David Ball

1
YTY SeminarRadioactive waste - Risk and
SocietyUniversity of KuopioNovember 2005
Developing policy trends towards involving
society in decision making

• David Ball
• Centre for Decision Analysis Risk Management
• Middlesex University
• London, UK
• D.Ball_at_mdx.ac.uk

2
Phineas Gage
3
Trends in decision making.
USA 1983
USA 1996
4
Trends in decision making.
UK 1983
UK 1992
5
Ref. Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Analysis (1995),
15(2), 137-145.
6
Features of the trend.
Up to the 1980s decisions about technical matters
were regarded, without question, as the domain of
experts In the 1990s decisions about technical
matters were beginning to be regarded as not
purely technical at all, and incorporated
uncertainty and value judgements In the 2000s
input from stakeholders and the wider public is
regarded as sine qua non, as are openness and
transparency
7
Justifications for broadening participation in
risk regulation 1. Normative rationale. Risk
regulation is not a value-free activity and
therefore it is necessary for moral and
democratic reasons
8

• Justifications for broadening participation in
  risk regulation
• 1. Normative rationale. Risk regulation is not a
  value-free activity and therefore it is necessary
  for moral and democratic reasons
• Epistemic rationale. Drawing on wider knowledge
  reduces the chance of policy error

9

• Justifications for broadening participation in
  risk regulation
• 1. Normative rationale. Risk regulation is not a
  value-free activity and therefore it is necessary
  for moral and democratic reasons
• Epistemic rationale. Drawing on wider knowledge
  reduces the chance of policy error
• Instrumental rationale. Increases the chance of
  implementing your chosen policy option.

10

• A plethora of techniques for public engagement
• focus groups
• opinion polls
• citizens panels and juries
• round tables
• analytic-deliberative methods
• et cetera

11

• In the UK, it is being applied to major issues
  like
• control of BSE and scrapie in animals
• issues around GM crops
• nuclear waste
• In the name of
• putting consumers first
• being open and accessible

12
But is it that easy?
13
Ref Henry Rothstein (2004), Public
Administration, 82(4), 857-881.
14
Emerging counter arguments - information and
power imbalances between stakeholders is
difficult to deal with. What looks like an
extension of democracy may be the reverse -
decisions may involve complex trade-offs between
different policy areas leading to
disenchantment - conclusions reached in
participative forums may have to bow to external
requirements e.g. EU or supra-national, more
disenchantment - greater transparency can
increase fear - might open the door to junk
science
15
Insights from psychology and decision research
Phineas Gage
16
(No Transcript)
17
There is no dearth of evidence in everyday life
that people apprehend reality in two
fundamentally different ways, one variously
labeled intuitive, automatic, natural,
non-verbal, narrative, and experiential, and the
other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and
rational. Seymour Epstein 1994, p. 710
18
Risk As Analysis vs. Risk as Feelings
Analytic/ Deliberative
Experiential/ Affective
19
(No Transcript)
20

• Reliance on Feelings Increases With
• Innumeracy
• Cognitive Load
• complexity of task information
• amount of information
• memory demands
• Stress
• time pressure
• pain
• poor health
• Older age
• Affect rich outcomes images
• evaluable information displays

21
AFFECT - Affective images
22
(No Transcript)
23
AFFECT is not the only factor to influences our
decisions 1. Evaluability
24
Attributes of Two Dictionaries in Hsees Study
Source Adapted from Hsee (1998)
25
Affect, Evaluability and Attractiveness of Simple
Gambles

• Mean attractiveness
• (0-20 scale)
• 9.4
• 14.3

• Gamble 1. 7/36 chance to win 9
• Otherwise win nothing
• Gamble 2. 7/36 chance to win 9
• 29/36 chance to lose 5
• Attractiveness is determined by probability in
  Gamble 1. The 9 payoff is not evaluable and
  carries little weight.
• In gamble 2, 9 comes alive with feeling as a
  very attractive outcome compared to the small
  loss. It then carries weight in the judgment.

26
2. Numeracy
27
Numeracy in UO undergraduate sample (Slovic)
28
The ability to understand numbers will influence

• The precision of feelings about probabilistic
  information
• The extent to which affect influences choices

29
3. Probability and Relative Frequency

• Are they the same or different in communicating
  risk?
• e.g. 1 chance
• vs.
• 1 out of 100

30
RISK COMMUNICATION A patient Mr. James Jones
has been evaluated for discharge from an acute
civil mental health facility where he has been
treated for the past several weeks. A
psychologist whose professional opinion you
respect has done a state-of-the-art assessment of
Mr. Jones. Among the conclusions reached in the
psychologists assessment is the
following EITHER Patients similar to Mr.
Jones are estimated to have a 20 probability of
committing an act of violence to others during
the first several months after discharge.
OR Of every 100 patients similar to Mr.
Jones, 20 are estimated to commit an act of
violence to others during the first several
months after discharge.
31
Question

• If you were working as a supervisor at this
  mental health facility and received the
  psychologists report, would you recommend that
  Mr. Jones be discharged from the hospital at the
  present time?

