Honeybees: A Defense Against Wireless Jamming Attack

1
Honeybees A Defense Against Wireless Jamming
Attack
Sherif Khattab Rami Melhem Daniel Mossé
Jamming in Sensor Networks
Jamming in Multi-radio 802.11 Networks
Motivation
Motivation
802.11 networks also
vulnerable hardware-based anti-jamming
either limited in speed or ineffective if used
by jammers. Software-based channel
hopping proposed for
single-radio devices.
Mutli-radio devices emerging
(e.g., 802.11n)
Jammers maliciously violate MAC-layer
protocols to block communication. Wireless
sensor networks highly vulnerable
constrained resources high compromise
risk Base-station single
point of failure
Reactive or Proactive?
Honeybees
Proactive hopping received more attention
than reactive in single-radio implementation
simplicity overhead and difficulty to detect
jamming Is proactive hopping
better also in multi-radio networks?
Mobile Base-stations move
between roots of redundant
data-collection trees. Mobile jammers
attack tree roots.
Jammer
Multi-radio node
Mobile Base-station
Sensor
Channels
Results
Results
Honeybees achieves higher
efficiency (throughput per unit of
relative energy) than plain evasion against low
and intermediate attackers and degrades to
high attackers more gracefully
than plain replication.
Against low to intermediate
attackers, proactive and
reactive have similar performance.
Against high attackers, reactive more
efficient taking into consideration attackers
best strategy.