Wolfgang Renzsch, European Integration 2: The Postwar period

1
Wolfgang Renzsch, European Integration 2 The
Post-war period

• Overview
• The first steps
• The way to the ECSC
• EEC and Euratom

2
The first steps

• None of the many concepts for a new peace order
  by federating the European nations succeeded
  after the war.
• Failure partly because of the rivalry of the
  new big Powers USA and USSR for hegemony,
  partly because other international interests
  (Commonwealth, colonies), partly because of
  rivalry between France and GB (British
  disappointment after the armistice between France
  and Nazi-Germany)
• The division of Europe in two antagonistic parts
  and the existence of a number of weak nation
  states was primarily in the interest of the two
  big powers.

3
Eastern Europe

• The hegemony of the Soviet Union which lasted
  from 1945 until 1990 prevented any autonomous
  alliance of the states within the Soviet area of
  influence.
• The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Rat
  für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe COMECON),
  created 1949, was an instrument of the Soviet
  hegemony in Eastern Europe, by no means a
  democratic or federal model of integration.
• Further development until 1990 of no interest.

4
The Third Way concept

• The way towards integration was not clear
  immediate after the war. Firstly many Europeans
  followed ideas of a third way, i.e. remaining
  or becoming independent of the two big powers.
• The third-way concept was a reaction to the
  experience of the war the political climate had
  become more leftist than before
• The conservative elites had lost credit because
  many of them collaborated or tolerated the Nazi
  rule. Political resistance was more an issue of
  the left than the bourgeois parties.
• The Soviet Union had paid the highest price for
  the defeat of the Nazis and had suffered more
  sacrifices than any other nation. Therefore she
  was (originally) highly respected.
• Many regarded the Nazi rule as a consequence of
  the capitalist economy. For instance CDU 1946
  Ahlen Program

5

• The Labour movement regarded the split in a
  Communist and Social-Democrat wing as one of the
  reasons for the success of the Nazis. Therefore,
  their amalgamation seemed to be on the agenda.
• Political cosequences
• The Communists were strong in Post-war Europe at
  free elections1945 Czechoslovakia 38 pc, France
  26 pc, Italy 19 pc.
• In GB the hero of WWII, Winston Churchill, was
  defeat at the general elections of 1945.
• The Christian Democratic parties produced left
  programs (see Ahlen) and joined coalitions with
  left wing parties, even Communists.
• With respect to these circumstances many
  Europeans saw themselves between the socialist
  however not democratic USSR and the democratic
  but capitalist USA.
• The Third Way Concept socialism and democracy
  failed because of the bipolarity between the USSR
  and the USA from 1946 onwards.

6
Western Europe

• In 1946 it became clear that the European could
  not keep themselves out of the American-Soviet
  antagonism.
• Eastern Europe was definitely under Soviet
  control.
• The Cold War, the threat by the Soviet Union
  against the West European nations convinced the
  West European that they had to look for a closer
  association with the USA.
• The Western powers (Churchill 1946) reacted
  integration politics had to be restricted to the
  Western part of Europe
• The offer of the European Recovery Program (ERP,
  Marshall Plan, Byrnes, announced Stuttgart 1946,
  started in June 1947) and the Atlantic Pact
  linked the reconstruction of Western Europe and
  its security closely to the Americans.

7

• First attempt failed because of disagreements
  among the West European nations about the future
  role of Germany
• Benelux-countries, GB and USA wanted to increase
  German industrial production, especially steel
  production
• France opposed because she wanted to keep her
  role as the leading steel producer in Europe

8

• Interests
• For USA and GB occupation was quite expensive
  they had to feed the Germans. Therefore they
  wanted to increase German production in order to
  lower the burden for the British and American tax
  payer
• France was interested to get German coal (Ruhr)
  for the production of steel from French iron ore
  (so was the USSR)
• GB in favour of a tariff association, but wanted
  to keep the advantages of dominating the
  Commonwealth by the Pound Sterling