32
4. Intuitive Toxicology Main Result
Many people lack dose-response sensitivity for
exposure to chemicals that can produce effects
that are dreaded, such as cancer (high
affect). If large exposures are bad, small
exposures are also bad.
33
5. Terrorism and Probability NeglectCass R.
SunsteinThe Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
26(2/3) 121-136, 2003

• People are prone to . . . probability neglect,
  especially when their emotions are intensely
  engaged. Probability neglect is highly likely in
  the aftermath of terrorism. People fall victim
  to probability neglect if and to the extent that
  the intensity of their reaction does not greatly
  vary even with large differences in the
  likelihood of harm. When probability neglect is
  at work, peoples attention is focused on the bad
  outcome itself, and they are inattentive to the
  fact that it is unlikely to occur.

34
From Sunstein, 2003

• In the context of the terrorist attacks of
  September 11, 2001, . . ., public fear led to
  private and public costs that were orders of
  magnitude higher than the costs of the attacks
  themselves, and that are best explained in part
  by reference to probability neglect. The same
  might be said about the extraordinary public fear
  produced by the sniper attacks in the
  Washington, D.C. area in October 2002 the extent
  of the fear is hard to understand without an
  appreciation of probability neglect.

35
6. Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life

• I am deeply moved if I see one man suffering
  and would risk my life for him. Then I talk
  impersonally about the possible pulverization of
  our big cities, with a hundred million dead. I
  am unable to multiple one mens suffering by a
  hundred million.
• Albert Szent Gyorgi

36
7. Proportion dominance
The proportion of lives saved carries more
affective meaning than the number of lived
saved For example, in separate evaluations there
will likely be more support for saving 80 of 100
lives at risk than saving 20 of 1000 lives at
risk.
37
A Study of Proportion Dominance (Slovic)
Airport Safety Imagine you are a member of
the emergency response committee of the Eugene
Airport. There is a proposal before your
committee to purchase some expensive new
equipment for use in the event of a crash landing
of an airliner. The circumstances that might
require such equipment to be used are rare but
important. It is estimated that, over a 10
year period, there is about 1 chance in 1,000
that the equipment would be needed one time and
that it would save the 150 lives that would be in
jeopardy in such an event. Thus, the benefit
of this equipment in saving lives could be
portrayed by the gamble 1 chance in 1,000 to
save the 150 lives in jeopardy. Critics
argue that the money spent on this system could
be better spent enhancing other aspects of
airport safety. How strongly would you
support this proposed measure to purchase the new
equipment?
38
Airport Safety Imagine you are a member of
the emergency response committee of the Eugene
Airport. There is a proposal before your
committee to purchase some expensive new
equipment for use in the event of a crash landing
of an airliner. The circumstances that might
require such equipment to be used are rare but
important. It is estimated that, over a 10
year period, there is about 1 chance in 1,000
that the equipment would be needed one time and
that it would save 98 of the 150 lives that
would be in jeopardy in such an event. Thus,
the benefit of this equipment in saving lives
could be portrayed by the gamble 1 chance in
1,000 to save 98 of the 150 lives in jeopardy.
Critics argue that the money spent on this
system could be better spent enhancing other
aspects of airport safety. How strongly would you
support this proposed measure to purchase the new
equipment?
39
Proportion Dominance and Airport Safety
Saving a percentage of 150 lives receives higher
support ratings than does saving 150 lives.
40
Some conclusions

• The analytic and experiential (affective) systems
  of thought are exquisitely sophisticated and
  embody the essence of human rationality. We need
  them both (as Phineas discovered)
• Both systems, however, can lead us astray.
• Each system needs the other for guidance.

41
Conclusions

• We cannot assume that an intelligent person can
  understand the meaning of, and properly act upon,
  even the simplest of numbers such as amounts of
  money or numbers of lives at risk, not to mention
  less familiar measures or statistics, unless
  these numbers are infused with affect.

42
Conclusions

• The scientific study of affective rationality is
  in its infancy.
• Question Are we, by placing so much hope in
  deliberative processes prior to their more
  careful evaluation, taking a big risk?
• GOOD DECISIONS ARE HARD TO MAKE.
• THEY REQUIRE HARD WORK AND PAIN.

43
What do the public want anyway?

• The evidence, so far as technological decisions
  are concerned, appears to be that the public
  want
• to be consulted (OED definition)
• to have an overview of the process
• not to make the decision
• to make full use of specialist knowledge

44

• Decisions about sci/tech should be based
  primarily on
• Expert advice on risks and benefits
• Publics views of risks and benefits
• C) DK

Eurobarometer June 2005
45
Q What kind of procedure might suit the public?
The indications are that its one that involves
the public at appropriate stages and also makes
full and proper use of accumulated specialist
knowledge whether its economics, science,
ethics, or law etc.
46
Ortwin Renns Insight

• It is necessary to integrate
• knowledge based on technical expertise
• knowledge derived from social interests
• knowledge based on common sense and personal
  experience

Ref The challenge of integrating deliberation
and expertise, Ortwin Renn, 2002.
47
In conclusion

• some decisions are immensely important and may
  affect countless lives
• some form of deliberation is nowadays seen as
  essential
• to have deliberated does not entitle one
  automatically to any high moral ground
• all forms of deliberation are not equal
• deliberation is to some extent experimental and
  its subtleties are not fully understood