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Unions and Microeconomic Performance

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Title: Unions and Microeconomic Performance


1
Unions and Microeconomic Performance
  • Zafiris Tzannatos and Toke S. Aidt

2
Benefits of Representative Organizations
  • Identify good policies to benefit the poor, who
    might otherwise not be represented in government
  • Prevent corruption by giving those otherwise
    without political power an opportunity to
    influence policy-makers
  • Reduce deadweight loss from policies benefiting
    represented groups

3
Are these benefits true of trade unions?
These benefits may not be true of trade unions,
for two reasons
  • Trade unions may pursue political objectivesfor
    example, they may attempt to use political power
    to block competitors from entering their market.
    Trade unions have also sometimes contributed to
    the demise of elected governments.
  • Trade unions may foster a labor aristocracy.
    They may cease to represent the weak and turn
    into groups promoting the welfare of a few,
    powerful members at the expense of the rest of
    the economy. For example, they may promote
    restrictive practices which serve to limit the
    supply, and hence raise the price, of union work.

4
Previous Research
Most research to date finds that unions can have
either positive or negative effects on an
economy, depending on a large number of external
factors. Unions can be good or bad for
economies. But two main verdicts have emerged
  • The economic effects of unions vary with the
    time and country.
  • Unions have different effects based on what
    kinds of economic, institutional, and political
    conditions they operate under.
  • Is the economy competitive? Is it protectionist
    or open to trade?
  • What kinds of government regulations exist on the
    right of workers to organize?
  • How pro-market or pro-welfare is the government?

5
Efficiency
Tzannatos and Aidt focus on efficiency as one of
the main pathways by which unions may slow
economic growth.
  • Allocative efficiency unions may prevent scarce
    resources from being used for the best purpose
    (e.g. wage-distortion between sectors).
  • Technical efficiency unions may prevent firms
    from producing the maximum output with their
    inputs (for example, by restricting the use of
    workers for certain tasks).
  • Dynamic efficiency unions may slow down
    employment creation, or reduce investment.
  • Distributional efficiency unions may arbitrarily
    affect wages for no good reason. Some may get
    higher wages just for being insiders.

6
Production Function Model
  • Typically, to estimate the productivity effects
    of unionization empirically, researchers run
    regressions to predict labor productivity or
    total factor productivity with given inputs,
    firm/industry characteristics, and a
    union/non-union dummy variable.
  • This may not be the most accurate method.
  • If unions raise wages in unionized
    firms/industries, employment may be reduced and
    the marginal product of labor will increase.
  • Higher union wages may cause changes in the input
    mix, creating a simultaneity problem, since
    whether a firm has a union will affect the
    right-hand variables in the regression.
  • Management actions are ignored in this method.
    Since unionization affects management/employee
    relations, this method could give unions credit
    for management actions.

7
Subjective productivity measurement
  • Other studies have used subjective measure of
    productivity, in which employers rate their
    establishments labor productivity compared to
    other firms in the same industry.
  • Obvious problems exist with this, too. The
    responses may not be reliable or accurate, and
    may be affected by unionization even if actual
    productivity is unaffected.

8
Productivity level differentials in the US
  • Considerable variation among studies.
  • Unions seem to raise productivity levels in
    industries with high competition.
  • Unions seem to raise productivity when there are
    good industrial relations (few grievances
    filed, few unresolved grievances, few
    strikes/quits).
  • In industries with bad industrial relations,
    unionized workers may have less incentive to work
    harder. For example, some studies find that
    unionized workers are absent 30 more than
    non-unionized employees. So unionized
    establishments that use incentive-based
    compensation and that use joint decision-making
    between management and labor tend to have higher
    productivity levels than similar non-unionized
    establishments, and unionized establishments that
    use traditional compensation and management
    styles tend to have lower productivity levels
    than similar non-unionized establishments.

9
Productivity level differentials in the UK
  • Tentative, non-robust conclusion UK unions
    decrease productivity levels.
  • The results are affected by what measure of
    unionism is usede.g., union density (negative
    effect) vs. strikes (no effect/positive effect).
  • In competitive industries, there seems to be
    little effect of unionization. Only when there
    are few product competitors do we see
    statistically significant negative productivity
    effects of unions.
  • The productivity effect of unions varies over
    time.
  • Pre-1979 no negative effects
  • Beginning in 1980s, negative effects are seen
  • By late 1990s, according to recent subjective
    productivity measurements, only industries with
    multiple, separately bargaining unions have
    negative productivity effects. For
    establishments with one union or with multiple
    unions that bargain together, there are no
    negative effects.

