Title: ECO 6705 Protectionism: Analyzing the Effects of Trade Restrictions
1ECO 6705Protectionism Analyzing the Effects of
Trade Restrictions
- Dr. Jeff Steagall
- September 22, 2003
2Associated Reading
- Van den Berg, chapter 6
- Friedman, chapters 11-13
3Types of Trade Restrictions
- Trade policy
- Set of rules restrictions on international
trade - Uses various policy tools (tariffs, quotas, etc.)
- Tariffs (duties)
- On
- Imports
- Exports (atypicalused when a country has market
global power for the good, such as oil) - Amounts can be
- Ad velorem ( of value)
- Specific (per unit)
- Combination
4Types of Trade Restrictions
- Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
- Quantitative restrictions
- Quotas (on imports)
- Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs)
- Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRAs)
- Export controls (quotas)
- Administrative protection
- Unfair trade statutes
- Antidumping
- Anti-subsidy (countervailing)
5Welfare Effects of Tariffs Small Country in PE
- Assume the country is small
- No global market power in the sector
- Countrys actions cannot affect world price
- Country bears entire cost of its actions
- Not necessary to draw Abroad or World markets to
analyze effects of small country tariff - Assume specific tariff for simplicity
- Analysis and results are similar for ad velorem
or combination duties
6Welfare Effects of Tariffs Small Country in PE
- Effects of tariff
- World price remains unchanged at PFT
- Country is too small to influence world price
- Importers still pay world price on world markets
- Domestic price rises by amount of tariff
- Importers must pay the tariff to get the product
through customs and into the domestic market - Consumer prices must rise to match
- Tariff creates a wedge between domestic and world
prices
7Welfare Effects of Tariffs Small Country in PE
- Effects of tariff, cont.
- Domestic consumer surplus (CS) falls
- Domestic producer surplus (PS) rises
- Government gains tariff revenue
- Area in graph is a rectangle defined by
- Import amount on horizontal axis
- Tariff amount on vertical axis
- Domestic consumers pay this tariff through higher
prices - Decrease in CS is bigger than the combined
increases in PS and tariff revenue (deadweight
loss) - Domestic welfare is ALWAYS lower with a tariff
than with free trade for a small country - Optimal tariff for small country is zero (i.e.,
free trade)
8Welfare Effects of Tariffs Large Country in PE
- Assume the country is small
- Has global market power in the sector, by
definition of being a large country - Countrys actions do affect world price
- Country does not bear entire cost of its actions
- It is necessary to draw Abroad or World markets
to analyze effects of large country tariff
9Welfare Effects of Tariffs Large Country in PE
- Effects of tariff
- Domestic price rises due to tariff
- Importers must pay the tariff to get the product
through customs and into the domestic market - Consumer prices must rise to match
- Graphically, tariffs decrease international
supply (left shift) - Increased domestic prices cause quantity demanded
to fall - Since country is large, the units that used to be
sold in Homeland are put back on the
international market - At prevailing international price, those units
remain unsold - International suppliers must drop their prices to
sell these units - Equilibrium world price with large country tariff
falls below PFT
10Welfare Effects of Tariffs Large Country in PE
- Effects of tariff, cont.
- Now importers
- Purchase products in international markets at new
world price - Bring products through customs, paying the tariff
- Sell the product domestically at a new price that
is equal to the new international price plus the
tariff - Thus, domestic price
- Is higher with the tariff than with FT
- Is lower than the sum of PFT Tariff
11Welfare Effects of Tariffs Large Country in PE
- Effects of tariff, cont.
- Domestic consumer surplus (CS) falls
- Domestic producer surplus (PS) rises
- Government gains tariff revenue
- Area in graph is a rectangle defined by
- Import amount on horizontal axis
- Tariff amount on vertical axis
- Tariff revenue is paid partly by
- Domestic consumers in the form of higher prices
- Foreign producers in the form of a lower
international price - Large countries can shift part of tariff burden
abroad!
12Welfare Effects of Tariffs Large Country in PE
- Effects of tariff, cont.
- Part of CS decrease is offset by PS increase
- It is not clear whether tariff revenue is bigger
or smaller than the part of CS loss that is not
offset by the gain in PS - Thus, it is POSSIBLE that domestic welfare is
higher or lower with a tariff than with free
trade for a large country
13Welfare Effects of Tariffs Large Country in PE
- Optimal tariff for large country
- If one chooses the right tariff, it can be
positive, but only if - Assumptions
- Government redistributes tariff revenue in a
welfare-increasing way - No waste, inefficiency, or administrative costs
- No loss through rent-seeking behavior
- Foreign governments dont retaliate with their
own tariffs - Unlikely!
