relative
    bargaining power of states
  • Decision-making delegation to supranational
    institutions reflect need to insure commitments
    of all parties and not federalism

12
Political integration (4)
  • Robert Cooper
  • Modern, pre-modern (failed or collapsed),
    post-modern states
  • The EU as a post-modern area of regional
    governance

13
History General Points
  • Why integration? (deep historical roots, but
    concrete results only after 1945)
  • Systemic level WWII and Cold War
  • State level Democracies
  • Individual level Schumann, Adenauer, De Gasperi
  • No linear, teleological, unfolding
  • Continuous process but with phases of stagnation
    and acceleration

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14
History 1.
  • Ideological-Political
  • Resistance movement.
  • Spinelli (Manifesto di Ventotene - Draft
    Declaration of the European Resistance in 1944
    calling for a federal Union among European
    people)
  • 1946 Churchills speech in Zurich calls for a
    federation of European states sponsored by US and
    USSR and UK
  • 1946 European Union of Federalists (Henry
    Brugmans) rebuild Europe as a federation
  • May 1948 the Hague conference
  • It creates the Council of Europe - 47 members
    today (adopted European Convention of Human
    Rights in 1950, maintains Commission and Court of
    Human Rights)

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History 2.
  • Economic
  • 1944-48 Benelux (Customs Union then Economic
    Union) and possible extension to I F
  • 1947 Marshall Plan (ERP)
  • 1947 Committee for European Economic Cooperation
    (CEEC) then OEEC then OECD in 1960
  • 1950 EPU
  • 1951 ECSC

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ECSC
  • Schuman Plan (9 May 1950) (1951, 1952)
  • Role of Jean Monnet
  • Dirigisme, Functionalist idea, organize
    Franco-German relations in light of the rebirth
    of the German state, assure French access to coal
    - From IAR to ECSC
  • Role of Adenauer (solidify link to the West,
    international recognition)
  • Role of De Gasperi (international recognition)
  • Role of the US
  • Position of Britain (island mentality
    supra-nationalism, self-image, nationalism,
    economic interests, coal had just been
    nationalized)

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ECSC
  • Institutions as conceived by Monnet and as they
    developed
  • High authority
  • Council of ministers (Dutch, Germans)
  • Common assembly
  • Court of justice
  • Negotiations subsidies for Belgium, maintenance
    of tariffs for Italy, break up of German cartels

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EDC
  • Treaty of Dunkirk (F and UK 1947)
  • Treaty of Brussels (BFBNLLUX) (1948)
  • NATO (1949- US, Cnd, UK, F, B, NL, Lux, ISL, I,
    N, P)
  • Problem of German rearmament US pressures
  • Pleven Plan launched in 1950, signed in May 1952,
    killed by the French National Assembly in August
    1954)
  • EDC and need for EPC (against the precepts of
    neo-functionalism)
  • Failure of EDC and lesson
  • 1955 WEU (admission of Italy and Germany, links
    to NATO and restrictions imposed on German army)

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Euratom and EEC
  • Euratoms idea advanced by Monnets Action
    Committee for the United States of Europe and
    supported by the French who do not like the idea
    of a common market
  • Benelux and D advance idea of a common market
    (Beyen Plan- Dutch FM)
  • UK prefers FTA
  • Messina Conference (April 1955) - Spaak report
  • Negotiations the French agree to the common
    market but concession on agriculture, access by
    goods from external colonies, Italians ask for
    regional policy
  • Treaty of Rome

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Evolution of the EEC
  • DeGaulle
  • 1961 Fouchet plan (how to avoid something by
    appearing to be in favor of it)
  • 1963 opposition to UK entry and first veto
  • 1965 crisis (empty chair) funding of CAP and
    responsibility for approval of the budget to be
    given to EP no majority vote in the Council of
    Ministers
  • 1965 merger treaty (coming into effect 1967)
  • 1967 Second veto of the UK application

