The End of PRA

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The End of PRA
John H Large Large Associates
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Nuclear Plant Details
Plant Resistance to Terror Act
CBRN
Consequences
Government Countermeasures
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INITIATING EVENT
ANT DEFENCE
NUCLEAR PL
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
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INITIATING EVENT
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Aircraft Size (fuel load)

Frequency

Air Corridors
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Torness
Chapelcross
Hunterston
Hartlepool
Sellafield
Wylfa
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(No Transcript)
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Frequency
Boeing Jumbo - 747
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Boeing Jumbo Jet
157 tonnes of fuel remaining
Fuel used to and for descent onto Sellafield
Aircraft Size (fuel load)
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(No Transcript)
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Blind Golfer
1) Misses Golf Course
2) Misses Golf Ball
3) Drives in Wrong Direction
4) Somehow Holes in One
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chance of an
ACCIDENTAL impact
1 in 70,000,000
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Defence in Depth
Probablistic Risk Assessment
Tolerable
Acceptable
PRA
Consequences
Risk
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0
DECREASING RISK
CONSEQUENCE SEVERITY
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PRA
ACCIDENTS ARE CASCADES OF
RANDOM ORDERED EVENTS THAT
LACK DELIBERATE INTENT
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Nuclear Plant Details
BECAUSE THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL AIRCRAFT CRASH IS
CONSIDERED TO BE ACCEPTABLY REMOTE THERE ARE NO
CUSTOM BUILT FEATURES TO RESIST AIRCRAFT IMPACT
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• EXCEPTIONS
• Light Private Aircraft on total weight
• Military Aircraft on pilot savvy

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No sweat I may be at zero altitude and
whistling along at 600 knots but Im still in
control !
Assumes In 95 of aircraft crashes military
pilots will retain sufficient control to avoid
the most critical parts of the power plant
ACCIDENT
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?
PRA
So, arguably 95 of intentional aircraft
targeting of nuclear plants will be successful
TERRORIST
ACCIDENT
ATTACK
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x
Blind Golfer
TERRORIST ORGANISATION
No longer an accidental challenge but a
deliberate and intelligent attack on the plant
safety systems
Could be a Hole-in-One
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Accidental Aircraft Impact 1 in 70,000,000
INCREDIBLE ODDS Intentional Aircraft Impact
Planned Attack CREDIBLE EVENT
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PRA Public Credibility Problem
aircraft ACCIDENTS remain INCREDIBLE events
so the Hypothical Consequences will NOT occur
-v-
aircraft terrorist ATTACKS are CREDIBLE events
with INTOLERABLE consequences
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TARGETS

RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
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CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANTS Relatively Small
Batches of HLW but Large Thermal Energy
Potential
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SPENT FUEL STORAGE Large Quantities of Fuel and
High Level Radioactive Wastes
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PLUTONIUM OXIDE STORES 70 tonnes of Pu-239
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(No Transcript)
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Local Authority Off-Site Emergency Plans
REPPIR
Radiation (Emergency Preparedness Public
Information) Regulations
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Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Sub
Committee
Civil Contingencies Committee
Government Technical Advisors Transport,
Environment, Etc
HM Department of Trade Industry
Hello, Hello, Hello !
Nuclear Operators On-Site Emergency Plan
REPPIR Local Authority Off-Site Plan
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Consulting Engineers
The Gatehouse 1-2 Repository Road Ha Ha Rd
London SE18 4BQ ? 44020 8317 2860
fax [phone] largeassociates_at_aol.com
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland
Rethinking Nuclear Energy and Democracy after
09/11
THE AFTERMATH OF THE US ATTACKS THE END OF
PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS ?
Rough Transcript Notes of the Presentation
by John H Large Large Associates