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Corporate Governance

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shareholders purchase stock, becoming residual claimants ... enforcement mechanisms such as the managerial labor market to mitigate the agency problem ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Corporate Governance


1
Corporate Governance
  • Corporate governance is
  • a relationship among stakeholders that is used to
    determine and control the strategic direction and
    performance of organizations
  • concerned with identifying ways to ensure that
    strategic decisions are made effectively
  • used in corporations to establish order between
    the firms owners and its top-level managers

2
Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Internal Governance Mechanisms
  • Board of Directors

Managerial Incentive Compensation
Ownership Concentration
External Governance Mechanisms

Market for Corporate Control
3
Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control
  • Basis of the modern corporation
  • shareholders purchase stock, becoming residual
    claimants
  • shareholders reduce risk by holding diversified
    portfolios
  • professional managers are contracted to provide
    decision-making
  • Modern public corporation form leads to efficient
    specialization of tasks
  • risk bearing by shareholders
  • strategy development and decision-making by
    managers

4
Agency Relationship Owners and Managers
  • Firm owners

5
Agency Relationship Owners and Managers
  • Firm owners
  • Decision makers

6
Agency Relationship Owners and Managers
  • Firm owners
  • Decision makers
  • Risk bearing specialist (principal) pays
    compensation to a managerial decision-making
    specialist (agent)

7
Agency Theory Problem
  • The agency problem occurs when
  • the desires or goals of the principal and agent
    conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the
    principal to verify that the agent has behaved
    inappropriately
  • Solution
  • principals engage in incentive-based performance
    contracts
  • monitoring mechanisms such as the board of
    directors
  • enforcement mechanisms such as the managerial
    labor market to mitigate the agency problem

8
Manager and Shareholder Risk and Diversification
Managerial (employment) risk profile
Shareholder (business) risk profile
Risk
Dominant Business
Unrelated Businesses
Related Constrained
Related Linked
Diversification
9
Governance Mechanisms
  • Insiders
  • The firms CEO and other top-level managers
  • Affiliated Outsiders
  • Individuals not involved with day-to-day
    operations, but who have a relationship with the
    company
  • Independent Outsiders
  • Individuals who are independent of the firms
    day-to-day operations and other relationships

10
Governance Mechanisms
  • Role of the Board of Directors
  • Monitor Are managers acting in shareholders
    best interests
  • Evaluate Influence examine proposals,
    decisions actions, provide feedback and offer
    direction
  • Initiate Determine delineate corporate
    mission, specify strategic options, make decisions

11
Governance Mechanisms
  • Salary, bonuses, long term incentive compensation
  • Executive decisions are complex and non-routine
  • Many factors intervene making it difficult to
    establish how managerial decisions are directly
    responsible for outcomes

12
Governance Mechanisms
  • Stock ownership (long-term incentive
    compensation) makes managers more susceptible to
    market changes which are partially beyond their
    control
  • Incentive systems do not guarantee that managers
    make the right decisions, but do increase the
    likelihood that managers will do the things for
    which they are rewarded

13
CEO Pay and Performance
  • Classic pay for
  • performance
  • relationship
  • Unfortunately, this
  • relationship is weak

CEO Pay
  • The stronger
  • relationship is with
  • firm size

Firm Performance
14
CEO Pay and Firm Size
  • Relationship between
  • pay and firm size is
  • curvilinear.
  • CEO pay increases at
  • a decreasing rate

CEO Pay
Firm Size
15
Relationship Between Firm performance and Firm
Size
  • Relationship between
  • firm performance and
  • firm size is curvilinear.

  • Beyond some point, as
  • size increases, firm
  • performance declines

Firm Performance
  • BUT
  • From the graph of CEO
  • pay vs. firm size, pay
  • doesnt decline

Firm Size
16
Relationship Between Firm performance and Equity
Ownership
  • Relationship between
  • firm performance
  • (Tobins Q) and
  • managerial ownership
  • is curvilinear.


Firm Value
  • Beyond some point, as
  • ownership increases,
  • firm value declines

Managerial Ownership in
17
Governance Mechanisms
  • Large block shareholders (often institutional
    owners) have a strong incentive to monitor
    management closely
  • Exit vs. Voice Cannot costlessly exit due to
    equity stake (transaction costs) so they press
    for change (exercise voice)
  • They may also obtain Board seats which enhances
    their ability to monitor effectively (although
    financial institutions are legally forbidden from
    directly holding board seats)

18
Governance Mechanisms
  • Types of institutional investors
  • - Mutual funds, pension funds,
  • foundations, churches, universities,
  • insurance companies
  • Pressure-resistant versus pressure-sensitive
  • - Mutual and pension funds are
  • pressure resistant
  • Are Institutional investors the same?
  • - Short vs. long term
  • Components of voice
  • - Pension fund hit lists
  • - Shareholder liability suits
  • - Investor alliances
  • - Proxy contests

19
Governance Mechanisms
  • Firms face the risk of takeover when they are
    operated inefficiently
  • Many firms begin to operate more efficiently as a
    result of the threat of takeover, even though
    the actual incidence of hostile takeovers is
    relatively small
  • Changes in regulations have made hostile
    takeovers difficult
  • Acts as an important source of discipline over
    managerial incompetence and waste

20
Managerial Defense Tactics
  • Designed to fend off the takeover attempt
  • Increase the costs of making the acquisitions
  • Causes incumbent management to become entrenched
    while reducing the chances of introducing a new
    management team
  • May require asset restructuring
  • Institutional investors oppose the use of defense
    tactics

21
Takeover Defenses
  • Poison pills
  • Leveraged recapitalizations
  • Greenmail
  • Litigation

22
Takeover Defenses
  • Poison pills
  • Leveraged recapitalizations
  • Greenmail
  • Litigation
  • Scorched earth defense
  • Crown jewel sales
  • Pac-man defense

23
Takeover Defenses
  • Poison pills
  • Leveraged recapitalizations
  • Greenmail
  • Litigation
  • Scorched earth defense
  • Crown jewel sales
  • Pac-man defense
  • White knight defense
  • Other bidder (competitive bid situation)
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