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Eurosclerosis
  • Limits to economic cooperation 1971 collapse of
    IMS, 1973 Oil Crisis, Stagflation
  • 1969 Hague Summit
  • Resignation of De Gaulle (April 1969)
  • Completion own resources for the budget
  • Widening Let the UK in (1973)
  • Re-negotiations after Labor (Wilson) replaced the
    Conservatives (Heath) and referendum in 1975)
  • Ireland and Denmark and Norway (referendum says
    no)
  • Deepening economic and monetary union (Werner
    Report) and closer intergovernmental cooperation
    on foreign policy along the lines of the Fouchet
    plan (Davignon Report)
  • Major success CSCE in Helsinki
  • 1974 European Council (3 meetings a year by
    Heads of states (F) and governments)
  • 1979 Direct election to the EP

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Eurosclerosis
  • 1978 Creation of the EMS and the ecu
  • 1979 Greece accedes
  • 1985 Spain and Portugal accede
  • 1979-1985 British renegotiation of the budget
  • 1980s- Moves behind the curtains to begin
    removing non-tariff barriers (European Round
    Table of Industrialists)

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1987-1992 Single European Act
  • Role of Jacques Delors
  • 1985 Commissions White Paper (Cockfield Report)
  • Remove NT barriers, open up procurement, free
    capital movement by 1992
  • Institutional Reforms tied to such a project
  • QMV within the Council of Ministers for single
    market measures
  • Increase legislative powers of the EP
  • What made the SEA possible?
  • Governments? Pressure groups (European Round
    Table of Industrialist) afraid of Europes losing
    international competitiveness to the US and
    Japan?

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1991 Maastricht Treaty
  • Delors continue on the path of the SEA
  • 1988 Delors committee report on strengthening
    monetary cooperation
  • Acceleration of history events in Eastern
    Europe, prospect of German reunification
  • The three pillars structure, EMU (three stages)
    and deepening of social policy
  • Kohl Reunification in exchange for EMU
  • Subsidiarity
  • Europe a la carte or flexible integration (UK
    opting out of EMU and social policy)
  • Citizens involvement
  • 1995 accession of A, SU, S,
  • Preparation for further enlargement different
    attitudes UK and Mediterranean countries

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The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997-99
  • Trying to prepare for enlargement institutional
    and policy reforms
  • Pillar 1
  • Tinkering with decision-making (limited extension
    of qmv and EP powers), emphasis on openness and
    transparency of EC procedures.
  • Pillar 2
  • Joint actions and common positions to be taken by
    qmv except when a state is strongly opposed.
  • So-called constructive abstention (EU committed
    but not the member states).
  • CFSP financing charged to the EC budget.
  • Pillar 3
  • A number of items related to visas, asylum,
    immigration, free movement, were transferred from
    pillar 3 to pillar 1 (opts out for IRL, UK and
    DK).
  • Justice and Home Affairs now renamed Police
    and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters

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Between Amsterdam and Nice
  • January 1999 EMU (euro) 11 (Greece in Jan.
    2001)
  • 1999 Problems with the Commission fraud on
    humanitarian funds resignation in March by
    Santer and entire Commission
  • Kosovo and St. Malo meeting (December 1998) (ESDP
    and rapid reaction force).

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The Treaty of Nice
  • Treaty of Nice 2002 (February 2003)
  • Reallocation of seats in EP and members capped at
    732 (from 700).
  • Redistribution of votes in the Council
  • Extension of qmv but with many exceptions and
    definition of qmv (62 of population plus a
    majority of states).
  • Composition of Commission (no more than one per
    state and later some without since no more than
    26).
  • Ireland rejects it in a referendum in June 2001
    (54 to 46 but only 33 turnout). Second positive
    vote in October 2001

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Enlargement and other issues
  • Copenhagen criteria
  • 2001 10 states accepted for membership in 2004
    25 states, 450 million people)
  • Bulgaria, Romania (2007)
  • Croatia and Turkey (begin negotiations 2005)
  • Macedonia (application accepted)
  • Divisions on CFSP over Iraq
  • Problems with stability and growth pact (budget
    deficits below 3 of GDP) Ireland and Portugal
    and then France and Germany

