David%20J.%20Kilcullen

1
Dinosaurs versus MammalsInsurgent and
Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq, 2007

• David J. Kilcullen
• Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency
• to the Secretary of State
• RAND Insurgency Board
• May 8, 2008

2
An unforgiving environment that punishes error
Leading to Darwinian pressure on both sides
3
1. Diagnosing the Problem a Vicious Circle
2
Sunni extremists attack neighboring Shia
communities
1
Extremists infiltrate Sunni communities,
establish base areas through intimidation
3
Shia militias and death squads attack Sunni
communities
Sectarian attacks intimidate Sunni communities,
which close ranks
4
Accelerants AQI terrorism Foreign
fighters Iranian infiltration Crime
unemployment
4
2. Breaking the Cycle Sustainable Stability
2
Sunni extremists attack neighboring Shia
communities
1
Extremists infiltrate Sunni communities,
establish base areas through intimidation
3
Shia militias and vigilantes attack Sunni
communities
Sectarian attacks intimidate Sunni communities,
which close ranks
4
De-celerants Political reconciliation Competent,
non-sectarian governance institutions
5
Lines of Operation (generic)
Starting Conditions
End State
Insurgent
Insurgent
Information Operations
Neutral or Passive
Security Operations
Neutral or Passive
Develop Security Forces
Support Government
Attitude of Populace
Essential Services
Support Government
Better Governance
Economic Development
6
Campaign Goal Near Term - End to large scale
sectarian violence, improved population security,
and substantial progress on political
accommodation Intermediate Term - The
establishment of a negotiated political agreement
that leads to sustainable security Long Term -
Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in
the War on Terror, with a representative
government that respects the human rights of all
Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to
maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a
safe haven for terrorists.
Lines of Operation (JSAT)
7
Campaign Concept 2007-8 (JSAT, Mar 07)
Coalition Force Level
CRITICAL FACTORS Time, Leverage, US political
will, GOI performance MNF-I applies increased
force levels, intimate cooperation with ISF and a
focus on population security, to improve security
situation between now and February 2008. USM-I
exploits improved security, to force key actors
toward GOI reform, confidence building measures
(07) political accommodation (08) resulting
in sustainable stability. MNF-I progressively
reduces force levels through 2008, aiming for
steady state early 09. MAIN EFFORT Political
diplomatic lines of operation translate security
progress into sustainable political stability.
8
A tentative Theoretical framework

• Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in
  Iraq,
• RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008

9
Research Limitations

• Methodology qualitative, subjective first-hand
  field research based on participant observation,
  backed by quantitative data when available
• Data corruption (especially SIGACTs) frustrated
  rigorous statistical analysis
• Emphasis on professional judgment and blink
  knowledge
• Selection bias (CF units in toughest areas,
  requiring most assistance, received greatest
  attention)
• Risk/stress/effort inherent in data collection
  clouds judgment skews emphasis
• Regional focus (Baghdad, belts, Anbar, Diyala)
  not necessarily transferable
• Little direct interaction with UK forces in Basra
• Poor Iraqi Arabic dialect language skills (some
  MSA) views of male, urbanized, educated Iraqis
  are therefore privileged in research
• Emotional factors sympathy for Iraqi
  nationalists, (over)concern for the civil
  population, distaste for Shia clericalists, over
  time intense hatred for AQI JAM

These research results provide a conflict
ethnography of central Iraq in 2007, producing
what anthropologists call a thick description of
one time-and-area-specific case study broader
applicability is problematic
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The logic of field observation in Iraq

• Everyone sees Iraq differently, depending on when
  they served there, what they did, and where they
  worked.
• The environment is highly complex, ambiguous and
  fluid
• It is extremely hard to know what is happening
  trying too hard to find out can get you
  killedand so can not knowing
• Observer effect and data corruption create
  uncertainty, and invite bias
• Knowledge of Iraq is very time-specific and
  location-specific
• Prediction in complex systems (like insurgencies)
  is mathematically impossiblebut we cant help
  ourselves, we do it anyway
• Hence, observations from one time/place may or
  may not be applicable elsewhere, even in the same
  campaign in the same year we must first
  understand the essentials of the environment,
  then determine whether analogous circumstances
  exist, before attempting to apply lessons.

