The Rules of the Game

1
The Rules of the Game

• February 17-19, 2009
• PS 426

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How to elect our leaders?

• Seems simple enough select the candidate
  preferred by the most voters.
• Easy enough with two candidates one wins, one
  loses, and there are only two ways to order
  preferences.
• Gets messy with three or more candidates
• Possible to win with less than a majority
  (indeed, possible to win with 1/3 of the vote
  1), or possible that the winner is disliked by a
  sizeable majorities
• How to reflect intensity of preferences?
• cycling phenomenon, when no outcome is
  universally preferred to others
• Outcomes depend on process therefore, in most
  cases, how we elect our leaders may determine who
  is elected.

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How the votes are counted

• Basic approaches
• Plurality (most votes wins),
• proportional (allocate representation based on
  of votes received),
• Majority runoff systems (winner must have
  majority of the votes).
• More complex systems
• Cumulative voting get to show intensity by
  clumping multiple votes for one candidate.
• Borda counts like balloting for the AP
  basketball poll or MVP.
• Instant Runoff voting cast ranked votes for all
  candidates, if nobody has a majority, drop the
  last place candidate and reallocate his/her votes
  to the remaining candidates.
• Approval Voting one vote for every acceptable
  candidate.

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Ranking Preferences with 3 or More Candidates

• Normally think of choices in binary terms we
  either choose A or B, vote yes or no, prefer one
  candidate over the other. What happens when
  there are 3 or more options?
• What decision rule to we use?
• What if, in opting for our first choice, we wind
  up with the least preferred option?
• 2006 AL-MVP and 1992 pres. election
• Morneau, 15-1st, 8-2nd, 3-3rd, 2-4th, 320 points
  (14 for 1st, 9 for 2nd, 8 for 3rd, 7 for 4th,
  etc.)
• Jeter, 12-1st, 14-2nd, 1-4th, 1-6th, 302 points
• Who would win the 1992 presidential election with
  MVP-style, Borda count voting?

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2000 Presidential election

• Preference rankings with 3 candidates in 2000
  (hypothetical, but likely). Why are Bush and
  Gore reversed and Nader at 5 rather than 3?
• In straight-up popular vote with everyone voting
  sincerely, Bush wins, 48-47-5 also Bush won the
  electoral college 271-266 (1 abstained).
• How would the election have turned out with
  alternative vote-counting rules?

48 47 5
Bush Gore Nader
Gore Nader Gore
Nader Bush Bush
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2000 Presidential Election, cont.

• Gores wins under all alternatives
• If Nader is not on the ballot, Gore wins 52-48
  (assuming Nader voters still vote).
• If there were a runoff election or instant runoff
  voting, Gore wins 52-48.
• With approval voting, Gore wins with 100 votes,
  Nader comes in 2nd, with 52 votes, Bush finishes
  third, with 48 votes.
• Borda count (3,2,1 scoring), Gore gets 247 (47x3,
  5x2, 48x2), Bush gets 196 (48x3, 47x1, 5x1), and
  Nader gets 157 (5x3, 48x1, 47x2). (cumulative
  voting cant be determined).

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Example of Majority Vote

• Special election in Californias 50th
  Congressional district, to replace Randy Duke
  Cunningham in 2006
• Process
• 1st round, a jungle primary in which all
  candidates from all parties run. If one
  candidate receives more than 50 of vote, she or
  he wins. If not, the top candidate from each
  party face each other in a runoff.
• Generally considered a Republican district
• 18 candidates ran 14 Republicans, 2 Democrats, 1
  Libertarian, and 1 Independent

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Results

• First Round (138,000 votes)
• Francine Busby (Dem) 43.7
• Brian Bilbray (Rep) 15.3
• Eric Roach (Rep) 14.5
• Second Round (134,000 votes)
• Brian Bilbray (R) 49.5
• Francine Busby (D) 45.3
• Bottom line all methods have their advantages
  and disadvantages. Australia example of instant
  runoff voting.

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Other factors

• Ballot design infamous butterfly ballot in
  Florida. Who gets to be first? Party column vs.
  office block. Straight ticket option?
• Voting technology ATM-style machines (paper
  trail or not), optical scan, punch card, paper
  ballots, lever. Controversy over Diebold
  machines and lack of a paper trail. Legislation
  proposed in Congress to require a paper trail.
  However, it is easy to hack in and steal votes.
  http//www.youtube.com/watch?v8JESZiLpBLE
• Human error Franken/Coleman recount.
• http//minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2008/11/
  19_challenged_ballots/

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Butterfly ballot
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Example Florida 13th, 2006

• Combination of ballot design and voting
  technology. 13th Congressional District election
  in Florida between Democrat Christine Jennings
  and Republican Vern Buchanan --- in which some
  18,000 votes disappeared on Sarasota County's
  paperless touch-screen machines in a race decided
  by just 369 votes. Undervote of nearly 14,
  compared to 2.4 in same election in counties not
  using the ATM-style machines. Ballot design?
  Probably not.

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Redistricting

• Criteria for redistricting population equality
  and race come first and then compactness,
  contiguity, partisan bias, protect incumbents,
  geographic boundaries, and respect for existing
  communities (split municipalities).
• redistricting process state legislatures, the
  courts, and non-partisan commissions. What data
  can be used?

14
Racial Redistricting

• the 1965 Voting Rights Act access to vote.
  Mississippi redistricting. The right to a
  meaningful vote. Then Mobile v. Bolden (1980)
  intent to discriminate, not effect.
• The 1982 VRA Amendments reversed the Mobile
  decision. Thornburg v. Gingles (1986),
  three-prong test for vote dilution.
• The 1992 redistricting process maximize the
  number of minority-majority districts.

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Racial redistricting, cont.

• Shaw v. Reno (1993) and progeny. Race cannot be
  the predominant factor (Miller v. Johnson, 1996).
  The question of legal standing and its
  implications for these cases.
• Status of racial redistricting today. Easley v.
  Cromartie (2001). 2002 round tension between
  VRA and Shaw. Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003). LULAC
  v. Perry (2006).
• Ashcroft overturned in 2006 in the VRA extension.
• Racial representation may also be affected by
  at-large versus single-member districts.
• partisan redistricting. Historical examples.
  Veith v. Jubelirer (2004). LULAC again.

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• The 1992 North Carolina House Plan

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Texass mid-decade redistricting carving up
Democratic districts.
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Money in congressional elections

• How much money?
• Campaign finance law
• FECA of 1974, Buckley v. Valeo.
• Soft money, PACs, independent expenditures,
  candidate expenditures, leadership PACs.
• McCain/Feingold. Upheld by the Supreme Court in
  McConnell v. FEC (2003). New loophole 527
  groups.
• Money and influencing the legislative process.
  Untangling the causal web.