Secure%20and%20Efficient%20Network%20Access

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Secure and EfficientNetwork Access

• DIMACS Workshop, November 3rd, 2004, Piscataway,
  NJ, USA
• Jari Arkko
• Ericsson Research NomadicLab
• Pasi Eronen
• Nokia Research Center
• Pekka Nikander
• Vesa Torvinen
• Ericsson Research NomadicLab
• This presentation has been produced partially in
  the context of the Ambient Networks Project. The
  Ambient Networks Project is part of the European
  Community's Sixth Framework Program for research
  and is as such funded by the European Commission.
  All information in this document is provided as
  is'' and no guarantee or warranty is given that
  the information is fit for any particular
  purpose. The user thereof uses the information at
  its sole risk and liability. For the avoidance of
  all doubts, the European Commission has no
  liability in respect of this document, which is
  merely representing the authors view

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Presentation Outline

• The Problem
• Ongoing work
• Some new ideas
• An example protocol run
• Conclusions

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The Problem
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Some Problems in Current Network Access
Approaches (1/3) - Efficiency

• Attachment involves a large number of messages
• Scanning 802.11 attachment
• 802.1X and EAP messaging
• 802.11i four-way handshake
• DNA IP router and neighbor discovery
• Address autoconfiguration, DAD
• Mobile IP home registration
• Mobile IPv6 correspondent node registration
• Over 50 of this is due to security
• Request/Response style, even across the Internet
• Amount of data is growing with certificates,
  configuration, and discovery
• Multiple mandatory waiting periods
• Even a second, such as for DAD
• Iteration over available accesses

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Some Problems in Current Network Access
Approaches (2/3) - Security

• Im one of the trusted network nodes approach
• Sufficient for large cell size, well protected
  base stations
• Not very good for devices on the coffee shop wall
• Focus on authentication, not authorization
• Does everyone know/agree with the service
  parameters ?
• Denial-of-Service problems
• Use of cryptographic keys very late in the
  process
• Attacks that create/leave state to network side
  elements
• Insecure lower-layer detach messages
• 802.11 countermeasures functionality
• Privacy protection is non-existent or incomplete

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Some Problems in Current Network Access
Approaches (3/3) - Functionality

• Security models do not fit all types of
  deployment
• Credit card payments
• Home deployments (e.g. leap of faith or physical
  connection instead of a certificate exercise)
• Configuration, discovery, and movement support
• What are the IP parameters that I can get from
  this access point?
• Is my home operator available via this access
  point?
• How much would accessing this network cost?
• Could the network tell me when to move, and to
  what channel and parameters to use?

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Ongoing Work
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Ongoing Work to Address the Problems...

• IP mobility
• Better implementations that employ parallism
  allowed by the RFCs
• Faster route optimization schemes, such as moving
  tasks out of the critical path
• Address autoconfiguration
• Turning DAD off
• Optimistic DAD
• DHCP and SEND security

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Ongoing Work, Continued

• DNA, Router and Neighbor Discovery
• Faster algorithms for detecting whether or not
  movement has occurred
• More frequent and precise router advertisements
• Elimination first message delays from RFC 2461
• SEND security
• EAP authentication
• Methods work (new credentials, deployment, )
• Channel binding and parameter authentication

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Ongoing Work, Continued

• Link layer
• Pre-authentication and proactive key distribution
• Better protection of payload packets (AES etc)
• Better information channels from the network to
  the clients (e.g., 802.21)
• Discovery (WIEN SG)
• Faster scanning techniques, parameter tuning
• Bigger subnets (less IP layer work after
  attachment)
• ...

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Observations

• People care about this!
• A lot of results!
• Most work focused on a particular slice of the
  problem
• No good understanding of what the impact of
  individual improvement is for effiency
• E.g., I cant afford 1 RTT in Mobile IP
• Not enough system-level understanding of the
  security issues

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Some New Ideas
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Approach

• Focus on the problem as a whole!
• There are multiple parties involved -- not just
  two
• Who needs to communicate with who?
• How are the parties identified?
• What is the optimal order of messages?
• What system security properties are needed?
• Are there bulk information transfer needs? How
  can they best be addressed?
• Can we learn something from solutions in other
  contexts?

