Veto Players and Greek Politics

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Veto Players and Greek Politics

• Standard comparative classifications regime
  types (presidential, parlimentary,
  semipresidential), party systems (two-multiparty)
• Veto players individual or collective actors
  whose agreement is necessary for a change in the
  status quo
• Difference?

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Add Greece, and US defense policy

• Multiparty system parliamentary system (Greece)
• Two party presidential system (US)
• Decisions are taken by single vps.
• Lack of policy stability
• Once we know their preferences, we know the
  outcome

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Policy conclusions

• The larger the number of vps, the more policy
  stability
• The larger their ideological distance, the more
  policy stability

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Implications

• The larger the core, the more independent the
  judiciary and the bureaucrats
• Difference between statutory (bureaucracies and
  judiciary) and constitutional interpretation
  (judiciary)

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Main points of the talk

• 1. Greek political system has a single vp,
  therefore lacks policy stability
• 2. Greece has 2 constitutional vps, therefore has
  significant (?) constitutional stability
• 3. There is no bureaucratic independence
• 4. There may be independence of constitutional
  courts

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1. Greece a political system with a single VP

• We observe policy change only when government
  changes preferences
• PASOKs economic policy
• 1981-1985, Arsenis Public Investments priority
• 1985-1987, Simitis Consolidation priority
• 1987-1989 ,Tsovolas Expansionary paradigm

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Arsenis 1997 reform on Education

• In 1997 government votes the 2525/97 law
• For more than a year massive demonstrations
  against the law
• In 13/01/1999 ND submits and loses a censure vote
  against Arsenis
• In April 2000 Simitis wins the elections and
  replaces Arsenis with Efthymiou who designs major
  changes in the 2525/97 law

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2. Constitutional change with 2 vps

• Requirement 3/5 (180) on the topic in previous
  parliament for revision by next parliament by
  simple majority (150).
• Otherwise 3/5 (180) in next parliament
• Result of this rule?

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Constitutional design

• Final outcome can be A or B if both of them vote
  for revision now (Parliament 0)
• Carte Blanche delegation to next winner
  (Parliament 1)
• Implication?
• No decision in Parliament 0

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3. Bureaucratic dependence

• In the summer of 2004, i.e. just a few months
  after New Democracy came to power, law
  3260/2004 was enacted. According to that law, the
  grade of general director (genikos diefthintis)
  was abolished, while the corresponding position
  (organiki monda) was maintained (genikes
  diefthinseis). All high positioned public
  employees holding the grade "A'" could apply to
  get that position. The ones who at the time were
  serving as general directors had the following
  choice either to resign and get the pension
  corresponding to the grade of general director,
  or to accept being downgrader to grade"A'", and
  then apply to the new post.
• N Alivizatos (personal communication)

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Explanation

• 1. Spoil system
• 2. Policies produce outcomes with some random
  error (depending on external conditions)
• Principal has preferences over outcomes, not over
  policies.
• Bureaucrat knows outcomes that correspond to
  different policies
• Principal prefers a bureaucrat that agrees on
  outcomes.

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4. Judiciary

• In the 80s (Alivizatos)

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• In the 90s and later (Papaspyrou)
• The Fifth Section was established in 1991 (Act
  1968 of 1991) with a view to uniting the case law
  and providing more comprehensive protection of
  pertinent environmental values. Since then, the
  section has developed a dynamic constitutional
  jurisprudence and has reshaped Greek
  environmental law. On the level of methodology,
  the Section has rejected the old positivist view
  that treats constitutional goals as directives
  with little normative force and has assumed the
  task of specifying the measures needed for
  compliance with the constitution.

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• In the 80s judiciary was dependent
• Throughout the 90s, in policy areas such as
  environmental regulation, education, public
  sector hiring procedures, and public procurement
  procedures, the State Council has produced a
  series of decisions opposing governmental
  executive decrees. It has annulled them or
  claimed that specific executive decrees violate
  constitutional provisions obliging the government
  to modify them accordingly.

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• Governments started using ministerial decisions
  instead of presidential decrees. (Alexopoulos in
  Rasch, Tsebelis)

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• However we observe examples where the State
  Council blocked also ex post ministerial decision
  such as in the case of the ministerial decision
  (?? G2/6953, F?? 1057, t.?? 1-12-97) for the
  reduction of the hours of teaching of the course
  on the orthodox religion on secondary education
  schools. The State Council obliged the minister
  to return to the previous status with a new
  ministerial decision (YA G2/4735/27-8-98).

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• the same in the case of the ministerial decision
  (6495/97 (F?? 975ß/4-11-97) concerning the launch
  of (Programmata Spoydwn Epiloghs) an adult
  education program leading to a university level
  degree next to the conventional way of obtaining
  such a degree in the Greek education system. The
  State Council said that the ministerial decision
  is unconstitutional and led the government to
  issue additional legislation and later in 2000
  the new minister Euthimiou abandoned the program

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Conclusions

• Greece is a country with a single vp as a result
  it has policy instability, and bureaucracies are
  dependent on political elites
• Constitutional change requires 2 vps as a result
  the Council of State can have significant
  independence