10
Productivity level differentials in Japan
  • Some studies find that productivity was boosted
    by unions in the 1970s (Muramatsu, 1984). Others
    find that productivity was 15 lower in unionized
    establishments (Brunello, 1992). This is
    confirmed by subjective measurements of
    productivity (Benson, 1994).
  • Full-time union officials seem to have a positive
    impact on productivity.
  • Other studies show that unions may have a ceteris
    paribus negative effect on productivity, but that
    unionization may indirectly increase productivity
    since unionized workers work for longer periods
    of time, reducing labor turnover.

11
Productivity level differentials in Germany
  • Unions seem to have a small negative effect on
    productivity.
  • German firms have work councils that represent
    workers, even in non-unionized firms, so this may
    have hidden some positive effects of unionization
    resulting from the representation of workers
    (evidence on the impact of work councils shows a
    positive effect on productivity, though only in
    larger firms).

12
More evidence based on productivity differentials
  • Unions had no impact on productivity in Korea,
    but mandatory works councils (similar to Germany)
    had positive impact.
  • Australia and Canada, limited evidence shows
    negative effect of unionization.
  • Study on Malaysia found that unionized firms have
    higher productivity levels.
  • Study on nine Latin American countries found that
    unionization had both positive and negative
    effects, depending on the industry and time
    period.

13
Productivity growth differentials
  • In US, unionization may have slowed productivity
    in certain cases, but not significantly overall.
  • In UK, though unions seem to have had negative
    effect on productivity levels during the 1980s,
    there is mixed evidence on the effect of
    unionization on productivity growth. Some
    studies show benefits of unionization on
    productivity growth. Others show no effect.
  • Tzannatos and Aidt believe that it is unlikely
    that productivity growth differentials could
    exist for long, since that would mean a forever
    expanding gap between unionized and non-unionized
    workplaces. If productivity growth differentials
    do exist, they are probably short term.

14
Unions and Technology
  • Theory is ambiguous. Unions may look at short
    term and decide to oppose implementation of
    technological advances, or they may look at
    long-run and decide that productivity-boosting
    technology will be beneficial.
  • Empirical evidence suggests no effect of
    unionization on the adoption of new technology.
    One study found no effect on the adoption of
    numerically controlled machine tools in the US.
    Another found a small positive influence of
    unions on the adoption of microelectronic
    equipment in the UK in the mid-1980s. A third
    found a positive influence of unions on the
    adoption of technological changes.
  • In general, studies show no significant effects
    of unions on technology adoption.

15
Unions, Investment, and RD
  • In theory, unions may demand that profits be used
    to boost wages rather than be invested in
    physical capital or RD. Its also possible that
    increased labor costs associated with unions will
    result in firms substituting away from labor and
    into physical capital and RD.
  • Empirical evidence in US, Canada, UK, and Germany
    suggests a negative effect of unions on
    investment. This effect is reduced as union
    density increases.
  • Evidence suggests a negative effect of
    unionization on RD in UK, US, Canada, and
    Germany, but a positive effect of unionization of
    RD in Japan.

16
Unions and Human Capital
  • Theory suggests that unions should have a
    positive effect on human capital accumulation
  • Empirical evidence shows clear positive effects
    of unionization on human capital acquisition in
    UK. Unionized workers receive more training and
    do better after the training than non-unionized
    workers.
  • US evidence is mixedsome studies find positive
    effects of unionization, but others find no
    differences in specific skills (computer
    literacy, numeracy, or skills training).
  • By changing relative wages, unions could also
    theoretically affect human capital formation by
    increasing relative wages for unskilled workers
    and thereby decreasing the returns to education
    or skill formation. However, firms facing higher
    wages for unskilled workers will substitute away
    from these workers, giving potential employees an
    incentive to seek education to avoid being
    unemployed.
  • Unions may demand more training for workers.
  • Since unions are associated with lower turnover,
    employees may be more inclined to seek
    job-specific training.

17
Unions and Profit
  • Typically, unions are seen as decreasing a firms
    profitability, since they redistribute profits to
    their members. However, this effect may be
    mitigated or eliminated if unionization boosts
    profits. In other words, unions might not just
    take a larger slice of the firms piethey may
    expand the pie first.
  • Studies from the US, the UK, Japan, and Korea
    suggest that financial performance was better in
    non-unionized than unionized firms in the 1980s
    and early 1990s. The effect was stronger for
    firms with monopoly power, and unions sometimes
    appropriated 47-77 of monopoly profits.
  • However, studies of the late 1990s suggest the
    opposite effectunions may have had a positive
    effect on profitsor no effect at all. One
    studied entrepreneurial firms in the US and found
    that unionized firms performed better
    financially. UK studies based on subjective
    measures of performance have found no negative
    effects of unions.

