CONCORDE FBTSC

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CONCORDE F-BTSC

• GONESSE, PARIS
• 25 JULY 2000
• THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
• Alan Simmons, Senior Inspector
• Air Accidents Investigation Branch

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RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FLIGHT
CHARTER FLIGHT PARIS TO NEW YORK, 100 PAX AND 9
CREW NO.2 T/R AIR MOTOR REPLACED No ADDs 19 BAGS
NOT ACCOUNTED (400KG)TAXI WEIGHT
186.7-187.2T FUEL 94.8T (237kg overfill TANKS
1-4) STARTUP 1407 TAXI 1438UTC V1 150 VR 198 V2
220KT
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TAXY AND LINE UP
TAXY AT 1438 UTC LINE UP 26R AT 1440 TAXI FUEL
2T CARRIED, 800KG USED TAKEOFF WEIGHT
185.7-186.2 T (MTOW 185.07T) BRAKE TEMPERATURES
WERE IN RANGE FUEL TRANSFER REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE
54.0 CG
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THE TAKE OFF
CONTINENTAL DC10 TAKEOFF 5 MINS EARLIER TAKE OFF
BEGAN AT 144231s WIND 090/8KT NORMAL TO
DECISION SPEED (150KT) AT 144303
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THE ROTATION
VR 199 KT. VZRC GEAR DOWN 3 ENGINES 205KT 2
ENGINES gt300KT TYRE BURST AT 174KT, SLOW ROTATION
AT 189 KT
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TYRE BURST AND TANK RUPTURE AT 14439.5 NOS.
1 2 ENGINE SURGES WITHIN FOUR SECONDS SLOW
ROTATION COMMENCED AT 144313 TWR YOU HAVE
FLAMES BEHIND YOU AT 144313
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AIRCRAFT DRIFTED TO LEFT EDGE OF
RUNWAY, TRACKED TOWARDS B747 STRUCK AND
INGESTED RUNWAY LIGHT ENGS 1 2 SECOND SURGE
AT LIFT OFF ENGINE 2 FIRE WARNING AT 144322,
SHUT DOWN
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LOW AIRSPEED 210 KT (V2 220 KT) LOW HEIGHT
200FT AGL 144330 PF CALLED FOR GEAR UP
BUT LANDING GEAR FAILED TO RETRACT LANDING AT LE
BOURGET CONSIDERED
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FINAL SECONDS PITCH-ROLL INTERACTIONS NO 1
RUNDOWN ROLL AND PITCH THRUST LEVERS
RETARDED IMPACT 109 FATALITIES ON BOARD 4
FATALITIES, 6 SERIOUS INJURIES ON GROUND
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THE IMPACT PARAMETERS
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NO 2. TYRE PARTS WEIGHTS 4.5 Kg.
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THE RUNWAY TITANIUM STRIP
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THE RUNWAY TANK 5 FRAGMENT
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ENGINE PERFORMANCE UTC 1 2 3 4 1443 12 GO
lamps out GO GO 16 75 thrust GO GO 17
GO 3thrust GO GO 19 80
thrust 20 15 thrust 21 1 2 2nd surge
(AoA 13 degrees) 23 Fire Warning 24 4
12 25 S/D 28 Recovery 35 CTY-5 CTY
. CTY.
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Meditation...
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ENGINE NO. 1 HARD FOD DAMAGE ENGINE NO.2 BLADE
CLASHING ENGINES 3 4 NORMAL
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THE INITIATING EVENT was the tyre
burst 10-3 tank rupture 10-5 fire 10-8 lo
ss of the aircraft 10-9 THE FLEET
HISTORY Total fleet experience under 100,000
ldgs. Tyre burst events 56 confirmed
3 seconds!
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PREVIOUS EVENTS 56 tyre bursts/ deflations
confirmed 2 sources 6 led to penetration of
tanks 19 caused by FOD 1 case of tank penetration
by tyre 0 cases of tank rupture multiple
power loss
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WASHINGTON 14 June 1979 Punctured No. 5
tank Gear did not retract Green lost, Yellow low
contents Airborne 24 mins.
Damage caused by wheel rim parts and pieces of
tyre Leak rate 4kg/s (Gonesse 60 l/s)
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WASHINGTON INCIDENT Risk of fire assessed as
small, since brakes, secondary nozzle not hot
enough to ignite fuel. Tyre deflation detection
system installed Hydraulic systems protected New
reinforced wheels Pre-departure inspections
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JOINT BEA-AAIB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION ISSUED 16
AUGUST 2000 ACCEPTED BY FRENCH DGAC AND UK
CAA FRENCH AIRCRAFT ALREADY GROUNDED BY DECREE OF
FRENCH TRANSPORT MINISTER BRITISH FLEET GROUNDED
BY BRITISH AIRWAYS WHEN REASONS BECAME
APPARENT CERTIFICATES OF AIRWORTHINESS
WITHDRAWN NOT TYPE CERTIFICATE
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THINGS WHICH WORKED WELL IN FRANCE Good working
relationships with BEA... Lunch on site... Lunch
in the canteen Lunch anywhere!
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DOCUMENTS AND AGREEMENTS WHICH DID NOT OPERATE
IN FRANCE
ICAO ANNEX 13 EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE
94/56 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
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TANK IMPACT TESTS Tank rupture modelled using
Finite Element techniques The modelling included
the tyre, tyre burst, impact, fuel and structural
responses It needed validation The validation was
carried out below the energies required to burst
the test tank The recorded and simulated data did
co-relate
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ADDITIONAL MODELLING BY ONERA RADIOSS Finite
Element modelling Particle impact at 30 degrees
and 120 m/s Tank damaged but not ruptured
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ENGINE SURGES First surges at 144312 Controller
calls ..vous avez des flammes.. by
144313 Conclusion - Fire is well developed
before 144313 Surges occurred too late to be
the ignition source.
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FUEL INGESTION TEST RIG AT SHOEBURYNESS
No surge at 1.6 l/s Slug ingestion generated
blade clashing Permissible ingestion rates above
liner capability
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THE REPORT
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AAIB COMMENTS ON THE REPORT AAIB was entitled
to comment under ICAO Annex 13 AAIB commented
on judicial interference with the
investigation. tank burst mechanism ignition
mechanism
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OUTCOMES OF THE INVESTIGATION The tyre burst
was the initial event The tank rupture was a
direct or indirect result of the tyre burst The
large fuel leak so caused, greatly increased the
risk of fire The engines surged because of fuel
and/or hot gas ingestion
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• AIRWORTHINESS ACTIONS
• Reduce the risk of tyre burst
• Reduce the damage caused by tyre bursts
• Reduce the leak rate
• Protect against ignition in the gear bay

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THE RETURN TO SERVICE
TANK LINER MODIFICATION TYRE DEFLATION SYSTEM NZG
TYRE NEW INTERIOR WIRING PROTECTED BRAKE FANS
ISOLATED
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Its a beautiful aircraft - its the only thing
we ever agreed about with the British.