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Caveat

• This may not be compatible with current protocols
• Layer-purists might object to our views
• We do not have all the details, just pointers to
  ideas

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Potential Solution Ingredients (1/5)

• Addressing
• All nodes (not just the client) need an address
• Addresses are hashes of public keys
• Benefits
• All parties -- such as the access network can
  be addressed in communications
• Avoid address stealing and functionality to bind
  addresses to credentials
• Nodes can generate their addresses and keys on
  their own, without infrastructure
• Privacy can be achieved via ephemeral keys
• Identifier vs. routing semantics

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Potential Solution Ingredients (2/5)

• Message order
• Find out what information the whole problem
  involves, and how many messages need to carry it
• And re-think message order
• Example If the clients IP address was known
  earlier, the authentication process with the
  home network could handle mobility-related
  registrations as well
• Benefits
• Number of messages can be reduced
• Ping-pong delays can be avoided

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Potential Solution Ingredients (3/5)

• Information transfer
• Do not fetch everything from the original source
• Cache information about, say, roaming consortium
  in the AP
• Learn from TCP no req-resp across the Internet
• Either run TCP-like protocols directly between
  the client and the, say, home network
• Or have the access point do this over the
  Internet, and use a request-response over the
  final radio hop
• Information transfer capabilities should not be
  restricted to the initial authentication exchange
• Benefits
• More and faster information transfer, at any time

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Potential Solution Ingredients (4/5)

• Miscallenous
• Delegation
• Does the client have to be involved in tasks?
• Can some tasks be delegated to the access
  point/router?
• For instance, router based address assignment and
  DAD
• Even a mobility related registration could be
  delegated
• Denial-of-Service protection
• No separation to attachment and secure
  attachment
• Stateless design on the network side

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Potential Solution Ingredients (5/5)

• Miscallenous, continued
• Privacy protection
• Build the protocols for non-static identifiers
  and addresses
• Protect communications from the start, not at the
  end

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An Example Protocol Run
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The Example

• Flows
• Current message flow
• Suggested basic message flow
• Variant with better mobility support
• Handoff
• Assumptions
• Authentication needed roaming case
• IPv6
• Mobility with RO one peer
• Client - home authentication in 2 RTT (identifier
  / challenge / response / success)

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Example Current Flow
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(No Transcript)
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Example Improved Basic Flow
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Beacon includes - Access node identifier -
Access network identifier - Possible other
advertised information, such as capabilities,
roaming partner identifiers, and so on
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Beacon
The functions of the secure attachment
protocol - Authenticate the claimed identities
(opportunistically) - Turn ciphering on, as in
802.11i 4-way handshake It also piggybacks the
following - Deliver IPv6 router advertisements -
Authentication and authorization to the home
(partially) - May perform address allocation on
behalf of the client - May perform mobility
registration on behalf of the client
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Beacon
I1 trigger exchange
--------------------------gt

select pre-computed R1 R1
puzzle, D-H, key, sig
lt------------------------- check sig
remain
stateless solve puzzle I2
solution, D-H, key, sig
--------------------------gt compute D-H
check cookie

check puzzle
check sig
R2 sig
lt-------------------------- check sig
compute D-H
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Beacon
Secure Attachment
Home auth authz
- The home authentication process follows the
identity/challenge/response/success model (for
instance) - A mobility protocol home registration
is carried in the same messages -- executed after
the final response message is sent
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Beacon
Secure Attachment
Home auth authz
RO registration
1. Client delivers its public key, other
parameters, and a statement that delegates the
access network to allocate an address for it. 2.
Access network has a statement from an authority
about the prefixes it owns. It constructs an
address and sends the address, the statement, and
the clients information to the home network. 3.
Home network sends the information along to the
correspondent node. Correspondent node believes
the validity of the care-of address since it
trusts the same authority. in a HIP-like mobility
solution there is no need to verify the home
address clients signed statement is sufficient.
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Example Variation with Better Mobility Support
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Beacon
Secure Attachment
Home auth authz
RO registration
Care-of Address Test
Variation A common authority can be avoided by a
care-of address test.
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Example Handoffs
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access node 2
Beacon
Secure Attachment
- Access node 1 has a signed statement from the
access network that it is a part of the network.
This is given to the client. - After
authentication and authorization at the home
network, a set of explicit authorization criteria
are known. A signed statement is given to the
client, saying that the client is allowed to move
to another access node within the same network,
as long as the criteria are fulfilled.
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access node 2
Beacon
Secure Attachment
Secure Attachment
- Access node 2 has a similar statement from the
access network as well. - Client presents its
statements and the usual home authentication/autho
rization process can be skipped. Client gets
access. - However, access node 2 needs to verify
authorization criteria. In many case this implies
contacting a central node in the access network
(e.g. concurrent usage limit).
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Conclusions
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Conclusions

• Need to look at the whole problem
• Measurements
• System-level security story
• Solutions
• Some early solution ideas presented
• Clearly more work is needed for the details,
  security analysis actual benefits
• Feedback appreciated!