US Policy towards Taiwan

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US Policy towards Taiwan
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• In December 2003, President Bush openly
  criticized President Chen
• the United States governments policy is one
  China based upon the three communiqués and the
  Taiwan Relations Act. We oppose any unilateral
  decision by either China or Taiwan to change the
  status quo.

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• the three communiqués
• 1972 Shanghai Communiqué (????)
• 1979 The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment
  of Diplomatic Relations (????)
• 1982 Joint Communiqué of the United States of
  America and the Peoples Republic of China (817
  ??)

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• the comments and actions made by the leader of
  Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make
  decisions unilaterally to change the status quo,
  which we oppose

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• In October 2004, US Secretary of State Collin
  Powell
• we do not support independence for Taiwan.
• there should be no doubt by either Chen
  Shui-bians mind or any other Taiwanese leaders
  mind that that is a firm US policy that is not
  going to change.

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• Taiwan is not independent and it does not
  enjoy sovereignty as a nation
• Powells statement was a heavy blow to Taipeis
  DPP government

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• After the 2004 election, US-Taiwan relations
  appear to be moving towards a positive direction
• the Six Assurances (????)
• arms sales package
• transit diplomacy

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• the Six Assurances (1982 by Reagan
  Administration) US pledged that it will NOT
• set a date for ending arms sales
• engage in prior consultation with Beijing over
  arms sales to Taipei

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• (continued) the Six Assurances
• undertake mediation between Beijing and Taipei
• revise the TRA
• alter its position regarding Taiwans
  sovereignty or
• pressure Taiwan into agreeing to negotiations

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• Research Questions
• How can we interpret these seemingly conflicting
  messages from Washington?
• What are the implications to Taipei?

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• Deterrence Diplomacy in Theory
• a situation where a defender (???) possesses
  retaliatory capability to impose costs that
  outweighs the benefits on a challenger (???) that
  attempts to change the status quo (????????)

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• To be credible (???), the defender must
  demonstrate to the challenger that it is
  committed to deterrence (???)
• Both action(??) and inaction (???) can exert
  deterrence effect

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• Extended Deterrence (?????) a situation where
  the defender seeks to prevent the challenger
  from attacking a third state

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• Extended Deterrence is inherently problematic
  due to the difference between the homeland and
  everything abroad

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• To enhance the credible threat (the resolve)
• formal alliance
• trip-wire
• important interests
• trade ties
• arms sales

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• In addition to credible threats (??), convincing
  reassurance (??) is also needed for an effective
  deterrence, which ensures the challenger that its
  principal values will not be subject to attack if
  it complies with the demands of the defender

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• Deterrence diplomacy is effective when the
  challengers are conditional revisionists

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• Types of target states
• unprovokable friends
• unstoppable enemies
• conditional revisionists who would like to
  challenge the status quo but will be refrained
  from taking unwanted actions when prized
  possessions are held hostage

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• Effective deterrence requires
• credible threats
• convincing reassurance
• conditional revisionists

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• Beijing as a conditional revisionist
• but would be willing to fight if its prized
  possession is deprived
• it has both economic and military reasons for
  avoiding a cross-Strait military conflict

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• Beijing views Taiwan as its prized possession
  (2000 ???)
• ????????????? (Taiwan is an inalienable part
  of China)
• ??????,????????,?????????? (fundamental
  interests of the Chinese nation)

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• no leaders in China will allow Taiwan
  independence without being regarded as traitors
  of the Chinese nation
• a failure in their Taiwan policy could incite
  other separatist groups
• ???????????, ??????

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• But, the price for a military attack at Taiwan
  would be high
• possible military intervention by the US
• holding back Chinas drive for economic
  development
• ???? (peaceful rising) ???
• believing that time is on their side

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• In general, Beijing
• has both economic and military reasons for
  avoiding a cross-Strait military conflict
• but would be willing to fight if its prized
  possession is deprived

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• Thus, Beijings current strategy towards the
  Taiwan issue is to prevent the island from
  declaring independence through economic
  integration and diplomatic isolation

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• Taipei as a conditional revisionist
• taking baby steps of moving towards independence
• but would stop if it encounters threats/pressure

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• ???? (de-Sinicization plan )
• ????????(reject the 1992 Consensus, i.e., the
  one China principle)
• ??????? (promote Taiwanese identity)
• ??????? (held defensive referenda)
• ??????(one country on each side ) ???

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• Signs of moderation
• ????? (advocates five noes)
• ?????????????? (advocates negotiations on the
  spirit of the 1992 meeting)

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• Taipei
• takes baby steps of moving towards independence
• but would stop if it encounters threats

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• US Policy
• In this context, the congressional testimony and
  the policy implementation shows that Washingtons
  policy combines both credible threats and
  convincing reassurances

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• Assistant Secretary James Kelly (4/2004)
• US is committed to its pledge of no use of
  force or threat to use force against Taiwan.

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• Washington views any use of force against
  Taiwan with grave concern, and we will maintain
  the capacity of the United States to resist any
  resort to force or other forms of coercion
  against Taiwan

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• Ultimately, successful deterrence will rely on
  Washingtons convincing reassurance to Beijing
  that it has no interest in supporting Taiwan
  independence

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• we have very real concerns that our efforts at
  deterring Chinese coercion might fail if Beijing
  ever becomes convinced Taiwan is embarked on a
  course toward independence and permanent
  separation from China, and concludes that Taiwan
  must be stopped in these efforts

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• the United States remains committed to our one
  China policy and that the US does not support
  independence for Taiwan

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• the President of the US knows that American
  lives are potentially at risk in a cross-Strait
  conflict and thus Washington opposes Taipeis
  unilateral moves that would change the status
  quo as we define it

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• the US may not intervene in a cross-Strait
  conflict should Taipei make statements or
  actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwans
  status

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• In summary,
• peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue but US
  security commitment to Taiwan is not for
  certainty. The ambiguity of American commitment
  is usually characterized asstrategic ambiguity

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• strategic ambiguity Washington has repeatedly
  asserted its interest in a peaceful settlement of
  the Taiwan issue, but has been deliberately vague
  about the depth of its commitment to defending
  Taiwan if Beijing were to use military force

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• the Taiwan issue is a matter to be decided by
  both sides of the Taiwan Strait

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• Implications
• Both the US and China are interested in
  maintaining the status quo
• Taipeis policy spaces on domestic and
  international issues are rather narrow

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• the status quo as we define it
• Taipei cannot ignore Washingtons messages for
  domestic gains or run the risk of being labeled
  as a trouble maker

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• Chens moves had the effect of moving Washington
  in the other direction in order to balance its
  delicate relations with Beijing and Taipei.

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• Some degree of ambiguity regarding the islands
  international status therefore may not be a bad
  thing for Taiwan

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• Beijings policy is becoming mature and flexible
• asking the US to restrain Taiwan
• formulating a series of policies to lure Taiwan
  citizens