14Lerner Symmetry Theorem
- An import tariff raises opportunity costs for
domestic exporters (in the other sector), and
therefore is a tax on both exports and imports - The price increase induced by the tariff
- Causes import-competing industry to expand
- Bid resources away from export sector
- Increases opportunity cost for export sector
- Decreases supply (left shift) in export sector
- Since export sector has CA, tariffs cause a
misallocation of resources across sectors - Some of the gains from specialization are
unrealized - Draw export sector PE for a country imposing an
import tariff to see this formally
15Tariff Effects in GE
- Students are responsible only for Figure 6.7 (not
appendix) - Small country case
- Tariff changes domestic prices
- If X-axis represents import-competing product
- Domestic price line gets steeper
- Production point shifts (away from CA product)
- Country still trades according to international
prices - Consumers purchase based on domestic prices
- Welfare is reduced
16Summary of Tariff Effects Large Country
- Transfers of welfare occur
- Domestic consumers to domestic producers
- Domestic consumers to domestic government
- Foreign producers to foreign consumers
- Foreign producers to domestic government
- Deadweight losses both domestically and abroad
17Nominal vs Effective Protection
- Nominal tariff
- Reflects tariff on output product only
- Ignores remainder of trade policy (e.g., tariffs
on inputs) - Specific tariff dollar amount
- Ad velorem tariff percentage
18Nominal vs Effective Protection
- Effective tariff
- Considers entire trade policy
- All protection that affects the industry
- Tariff on output
- Tariffs on inputs
- Non-tariff protection would also be included, but
for simplicity, well stick to tariffs only in
this class - Effective tariff is the percentage change in
value added for the industry with the entire
trade policy in place (vis-à-vis free trade)
19Nominal vs Effective Protection
- Value added output price - cost of inputs
- (VA)
20Calculating Effective Tariff Rate (ETR)
- Calculate free trade VA (VAFT)
- Calculate prices of output inputs with new
trade policy - Calculate VA with trade policy (VATP)
- ETR (VATP - VAFT) / VAFT
- This is a fraction
- Multiply by 100 to get the percentage
- Students are responsible for this calculation
21Effective Tariff Rate
- ETR is sometimes called Effective Rate of
Protection (ERP) - ETR can be
- Positive
- Trade policy increases value added vis-à-vis FT
- Value of output protection exceeds harm of input
protection - Negative
- Trade policy increases value added vis-à-vis FT
- Value of output protection is less than harm of
input protection - Zero
- Trade policy has no effect on VA
- Value of output protection equals harm of input
protection
22Effects of NTBs
- Students are responsible only for small country
case of NTBs - Small country version of Figure 6.12 only
- Not for Figures 6.10 and 6.11
- Not for Figure 6.12 for large nation
- All NTB analyses will be for
- Tariff-equivalent quota (TEQ) a quota that has
the same effects on prices quantities as a
given tariff - Refer to tariff as corresponding tariff
- This allows us to focus on differences between
various trade policy tools
23Effects of Quota, Small Nation
- Some effects same as corresponding tariff
- Decrease in CS
- Increase in PS
- Government revenue can be different
- No tariff, so no tariff revenue
- Allocation of quota can generate some revenue
- Quota leaves country no better off, and most
likely worse off, than an equivalent
(corresponding tariff would have)
24Effects of Quota, Small Nation
- Ways to allocate quota rights
- First-come, first-served
- No revenue for government
- Incentive for exporters is to be first into
market - Lots of goods available early in year
- No new imports late in year, as quota has been
used up - Issue import licenses (i.e., import permits)
- Each license gives firm the right to export some
amount during the year - Firm chooses when to export, so goods can be
available all year - Selling licenses can generate government revenue
25Effects of Quota, Small Nation
- Ways to allocate import licenses
- Flat fee
- Who sets fee?
- Does fee reflect value of licenses?
- Set requirements for exporters to be eligible
- Require paperwork by exporters to justify why
they should be able to export - Lotteries
- Auctions
26Effects of Quota, Small Nation
- Auction, cont.
- If set up efficiently, auction can generate up to
same amount of government revenue that the
corresponding tariff would generate - Firms that have licenses can sell at higher
prices in the quota-imposing country than it can
on world markets - Earn rents on exports
- Total available rent is equal to tariff revenue
with corresponding tariff - Firms will pay up to that amount in order to be
eligible to earn those rents - Efficient auctions are fairly easy in practice
27Rents and Rent-Seeking
- What happens when import licenses are sold by
government? - Government captures rents
- Rent-seekers who feel entitled to having those
rents transferred to them appear - Import-competing industry
- Other ways that rents are captured
- Higher profits by subsidiaries producing in the
protecting country (e.g., Toyota plants in US)
28Rent-Seeking Behavior
- Rent-seeking is the use of scarce resources to
induce transfers of wealth instead of using them
to create new wealth - Lobbying
29Effects of VERs Small Nation
- Same as quota situation, except
- VER is policy of export-nation government, not
import-nation government - Import-nation government has no import licenses
to allocate, since its not actually restricting
imports - VER allows no import-country government revenue
- VER leaves country even worse off than with a
quota
30Relative Rankings of Trade Policies
- So far, we know that
- Free Trade (best)
- Tariff
- Quota
- VER (worst)
31Administrative Barriers to Trade
- Bureaucratic procedures
- Safety requirements
- Foreign ownership restrictions
- Threat of lawsuits (harassment of foreign firms)
- Government procurement (buy domestically)
- State, provincial local restrictions