Stephen M. Maurer

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WMD Terrorism Risks Responses
Stephen M. Maurer Science Policy
PP190-01/PP290-01 April 13, 2006
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Introduction
Terrorism Intent Capability CBRN
Technology (Mostly B and R) Viewpoints Barriers
to Entry Social Psychology Cost-Benefit Necessar
y Conversations
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Terrorism
Overview Intent Rational Goals The Case for
Mass Violence The Case for WMD Capabilities
Necessary Conversations
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Terrorism
Intent
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Terrorism
The Rational Actor Hypothesis Thanatos
Romanticism The Socialists Patients Collective
(1975) Cult and Suicide Analogies Youth
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Terrorism
Traditional Rationales for Terrorists No
Alternative Revolution Destroying and
Replacing the State Destroying the
Economy Publicity Propaganda Obtaining
Concessions/Forcing Withdrawal Provoking a
Crackdown Catalyzing Diplomacy/Foreign
Intervention Supporting Major Military
Operations Credibility Blocking Political
Solutions Money Holding Territory
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Terrorism
Traditional Rationales for Sponsors Large vs.
Small Sponsors Benefits A Cheap Foreign
Policy Capability Increases Nuisance
Value But Only if Sponsor Can
Renounce. Drawbacks Difficult to Terminate
Miscalculation (El Dorado Canyon) Isolation
Inconsistent With WMD
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Terrorism
Mass Violence Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114
(February 1973) Operation Mt. Carmel (July 21,
1973) September 11 Is Mass Violence a Sensible
Strategy?
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Terrorism
Deaths in Total Wars. Napoleonic
Wars France (5) American Civil War North
(1.4) South (2) World War I France
(4.4) German (3) World War II Germany
(6) Japan (2.7) USSR (18)
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Terrorism
Novel Weapons Western Front (1914) US and
England (1930s) London (1940) Berlin
(1944) Korea (1950) Baghdad (2005) Lessons
People are Resilient Modern State is
Resilient WMD
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Terrorism
Capabilities
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Terrorism
Probabilities of Failure Lone Actors vs.
Complexity Technology Tradecraft Getting
People to Die Getting People to Kill Simple
Attacks Suicide Bombers (25 failure
rate) Complex Attacks Israeli Wrath of God
Teams Nazi Saboteurs
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Terrorism
9/11 Conspiracy Mid-1999 KSM gives Hazmi, Abu
Bara, and Khallad basic training in English
phrases, reading phone books, renting
apartments, etc. 1999 Yemeni citizens Khallad
and Abu Barra cannot obtain visas and are
unable to learn English. Mid-1999 Yemeni
police arrest Khallad by mistake as part of
the Cole investigation. Khallads father
gets him released. January 2000 Hazmi and
Mihdar enter the US. KSM relaxes security
so that they can receive support from San
Diego Mosque.
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Terrorism
9/11 Conspiracy March 2000 Mihdar starts
ranting and raving over a security
deposit. May 2000 Hazmi and Mihdar give up
trying to learn English. Flight school
becomes impossible. June 2000 Mihdar goes
AWOL and tells his cousin that Bin Laden is
planning five attacks in the US. Bin Laden
prevents KSM from firing him. June 2000 Hazmi
is bored in Mihdars absence and asks KSM for
permission to search for a wife on the
Internet. He tells a coworker that that he
will become famous.
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Terrorism
9/11 Conspiracy May 2000 Atta, el Shehhi and
Jarrah complete flight training. January
2001 Atta is a rude and abusive student.
Fourth Hamburg plotter fails to obtain entry
visa. October 2000 KSM sends Moussaoui to
Malaysia for flight training, but Moussaoui
decides to work on a different plot instead.
KSM recalls Moussaoui, and sends him to the
US for flight training. Interviewed by FBI on
August 15 2001 and arrested on immigration
charges the following day. 2000-2001 Nine
muscle hijackers fail to obtain travel
documents, back out, or are removed by the
leadership. Pilot hijackers meet muscle
hijackers and help them rent apartments, etc.
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Terrorism
9/11 Conspiracy Summer 2001 Atta, el Shehhi, al
Hamzi, Jarrah, and Hanjour make at
least six trips to Las Vegas. Sept. 11,
2001 Hanjour, Mihdar and one muscle
hijacker are flagged by CAPPS. Fourth
airliner hijacking fails.
