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How to Cure an Externality

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To eliminate the externality you'd have to give up the productive activity ... Note similarity to procedures used in Alaska's halibut and sablefish IFQ programs ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: How to Cure an Externality


1
How to Cure an Externality
  • Economics of Public Policy
  • PADM 625
  • Ben Muse

2
Optimal amount of negative externalities is not
necessarily zero
3
Externalities
  • Are byproducts of productive activities
  • To eliminate the externality youd have to give
    up the productive activity
  • What you want to do is find a balance

4
Balance marginal benefits and costs
  • Consider steps taken to mitigate a pollution
    externality
  • Reducing the amount of the externality will have
    costs
  • installation of and operation of new capital
    equipment
  • reduction in potentially valuable activity

5
Balance marginal benefits and costs
  • Reduction in the level of a negative externality
    will generate marginal benefits
  • As weve discussed before in this class
  • The optimal level of the activity (abatement)
    must balance benefits and costs

6
Balance marginal benefits and costs
7
What should we do about externalities?
8
What is our goal?
  • To move toward an optimal level of externalities.
  • Not necessarily to eliminate them.
  • We would like to do so at the lowest cost
    possible as well.

9
The key -
  • There are a variety of ways that we can structure
    situations so that
  • parties producing negative externalities
  • face the costs of their actions

10
What to do about externalities
  • Nothing
  • Define property rights better
  • Command and control
  • Emission fees
  • Transferable quotas

11
Do nothing?
  • Coase theorem
  • If transactions costs are zero, parties to an
    externality will reach the optimal outcome.
  • The intuition is simple - externalities create
    opportunities for gains from trade (or merger).

12
The problem with this is
  • The transactions costs of dealing with many
    pollution problems are high
  • In the electricity example
  • there are a lot of people on one side of the
    agreement who have to coordinate and negotiate
  • This may preclude agreement

13
Still
  • Administrative costs of action
  • may be high relative to
  • potential benefits
  • If government action is more costly than the lost
    efficiency
  • may still be better to do nothing

14
Also, note inframarginal externalities
  • The size of the external benefit or harm doesnt
    depend on small changes in the quantity of the
    good around the market equilibrium quantity.

15
Following slide
  • Positive externality
  • Person gets an education
  • The first few years have broad benefits for the
    rest of society
  • The later years dont produce the same positive
    externalities

16
An inframarginal externality
17
Private solutions to negative externalities
18
Unitize
  • Private merger
  • Condominium associations
  • definition of jurisdictions

19
The key -
  • By bringing all parties into the same decision
    making organization
  • the costs are internalized

20
John Wesley Powell and externalities
  • Important scientific figure in second half of
    19th Century U.S.
  • Made a number of arguments about political
    arrangements that depended on a consideration of
    water externalities in the American west
  • Organize Montana counties on basis of watersheds

21
John Wesley Powell and externalities
  • Organize Montana counties on basis of watersheds
  • So that farming communities in lower lands
  • could control development in uplands that might
    have impacts (negative externalities - maybe
    through erosion) on the lower lands

22
Assign property rights
  • To each party and let them negotiate
  • If the property rights are clear and the costs of
    negotiating are small the parties should reach an
    agreement that maximizes their joint benefits
  • but plenty of room for debate over dividing the
    benefits

23
Interstate compacts
  • Provide a constitutional mechanism for this
  • States upstream and downstream on the same river
  • could negotiate a common approach to pollution
    and flood control by forming an interstate compact

24
Interstate compacts
  • Is there scope for states or provinces to reach
    agreements with each other
  • to deal with joint pollution problems?
  • The Coase theorem suggests there are
  • Constitutional provisions that might help this
    work?