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The Constitutional Treaty
  • Representatives of national governments and
    Parliaments including accession states, and EU
    representatives, chaired by Giscard DEstaing
  • Supposed to replace existing treaties and
    systematize some lingering issues
  • Fails because of non ratification in France and
    the Netherlands
  • Replaced by the Reform Treaty (2007)

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Institutional Architecture
  • The treaties in lieu of a formal Constitution
    (symbolism?)
  • EUs three pillars EC, CFSP,JHA
  • EC Pillar
  • The Commission
  • Council of Ministers (Council of European Union)
  • European Parliament
  • European Court of Justice
  • Others

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The Commission (1)
  • A bureaucratic monster or a small organization?
    College of Commissioners (27) and staff of 25 000
    of which about 10 000 are interpreters and
    translators
  • 24 Directorate Generals (DGs) special and
    internal services
  • Commissioners cabinets from national enclaves
    to multinational and increasing internal
    recruitment
  • Commissioners
  • Nominated by National Governments
  • Appointed by the Council of Ministers and subject
    to approval by Parliament
  • renewable 5 year term in line with EP
  • President chosen first (by Council)
  • Sworn to abandon all national allegiance

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The Commission (2)
  • Functions
  • Policy initiations (a Treaty-based justification
    of the initiative is always provided)
  • Legislative proposals can be amended by the CoM
    acting unanimously
  • Does the Commission determine the direction in
    which the EU moves?
  • Autonomous or servant of national governments?
  • More than an international secretariat but not
    quite a government
  • Opposed to give EP legislative initiative (policy
    coherence). Maastricht treaty allows the EP to
    request (majority vote), legislative initiative
    from Commission

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The Commission (3)
  • Acts as guardian of the treaties
  • Monitors policy implementation (as opposed to
    direct implementation as in competition policy,
    fisheries, humanitarian and transition aid)
  • Prepares budget
  • Mediator (role in European Council and IGC)
  • External role (Negotiator in commercial and
    cooperation agreements) - Delegations

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The European Council
  • European Council (intergovernmental at the top of
    the EU) since 1974 officially
  • summitry
  • Provides strategic guidance to the EU
  • Also institutional reform, CFSP, enlargement
  • Breaking deadlocks
  • June and December meetings plus occasional more
    focused meetings
  • Communiqués or Presidency conclusions

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Council of the EU (1)
  • Council of the European Union (formerly Council
    of Ministers) core of legislative process
  • Takes decisions (Committees of member states
    government officials and CoRePer)
  • Unanimity and QMV depending on issue
  • Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom 29
  • Spain, Poland 27
  • Romania 14
  • Netherlands 13
  • Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary,
    Portugal 12
  • Austria, Bulgaria, Sweden 10
  • Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Finland 7
  • Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovenia 4
  • Malta 3
  • TOTAL 345

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Council of the EU (2)
  • Different embodiments (General Affairs Council,
    Ecofin, and sectoral councils e.g. agriculture,
    fisheries, culture, health etc.)
  • CoRePer
  • Supranational element of the Council (?)
  • Bonding, iterated game, diffuse reciprocity,
    thick trust, mutual responsiveness,
    consensus-reflex
  • About 85 of all decisions
  • Working groups (over 250, some permanent, some
    ad-hoc)
  • Council General Secretariat (memory of the
    Council, broker, creative legal solutions)

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Council of the EU (3)
  • Rotating presidency (six months)
  • Troika system
  • organizing meetings, setting agenda)
  • visibility, leaving imprint
  • Output
  • Regulation, directives, decisions and
    recommendations in pillar 1
  • Joint actions and common positions in Pillars 2
    and 3
  • Unanimity and QMV (formal voting rare)

