The Strategy of Rhetoric William H' Riker

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The Strategy of RhetoricWilliam H. Riker

• The Research Question Are there systematic (
  rational) patterns to campaign rhetoric?
• The Analytical Challenge How do we analyze
  subjective material objectively?
• The Research Design multiple coders, rely on
  editorial choices, weighted words
• Key Assumption the logic of increasing returns

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The Utility of Negative Campaigns

• Why was campaign so negative?
• An aberration unlikely its been with us ever
  since!
• Not simply reaction to losing federalists were
  negative too
• Perhaps negative campaigns are effective
• Why might negative campaigns be effective?

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• Campaigns make arguments about contingent states
  of the world
• Failing to adopt the Constitution will lead to
  another war
• The Constitutions uniformity will spur economic
  growth
• The Constitution will create a costly and
  tyrannical federal government
• A second convention would offer a better solution
• How might voters decide over these contingent
  states of the world?

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• Consider each campaign as offering a lottery,
  e.g.
• Probability, p, that Constitution aids economic
  growth
• Probability (1-p) that Constitution adds to cost
  of government
• Voters expected utility of a federalist vote is
  therefore
• EUFederalist pGrowth (1-p)Costly Government

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
This line sets out the possible outcomes between
the two possible states of the world.
UEG
UCG
Voters Income given
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
reducing to costly government (of some value)
if p 0
Voters Income given
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
and to economic growth (of some value) if p
1
Voters Income given
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
and to the possibilities in between economic
growth and costly government as p varies from 1
to 0.
Voters Income given
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
so that if p .5, the voters expected income
would fall exactly on the middle of this line...
UEG
UCG
Voters Income given
Expected Income if p .5
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
but how much utility the voter gets from that
expected income is an open question
UEG
UCG
Voters Income given
Expected Income if p .5
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
The voter might be indifferent between this
income and a 50-50 shot at the lower or higher
incomes
Voters Utility
UEG
UCG
Voters Income given
Expected Income if p .5
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
The voter might be indifferent between this
income and a 50-50 shot at the lowest or highest
incomes
UEG
these voters are risk-neutral
UCG
Voters Income given
Expected Income if p .5
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
But other voters might get as much utility from
getting a lower income for certain
UEG
Certain Income
UCG
Voters Income given
Expected Income if p .5
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
indeed, theyd always prefer less income at
higher probabilities so that their utility
functions would actually look like concave
curves these voters are risk averse
Voters Utility
UEG
Certain Income
UCG
Voters Income given
Expected Income if p .5
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion
Voters Utility
Conversely, given a certain income, some people
would get as much utility from a lottery on a
higher income. Their utility functions would
actually look convex these voters are risk
acceptant
UEG
Certain Income
UCG
Voters Income given
Costly Government
Economic Growth
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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• We know that people tend to
• be risk-averse over gains
• be risk-acceptant over losses
• over-estimate subjective probability of rare
  events,
• and minimize regret rather than maximize utility

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• Consider these choices
• An African village of 600 is at risk of a cholera
  epidemic, and
• 200 will be saved
• There is a 1/3 chance that 600 survive

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• Consider these choices
• 1,000,000
• .89 chance of 1,000,000, .1 chance of
  5,000,000, .01 chance 0.00

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• Consider these choices
• An African village of 600 is at risk of a cholera
  epidemic, and
• 400 die
• 2/3 chance that 600 die

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• Consider these choices
• .11 chance of 1,000,000 and .89 chance 0.00
• .1 chance of 5,000,000, .90 chance 0.00

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• Some people chose
• Health plan I over II but IV over III
• a over b but d over c!!
• Reflects minimizing regret

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Expected Utility and Risk Aversion

• We know that people tend to
• be risk-averse over gains (i.e., prefer a little
  less for sure)
• be risk-acceptant over losses (i.e., prefer to
  gamble to get out of a hole)
• over-estimate probability of rare events,
• and minimize regret rather than maximize utility
• This can affect voting behaviour

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Using Rhetoric to Manipulate Risk

• So far is the general sense of mankind from
  corresponding with the tenets of those who
  endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of
  discord and hostility between the States, in the
  event of disunion, that it has from long
  observation of the progress of society become a
  sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or
  nearness of situation, constitutes nations
  natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses
  himself on this subject to this effect
  NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally
  enemies of each other unless their common
  weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE
  REPUBLIC
• Federalist No. 2

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Using Rhetoric to Manipulate Risk

• The evils of anarchy have been portrayed with
  all the imagery of language The other spectre
  raised to terrify and alarm the people out of the
  exercise of their judgment on this great
  occasion, is the dread of our splitting into
  separate confederacies or republics that might
  become rival powers and consequently liable to
  mutual wars This is an event still more
  improbable than the foregoing This hobgoblin
  appears to have sprung from the deranged brain of
  Publius, who has mechanically endeavored to
  force conviction by a torrent of misplaced words
• Centinel 453

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Using Rhetoric to Manipulate Risk

• Three types of voters
• Decided Maximizers exaggerate difference between
  benefits of outcomes
• Disengaged grab attention with survey of
  potential disaster stories
• Regret-minimizers focus on worst possible
  disaster if they vote for opponent
• Negative campaigning works on all three groups
• What about wavering utility maximizers?

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A Wavering Voters Utility Function
Flatter, concave (i.e., risk-averse) utility
function in gains
Voters Expected Utility
Outcome of Opponents Platform (e.g., war,
depression)
Outcome of Rhetors Platform (e.g., peace,
prosperity)
Steeper utility function in losses because people
exaggerate subjective probability of rare events,
esp. bad ones

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The Anti-Federalist Rhetorical Campaign
than by emphasizing gains here
Voters Expected Utility
The Constitution
A 2nd Convention
The Articles
Greater marginal effect by exaggerating threat
here
Expected outcome of lottery over Constitution
and 2nd convention

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The Federalist Rhetorical Campaign
Voters Expected Utility
War Anarchy
A Ratified Constitution
The Articles
Expected outcome of lottery over Constitution
and War Anarchy