11
My role (hence, my bias)

• Senior counterinsurgency advisor to Commanding
  General MNF-I (Petraeus)
• No specific direction on what to do or how, just
  broad guidance on what to achieve (rapid shift of
  focus across MNF-I and ISF) and why (need to get
  through learning curve ASAP to make the Surge
  work)
• Very limited background in organizational change
  theory / organizational learning literature, just
  made it up as I went along (could have done
  with insights from Dr Davidson / LTC Nagl)
• Design of the 2007-2008 MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan
  (the surge), the MNC-I Counterinsurgency
  Guidance, and training packages for MNF-I, ISF
  and USM-I
• Field counterinsurgency support (combat advising)
  with the
• Multi-National Force-Iraq and subordinate units
• U.S. Mission-Iraq (Embassy, AID mission, Office
  of Regional Affairs)
• Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams
• Iraqi government (civil, military, police,
  intelligence)
• Raising, vetting and employing tribal irregular
  forces (AFF, shurta isanad, sahwa al Anbar, abna
  al Iraq)
• Approx. 65 field-deployed, 35
  headquarters/embassy almost all muhalla time
  was in Baghdad, the northern and southern belts
  and the so-called triangle of death south/SW of
  Baghdad City (the fiyas)

12
Tentative theoretical model for Insurgent
Counterinsurgent Learning
The Metz Threshold
13
Observations and Hypotheses

• Observations
• The counterinsurgent always starts from behind in
  terms of objective performance, as well as in
  terms of performance acceptability (Galula
  1964,Thompson 1966)
• Counterinsurgency techniques decline in
  effectiveness as a function of time, speed and
  scope of onset, and insurgent familiarity
  (Beitler 1995, Kilcullen 2004b)
• The counterinsurgent must achieve acceptable
  performance by the time political patience runs
  out, requiring an organizational learning
  response (Davidson 2005,Nagl 2002/2005)
• The historical U.S. threshold for political
  patience is 3 years (Metz, 2007)
• Hypotheses
• The acceptability gradient is defined by domestic
  political perceptions, and governed by the
  tyranny of rising expectations
• In a domestic counterinsurgency, there is one
  acceptability gradient, hence insurgent and
  counterinsurgent performance are systemically
  coupled (through the mechanism of competition for
  support of one domestic population)
• In a third-party counterinsurgency (Simpson
  2008), there are multiple gradients one for
  each constituency within the domestic polity, one
  for each intervener hence insurgent and
  counterinsurgent performance are decoupled in
  terms of acceptability, though mutually
  influential through a process of co-evolution

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Scope Permanence key factors?

• Scope (Operational vs Institutional learning)
• Operational (pertaining to that part of an
  institution actually engaged in operations)
• Institutional (pertaining to the entirety of an
  institution, including its supporting structures
  and processes outside theater)
• Permanence (Adaptation vs Evolution)
• Adaptation (structural or behavioral
  modifications of a temporary or ad hoc nature
  that occur within one generation and improve
  fitness for the environment, but may not be
  sustained over multiple generations)
• Evolution (changes of a permanent or
  semi-permanent nature that occur over, and are
  sustained over multiple generations tours, life
  cycles or posting cycles)

15
Example adaptations
Supplemental funding
Institutional Adaptation
Institutional Evolution
New permanent units
Budget changes
New individual training
New personnel systems
New collective training
Operational Evolution
Operational Adaptation
New In-theater organizations
New TTPs
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Hypothesis counterinsurgents adapt slowly,
insurgents evolve quickly?

• Observation seems to suggest that
  counterinsurgents typically undergo relatively
  slow operational adaptation during a campaign,
  and only engage in institutional evolution more
  slowly (possibly not until after the campaigns
  outcome has already been determined)
• Conversely, insurgents (especially those with
  loose organizational structures or fluid network
  architecture) may be more likely to evolve
  rapidly (through attrition and natural selection
  over generations of insurgent life-cycle), as
  well as engaging in purposeful adaptation at
  street level
• Is this pattern apparent in Iraq in 2007?
• Should we expect insurgents with tighter
  structures and hierarchies (e.g. JAM) to adapt in
  a similar fashion to counterinsurgents, while
  looser networks (Sunnis) evolve in a more fluid
  fashion?