18
Unions and Profit (continued)
  • Unions still have vastly different impacts in
    different firms or industries.
  • Multiple unions that bargain separately are
    associated with lower firm profitability.
  • Unions in firms/industries that face little
    competition have negative impacts, while unions
    in firms/industries that face more product
    competition have little effect.
  • Tzannatos and Aidt argue that, recently, more of
    a firms monopoly rents are part of the value of
    the firm itself, not yearly profits. For
    example, an innovative company that is expected
    to be profitable will have a high rate of return
    on its shares. Some of the monopoly rents, then,
    are gained through capital gains determined
    through the market in expectation of future
    profits. These rents cant be given to a firms
    workforce. They believe this explains much of
    the decrease in the negative effects of
    unionization on financial performance.

19
Unions and Economy-Wide Efficiency Costs
  • Typically, when unions gain benefits for their
    members, they are seen as imposing costs on the
    rest of society. They seek narrow objectives
    that give benefits to their members or reduce
    competition, which tends to displace workers from
    unionized to non-unionized sectors.
  • Empirically, the deadweight loss has been
    estimated in the US and Australia. The two
    countries had similar deadweight losses (lt0.5 in
    the US) though they had large differences in
    unionization (80 unionized in Australia vs. 15
    in the US).

20
Unions and Economy-Wide Efficiency Mitigating
Costs?
  • Unions may decrease information imbalances in the
    economy at large. For example, they may inform
    potential workers about dangers associated with a
    particular firm or industry. Ordinarily, the
    firms would not have to compensate workers for
    the hidden risks, leading to an inefficient
    allocation of labor.
  • In a study in Mexico, the effect for workers of
    correcting this imbalance was estimated at 0.5
    of GDP per year. The economy-wide effect was
    estimated to be about 0.6 of GDP per year.

21
Unions and Economy-Wide Efficiency Unions
Choices
  • Unions can decide whether and to what degree to
    they want to be rent-seekers and advocate
    political change or provide agency services to
    reduce workplace inefficiencies. One path takes
    currently existing wealth and allocates a greater
    share to those the union represents. The other
    makes the firm more profitable and gives the same
    share to the unions members.
  • Unions will base their decisions on market
    conditions.
  • If conditions are competitive, a union will not
    find it as beneficial to spend resources
    attempting to get a larger share of the small
    monopoly rents, and may choose to focus more on
    agency services that expand rents.
  • If an industrys labor relations are more
    regulated, a union will have increased bargaining
    power and will not need to use as many resources
    to gain the same share of the pie. They may
    then focus more on providing agency services that
    expand the pie.
  • Empirically, a study of utility companies in the
    UK showed that, when the companies were
    privatized and hence faced a highly competitive
    market, unions changed their focus from conflict
    (taking more of the pie) to cooperation
    (increasing the pies size).

22
ConclusionUnions have ambiguous effects.
  • External factors determine whether unions are
    detrimental or beneficial to society. For
    example, if markets are competitive and flexible,
    unions may be beneficial. In industries with
    high monopoly rents, however, unions may have
    negative effects on the economy at large.
  • Government and employers have an important role
    to play. They can change the external conditions
    which help determine whether unions are
    beneficial or harmful.
  • Properly handled, unions can be beneficial for
    companies profits and the economy at large.

23
Discussion Questions
  • Tzannatos and Aidt argue that competitive markets
    will reduce the benefits of rent extraction, so
    unions will substitute towards rent creation.
    They also argue that deregulation increases the
    cost of rent extraction by decreasing a unions
    bargaining power, so unions will shift their
    resources towards rent extraction in order to
    maintain their share. Arent these two stories
    similar? In both cases, the marginal benefit of
    a dollar spent on rent extraction has decreased.
    Why do Tzannatos and Aidt believe there will be
    different effects?
  • Were you satisfied with the authors handling of
    the difficulties in measuring productivity (e.g.,
    increasing wages in unionized firms automatically
    increases the MP)?
  • Does this paper have implications for long-term
    growth?
  • Do you accept the authors contention that unions
    will make rational allocative decisions between
    rent extraction and rent creation?
  • One problem with unions mentioned in the paper is
    their propensity to seek their ends through
    government means. Does this pose a problem for
    Tzannatos and Aidt when they argue that external
    factors shape the face of the union? For
    example, though competitive markets make for a
    more productive union, unions may use democratic
    means to control their market and make it less
    competitive.
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