25
Legal system (torts)
  • Suppose we let people sue a large polluter for
    its smoke discharges
  • This can force the polluter to bear the costs of
    its action
  • and lead it to pursue an optimal level of that
    action
  • Speeding tickets are another example

26
Some problems
  • Public good (free rider) problems
  • Problems with imperfect information
  • Transactions costs
  • Uncertainty about litigation outcomes and
    differential access to court systems

27
Public solutions to negative externalities
28
Impose standards
  • Impose firm standards on activity
  • No firm may emit more than 500 metric tons/year
  • No noise above xdecibels
  • limit of one fish per trip for recreational
    anglers
  • zoning

29
Command and control
  • Tell the firm what to do and how to do it
  • Specify appropriate technologies that must be in
    use under different conditions
  • a problem - one size fits all

30
Pros/cons of standards, command and control
  • In one sense, easy to impose
  • However, one size fits all
  • impose same burdens on firms that can clean up
    cheaply and firms that face high costs
  • Ultimately can be more costly than other
    alternatives

31
Pros/cons of standards, command and control
  • Firms may have different marginal cost curves for
    reducing pollution
  • Ideally wed like to allocate pollution reduction
    responsibilities among firms to equalize marginal
    costs of further reduction

32
Pros/cons of standards, command and control
  • But standards/command and control, dont pay
    attention to this
  • High cost cleaner-uppers will probably clean up
    more than they should
  • low-cost clean up less

33
Pros/cons of standards, command and control
  • Otherwise we could reduce pollution at less cost
  • by making low cost cleaner-uppers clean up more
  • and reducing the burden on high-cost
    cleaner-uppers

34
Taxes and subsidies
  • Impose a tax on the activity
  • For example, if you are dealing with a firm
    emitting air pollution impose a tax on each
    metric ton of emissions
  • This increases the firms opportunity costs of
    emissions to reflect the marginal cost of the
    externality

35
Taxes and subsidies
  • Conversely, we could subsidize the abatement of
    the externality -
  • if pollution we could subsidize pollution
    abatement (instead of taxing pollution)

36
Taxes and transferable quotas can bring about
emission reductions at lower cost.
37
Taxes
  • Remember that the problem is that firms dont
    face the full cost of their actions
  • The electricity plants pay for most inputs, but
    they dont pay for the service the environment
    provides for pollution disposal

38
The idea of a pollution tax
  • Is to charge firms a price that reflects the
    costs
  • that their pollution imposes

39
Firms would
  • Respond to that price and each would choose its
    optimal level of electricity production and
    pollution
  • given that price

40
Fees are relatively rare
  • Most fee systems of which I am aware exist
    primarily to raise revenues for pollution control
    efforts
  • They arent calibrated to reflect the external
    costs of pollution

41
Which brings us to transferable pollution rights.
42
The basic idea
  • The appropriate level of pollution is determined
    administratively
  • The rights to pollute are divided up among the
    different sources
  • If the total emissions level is 100,000 metric
    tons (reduced from 150,000)
  • Each firm will be allocated a share of that

43
Allocation can be done in different ways
  • Equal division of the available rights
  • Allocation in proportion to historical emissions
    activity
  • Auction of the rights to the highest bidder (rare
    if it occurs at all)

44
Transferable rights
  • Once allocated
  • Firms are free to buy and sell them
  • A firm that could clean up its act fairly cheaply
  • Will have an incentive to do so and reduce its
    requirements for emission credits or quotas

45
Then...
  • It can sell its surplus quotas to
  • a firm that can only reduce emissions at high cost

46
Look how everyone benefits...
  • Total pollution is reduced to the level
    determined by the total quotas
  • The high cost firms dont have to reduce as much
    since they can buy credits
  • Their purchases of credits subsidize the
    reduction efforts of low cost firms

47
Transferable licenses or quotas
  • Note similarity to procedures used in Alaskas
    halibut and sablefish IFQ programs

48
Sources
  • Nicholaou, K.C. And Christopher N.C. Boddy.
    Behind Enemy Lines. Scientific American. May,
    2001.
  • Stegner, Wallace. Beyond the Hundreth Meridian.
    John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the
    West. 1953.
  • Friedman, David. Laws Order. What Economics
    Has to Do with Law and Why it Matters. Princeton
    University Press. 2000.

49
Sources
  • Stiglitz, Chapter 9, Externalities and the
    Environment.
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