9

• The Benelux-countries were reluctant because they
  wanted to have GB in a European alliance in order
  to avoid a French dominance but GB gave priority
  to the Commonwealth.
• Germany (before the foundation of the Federal
  Republic, 23 May 1949) Konrad Adenauer engaged
  himself for a West European integration. He
  pursued four objectives
• Satisfaction of the demand for security of the
  neighbours, especially France gt security for the
  neighbours was considered as being in the well
  understood German interest
• Reduction of the burdens of the occupation of
  Germany
• A turn around of German foreign policy leaving
  behind the nationalist traditions since Bismarck
  gt joining the camp of western democracies instead
  of balancing between East and West
• For security reasons European integration in
  close co-operation with the USA

10

• European Recovery Program (ERP Marshall Plan)
• The European Recovery Program started without an
  institutional framework because of differences
  about institutions
• Finally the OEEC (Organization of European
  Economic Co-operation) was founded (16 April
  1948) due to American insistance.
• Turning point March 1948 Brussels Pact France,
  Benelux-countries, GB defence alliance,
  forerunner of NATO

11
At the same time

• Soviet Union rejected ERP and prevented the East
  European states from participation
• Communist Coup détat in Czechoslovakia 1948
  despite the fact that the Communist had won a
  majority in free elections
• Berlin blockade 1948-1949 after in the
  introduction of the Deutsch Mark in West Germany
  and West-Berlin
• Resulting in the division of the European
  continent
• West European integration was a consequence of
  the Soviet threat.

12
London Six Powers Conference 1948

• USA, GB, France and Benelux-countries agree upon
  the foundation of a West German state (London
  Documents/ Frankfurter Dokumente).
• New pressure for integration especially since
  France still feared a German-Soviet alliance.
• Integration to prevent Germany from such policies
  gt keeping her in the western camp
• French government requested a European
  Parliamentary Assembly (20 July 1948) in order
  to discuss the problems of European integration
  and the preparation of an Economic and Monetary
  Union (!!)
• Assembly should become the nucleus of a federal
  Europe

13

• GB was rather reluctant
• Compromise (5 May 1949)
• Council of Europe (Europarat), residing in
  Strasbourg
• Originally 10 members 5 members of Brussels pact
  plus Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden
• It was first steps of sovereign nations to create
  institutions for common action, however it was
  hardly equipped with any powers.
• Do not mix up the Council of Europe (Europarat)
  with the European Council (Europäischer Rat)
  assembly of the heads of states and governments
  of the EU.

14
Council of Europe

• Developed dynamics of its own the members
  (parliamentarians) used their rights extensively
  
• Permanent committee (chairman Paul-Henri Spaak)
  defined the objective of the Council of Europe
• the creation of a European political authority
  with limited powers, however real powers
• British opposition
• Federal Republic became associated member in 1950

15

• Dilemma for integrationist (on the Continent)
• GB prevented any real step towards integration
  Alternatives
• Restrict integration to limits sets by GB?
• Or integration without GB (and in the consequence
  without the Nordic nations)?
• What would GB do if integration were successful
  on the Continent?
• Conservatives primarily in favour of integration
  without GB (Labour gvt., special relations to
  USA, Commonwealth, role of Pound Sterling)
• Social-democrats wanted to have GB inside in
  order to balance the Conservative dominance on
  the Continent

16

• Decisive steps in the Council of Europe in August
  and November 1950
• Alternatives (until today)
• Federal Europe (United States of Europe) with
  sovereignty of its own, political authority and
  institutions
• Con-federal Europe (Europe of Nations/ patries/
  Väterländer) leaving sovereignty with the member
  states, based on intergovernmental relations
• Council of Europe paid tribute to British
  reservations, therefore failed
• Further process of integration took place without
  GB until GB joined EEC in 1973!!