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Terrorism
Can Terrorism Afford Failure? Budget Morale
Messianic Expectations, Example, and
Futility. Necessary Conversations (I) Neither
Peace Nor War Talking about Casualties Low
Probability, High Consequence Events Business
as Usual Pork Barrel, Bioshield
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WMD
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WMD
Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
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Nuclear
Nuclear Weapons Atom Bombs vs. H-Bombs.
Blast, Flash, Fallout.
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Doing Policy Barriers to Entry The
Secret of the Atomic Bomb The Plutonium
Route The Enriched Uranium Route A
Surprisingly Durable Barrier No Go
Theorems? Approximately true for Nuclear A
Quick Way Home? Clever Technologies State
Sponsors Theft
Nuclear
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Radiological
Overview Introduction Physics Health
Physics Estimating the Damage Would the Public
Be Sensible? Necessary Conversations
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Radiological
Introduction Radiological Dispersion
Devices Very Low Barriers to Entry Weapons
of Mass Disruption?
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Radiological
An Easy Physics Problem Curies ? Rads
1400 Curies Cesium-137 _at_ 1km2 140
REMs/yr. _at_10km2 13 REMs/yr
Richard Muller, The Dirty Bomb
Distraction, Technology Review http//muller.lbl.g
ov/TRessays/29-Dirty_Bombs.htm
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Curies ?Rads (Computer)
Radiological
1 REM
0.1 REM
0.01 REM
Brooke Buddemeier, Misuse of Radioactive
Material First Responder Considerations (2003),
http//www-cms.llnl.gov/seaborginstitute/training/
radiological_response_2.pdf
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Radiological
Health Physics Benchmarks 0.6
REM/year Denver 0.5 REM/year Radiation
Workers
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Radiological
Health Physics Rads ? Expected Excess Cancers
Late (stochastic) effects follow a linear or
linear quadratic relationship
100
Dose (in Rads) 2,400 (Over 30 years)

80
60
Cancer Induction Rate
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20
2400
rem
Courtesy Christine Hartmann-Siantar, LLNL
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Radiological
Caveat 20 REM ???
Ottawa U International Center For Low-Dose
Radiation Research (Jan. 2002)
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Radiological
One Year, No Evacuation 1km2 1000 people _at_
140 REMs 60 deaths cf. Sept.
11 10km2 10,000 people _at_ 13 REMs 60
deaths cf. Fallon Cancer Cluster
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Radiological
What Will It Cost? Direct (Negligible) Evacuati
on Clean Up
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Radiological
Evacuation Richardson et al. One
week/400,000 people 4.1 billion
estimate Benefit _at_ EPA 6.1m/life standard
100 deaths 600m
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Radiological
CleanUp Scenario 1) Formal Plans 0.1
REM/year National Response Pl
an Protective Action Guide Scenario 2)
Public Panic
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Radiological
Would the Public Really Panic? Imaginability
Memorability Dread Familiarity (Banning the
Threat is Not an Option) Manner of
Death Examples Nuclear Weapons, Radon,
Denver, WWII Bombing
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Radiological
Scenario 3 Elite Panic. ABC and NBC
Several hundred thousand dollars... Har
t Senate Office Building More than 23
million Brentwood Post Office More than
100 million
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Radiological
Necessary Conversations (II) The Response is The
Damage. Discussing Dirty Bombs Ex
Ante. Challenges Nuclear Power Politics Cheap
Shots and Everyone Knows A Tipping Dynamic?
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Chemical
World War I World War II Barriers A Very
Industrialized Weapon (Bhopal)
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Biological
Overview History Barriers to Entry Synthetic
Biology
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Biological
History Between the Wars World War II The Poor
Mans Atomic Bomb? Classical Programs The
Soviet Program
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Biological
Barriers to Entry Identifying Organisms Obtainin
g Pathogen Cultures Hardiness, Virulence,
Antibiotic Resistance Manufacturing
Safety Delivery Wet Agent Dry
Agent Contagious Disease
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Biological
Not Just Biology Knowledge More Than Equipment
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Biological
Synthetic Biology Identifying Organisms Obtainin
g Pathogen Cultures Hardiness, Virulence,
Antibiotic Resistance Manufacturing
Safety Delivery Wet Agent Dry
Agent Contagious Disease
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Biological
Synthetic Biology Self-Governance Screening Expe
riments of Concern Reporting Dangerous
Behavior Collecting Safety/Security
Knowledge Invest in New Technologies
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Biological
Necessary Conversations (III) Prognosis Short-Ru
n Long-Run Not Like the A-Bomb?
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WMD Terrorism Risks Responses
Stephen M. Maurer Science Policy
PP190-01/PP290-01 April 13, 2006