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Institutional Architecture Parliament
  • The European Parliament
  • Low public profile
  • From Common Assembly (78 members, supervisory and
    advisory role, part-time) to European Parliament
    (785 to be reduced to 750) members directly
    elected, with more power on budget and
    legislative process
  • Directly elected since 1979 (5-year term)
  • Supervisory function (Commission and a little
    over the Council)
  • From consultative role to co-decision

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Institutional Architecture Parliament
  • Plenary sessions (once a month except August in
    Strasbourg)
  • President (2.5-year term)
  • Party groups (8) CD and Socialists the largest
  • Committees (meet in Brussels)
  • Elections
  • Low turnout (to less than 50)
  • Perceived as second order national elections

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Institutional Architecture
  • CoRePer (already mentioned)
  • The Economic and Social Committee
  • Employers workers and various interests appointed
    by national governments but sitting in a personal
    capacity consulted on legislative proposals
  • Committee of Regions and Local Authorities
  • Created by TEU and consulted on issues that
    affect regional and local interests (Chosen by
    member states and appointed by CoM)
  • Upper House in the making?

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The Court
  • European Court of Justice and Court of First
    Instance (1988)
  • 27 judges and 8 advocates general (six year term
    in two sections))
  • Preliminary rulings (only the ECJ) vs. direct
    actions (failure to take action, infringements
    and annulments)
  • Court of First Instance (1989)
  • Principle of Direct Effect (1963)
  • Principle of Supremacy of EC law over national
    law (1964)

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Weiler (1)
  • Weilers central argument is that the legal
    changes that have occurred in the Community can
    only be properly understood if seen against the
    evolution of the political process. There is no
    doubt that the Communitys operating system is
    no longer governed by general principles of
    public international law, but by a specified
    interstate government structure defined by a
    constitutional charter and constitutional
    principles (p. 12). Yet, this process of
    constitutionalization, which makes the Community
    very like to a federal state, occurred at the
    same time as the Communitys political and
    decision-making process adopted an increasingly
    confederal procedure controlled by member States
    acting jointly and severally (p. 36).

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Weiler (2)
  • According to Weiler, the two processes were
    linked. On the one side, a judicially driven
    process led Community norms and policy to
    penetrate national polities and make the exit
    option increasingly costly and unlikely for
    member states. On the other, member governments
    reacted to this process by reaffirming their
    voice that is by taking more control of the
    Communitys decision-making process the outcomes
    of which they had to abide by. This explanation
    resolves the apparent paradox that integration
    has not threatened, and perhaps even
    strengthened, member states. It also throws
    light on the alleged democratic deficit of the
    Community Europeans have become empowered as
    legal consumers at the price of remaining largely
    disempowered as political citizens.

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Institutional Architecture
  • Intergovernmental pillars
  • Legislative initiative shared by Commission with
    member states and EP has only a right to be
    consulted.
  • Outside ECJ

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Decision-Making
  • Legislative Procedure Increasing role of EP
  • Consultation
  • From Commission to Council which simply consults
    EP and can reject its advice Amendments can be
    made only by unanimity in CoM (Agriculture,
    issues transferred from JHA)
  • Co-Operation
  • EP has a second chance in areas of QMV. If EP
    rejected the common position of the CoM the
    latter could only proceed unanimously. If EP
    proposed amendments, Commission had to decide
    whether to accept them and if not CoM would
    decide but unanimously
  • Co-Decision (same as above plus Conciliation
    Committee EPCoM 6 weeks). If CC fails,
    measures falls
  • Assent EP assent needed (originally only for
    agreements with non-member states but extended in
    the TEU)

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Implementation
  • Responsibility of the Commission but implemented
    by member states
  • Outputs
  • Decisions addressed to specific legal actors or
    states
  • Directives incorporated into national
    legislation and then implemented by national
    administrations
  • Regulations implemented as they are by national
    administrations
  • Record of member states
  • The Commission acts as a watchdog and may bring
    member states to the ECJ moral blame and then
    fines if states do not comply
  • Court of Auditors (1975) auditing the accounts
    and the implementation of the budget improve
    and report

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