17
Summary Council of Europe

• First institutionalized step towards an
  integrated Europe, founded 5 May 1949
• 10 West and North European nations
• Small competences arts, science, but also human
  rights
• In the shadow of EU, however new importance after
  the end of Communist rule for East European
  nations first step into the institutional
  structure of integrated Europe
• Requirements for membership democratic
  government, rule of law, observance of human
  rights and civil liberties, no torture
  authoritarian states are not admitted or excluded
  (Communist ruled nations, Spain under Franco,
  Portugal under Salazar, Greece during military
  dictatorship Turkey today??)

18

• 1953 Convention on the Protection of Human
  Rights and Civil Liberties, signed 4 November
  1950, in power since 3 September 1953
• Binding law, not mere declaration! Enforceable by
  courts.
• 1959 European Court for Human Rights, Strasbourg
• First international agreement at all which
  obliged the signatory power to observe a
  catalogue of human rights and provide for
  judicial control more effective than any other
  international agreement (European Charts of Basic
  Rights might supersede the Convention, however,
  it is not enforced yet)
• Protected rights life, protection against
  torture, slavery and forced labour liberty and
  security, rights accused at court, freedom of
  opinion . Today part of EU law
• Later Social Charta, Culture Convention and
  others primarily soft issues
• Today former Communist nations and CIS-states
  members. Council of Europe serves as first step
  on the road to an integrated Europe

19
The German Problem

• Key issue of early European integration was
  Germany
• Germany should be brought in a position to feed
  herself and to pay for the occupation. The
  burdens of the tax payers of the occupying powers
  should be lowered
• The German industrial potential should serve the
  Western allies neutrality of Germany in the Cold
  War should be prevented
• Strategy of allies integration of West Germany
  in European structures on equal footing.
• Adenauers strategy in principle the same
  international recognition by integration

20

• Time became scarce. ERP had sped up German
  economic recovery. The longer the Western allies
  waited the lower the price to be paid by Germany
  for integration.
• Germany owned coal necessary for reconstruction
  and rearmament in the Cold War.
• After the first Soviet nuclear bomb 1949 Germany
  was asked for a defence contribution Churchill
  request German troops within a European army in
  March 1950
• Under these condition Germany had more options
  than the Western powers

21

• Early in 1950 GB and USA agreed to abolish the
  limits for German steel production and to ease
  the occupation. A German military contribution
  seems a question of time only.
• Therefore the French Foreign Minister Robert
  Schumann acted in March 1950 and presented a
  proposal by Jean Monnet suggesting a European
  High Commission for Coal and Steel gt European
  Coal and Steel Community

22

• Proposal implied a step towards a supranational
  structure without GB
• Schumann discussed the proposal firstly with
  Adenauer, afterwards with the French cabinet
• In May 1950, immediately before a meeting of the
  Foreign Ministers of the three Western powers,
  Schumann proposed publicly
• The complete French and German steel production
  should be controlled by a common High Commission.
  This Commission should be authorized to act
  conclusively. Other European nations were offered
  to join.

23

• French Interest
• Solution of the steel crisis and securing coal
  (Ruhr) for French iron ore (Lorraine)
• Common steel production offered the opportunity
  to ease the conflicts between France and Germany
  and to open the road towards reconciliation
  problem Saarland!
• In terms of security and defence policies
  interlocking French and German heavy industries
  meant, rearmament against each other would be
  impossible no material base for war

24

• A failure of integration would have implied that
  Germany in the long run might become the
  dominating power on the Continent.
• Integration offered France a leading global role
  independent of the USA
• Economically integration meant pressure for
  modernization on French industry
• Finally this proposal was less ambitious and
  easier to adopt than others. Less provoking with
  respect to GB, however a conflict with GB was
  expected.

25

• The British government was surprised by French
  initiative
• GB agreed with integration of Germany, however
  not with supranational institutions.
• After British rejection France, the
  Benelux-countries, Italy and Germany declared
  their readiness to start negotiations about the
  Schumann-proposal.
• They began in Paris on 20 June 1950. The six
  nations signed the contract on 18 April 1951
  European Coal and Steel Community ECSC (EGKS)
• ECSC became the corner stone for the Europe of
  Six for the next 20 years.

26

• Institutional structure of the ECSC
• High Commission (executive body) 9
  Commissioners, 8 of them unanimously agreed upon
  for 6 years, one elected. Up to two members from
  one member state
• Council of Ministers
• co-ordination of the policies of the member
  states, under certain circumstances entitled to
  give orders.
• System of differentiated majority up to
  unanimity.
• Common Assembly Parliamentary body, D, F, I each
  18 members B, NL 10, L 4 without much influence
• Court of Justice Judges nominated for 6 years
  dispute settlement

27

• ECSC was not the great hit, however it was the
  first real success in the integration process.
  Obviously small-step strategies with a limited
  number of states proved to be more successful
  than the search for a grand design and the big
  leap forward.
• ECSC proved the importance of a Franco-German
  understanding as a precondition for integration,
  however as not sufficient for a larger
  breakthrough.
• The Rationality was to integrate Germany in order
  to protect the western nations against German
  aggression and have Germany on the Western side
  against the Communist threat security against
  and with Germany.

28

• European Defence Community (EVG) and European
  Political Community both failed!
• Korean War started 25 June 1950 North Korean
  attack.
• US-President Truman increased American presence
  in Europe, and requested a German military
  contribution in August 1950
• September 1950 US wanted German troops as part
  of European army within NATO, offered the
  integration of US-troops in NATO and more US
  military in Europe
• Coincidence of US and German interests to get on
  equal footing with other Western powers
• France saw herself in the danger of isolation
  extension of European integration on defence
  policies

29

• France advocated political integration before
  military integration. However, pressure for
  faster (military) integration grew because of
• Changed role of Germany
• Nationalistic (SPD-)opposition in Germany
• Therefore military became promoter of political
  integration
• integrated European army, no national armies
  (except overseas), united command
• Pleven-Plan (French PM) a lot of problems, no
  details
• European Defence Treaty signed 27 Mai 1952 in
  Paris (after 18 months of negotiations)

30

• However, the treaty was never ratified.
• The attempt to create a political community
  failed far too ambitious and too early
• Stalins death seemed to open up a period of
  reduced tension peaceful co-existence gt less
  pressure on the European to unite
• Disagreement about troops in colonies and about
  the Saarland as well as about the role of GB and
  the US
• European defence meanwhile relies heavily on
  American nuclear weapons gt dependency from the US
• Disagreement between USA and France about
  Indo-Chinese war

31

• For Germany rearmament implied getting accepted
  by the other powers France lost interest in EDC
  (EVG) neither enough protection nor European
  independence
• Germany in NATO seemed to be the better solution
  gt Adenauer was already looking for a direct
  access to NATO-membership (North Atlantic instead
  European solution)
• France decided not to ratify EVG after 7 May
  1954 defeat at Dien Bien Phu (Vietnam)

32

• After the failure of EVG Germanys road to NATO
  was open France accepted German membership,
  Germany made concessions concerning the Saarland
  Europeanization (which were futile after a
  referendum on 23 October 1955)
• Brussels Pact became, after Germany and Italy ,
  the West European Union, the European part of
  NATO (meanwhile important for GASP/CFSP)
• After failure of European Defence Community a
  success was necessary
• 23 October 1954 Paris NATO treaties signed,
  ratified by France on 30 December 1954, by
  Germany after fierce debate on 27 February 1955

33

• Paradox European Defence Community was a
  setback, however it opened the way for
  alternative solutions, based on Atlantic
  partnership.
• Defence was primarily delivered by NATO, which
  became the base for further European integration.
  Until 1995 EC/EU-members were all simultaneously
  NATO-members except Ireland.