Counterinsurgents are dinosaurs (powerful,
dominant, slow to adapt) insurgents are more
like early mammals (small, furtive, will lose any
encounter with dinosaurs but potentially
out-compete and out-evolve them over time)
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Hypothesis mechanisms for insurgent evolution

• General evolutionary effect
• Attrition imposed by combat action culls less
  well-adapted members of the insurgent network,
  improving overall quality
• Weaker, smaller networks coalesce or collapse and
  are absorbed by stronger networks
• Leadership evolution (destruction-replenishment
  cycle)
• Targeting of insurgent HVTs creates greater
  attrition at the mid-upper leadership level than
  at any other
• Hence networks have a relatively stable senior
  leadership core, but rapid turnover at mid-level
• Junior leaders are more familiar with the
  environment and CF TTPs, hence better adapted to
  current conditions
• Older leaders are tired, combat-shocked,
  increasingly over-confident or careless, more
  likely to be attrited
• This keeps leadership improving over time, unless
  attrition rate too high to be sustained or a
  critical mass (say, 25 of insurgent middle
  leadership) killed/captured (cf Israeli data on
  PIJ)
• Bell Curve effect

Significant evolutionary effect
Too little attrition to generate meaningful
evolution
Too much attrition for destruction-replenishment
cycle to operate
Rate of attrition x per unit time
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INSURGENT EVOLUTION

• Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in
  Iraq,
• RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008

19
UNCLASSIFIED Derived from OSINT
Iraq Sunni insurgent Networks
Muslim Ulema Council (former Baathist Society of
Islamic Scholars)
Abdullah Janabi friends with Izzat al-Duri
Harith al-Dari (all three Baathists, sufis,
fedayeen, IIS Not Salafists, sufis tarekat
links Kamis al-Sirhan Muhammad Yunis Ahmad al
Hamdani (al Duris deputy in Mil Bureau
Saddams network for religious-based
organization of insurgency, kept eye on tribes,
mosques security orgs old boy network)
Mujahideen Central Command
(Baathists / Former Regime Elements)
Coordination Department of the Jihad Brigades
Horror Brigades
Islamic Army in Iraq
1920s Revolutionary Brigades
Jaish al Sunna wal Jamaa
Jaish al Mujahidin
Islamic Jihad Brigades
Green Brigades
Ansar al Tawhid Brigades
Strangers Brigades
Victorious Army Group
Islamic Iraqi Resistance Front Jaami
Jaish Muhammad
Jeish al-Ta'eifa al-Mansoura
Jamaa al Murabitin
Larger in numbers
Mujahidin Shura Council (ISI may have taken over)
Ansar al Sunna Blended org, FREs jihadists,
formerly Ansar al Islam Kurdish Shia Sunni
Leaders, long-standing personal links to AMZ,
home ground advantage in KRG area
Al Qaida in Mesopotamia
Iraqi Turkmen Front (Turkish govt links?)
Tanzim Qaidat fil Balad ar Rafidayn
DJ Kilcullen / JSAT / March 07
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Insurgent Organizational Evolution Jaish al
Mahdi
JAM 2005-6
Political Leadership
Propaganda wing
Social Services / Charity
Militia / Local insurgents
Special Groups
Criminal elements
Political leadership divided Propaganda efforts
weak Social services growing
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EVOLUTION OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
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IED tactical counter-mobility overpass attacks
during surge
Route Grizzlies, 10 June 2007, 0500 am
23
Strategic counter-mobility ops or copy-cat
attacks?
Sarafiyya Bridge attack, April 2007
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28 MAY 07 - DOWNED OH-58 - TIMELINE

• 28 MAY
• 1816D- 0H-58 (SB 56) DOWNED 38S MC 7696 5353,
  16KM W. OF MUQDADIYAH. SWT RECEIVED SAFIRE FROM
  SINGLE POO. SB 56 CONDUCTED ATTACK RUN RESULTING
  IN CATASTROPHIC DAM TO SB 56. B26 EVADED ENEMY
  FIRE.
• 1820D- 3-1 CAV RECEIVED MAYDAY CALL FROM DOWNED
  OH-58. QRF ALERTED. ANOTHER AWT RESPONDED TO
  CRASH SITE AND ASSISTS SB26 IN SECURING SITE.
• 1842D- CAS (2X F-16) OVERHEAD.
• 1848D- A UH-60 TEAM (LIGHTNING 06) IVO CRASH
  SITE LANDED AND PICKED UP OH-58 CREW. AWT
  PROVIDED SUPPRESSIVE FIRE 2X CF (US) KIA. UH-60
  CASEVACED CAS TO FOB WARHORSE.
• 1940D- AWT (REDWOLF 06) ENGAGED 3X AIF AT CRASH
  SITE 2X AIF KIA.
• 2006D- GROUND QRF IN ROUTE (3-1 CAV QRF 4X
  M1114, 2X M2, 24X PAX)
• 2024D- 5Ws SENT TO COMMAND GROUP FROM MNFI
  CHOPS (OIC).
• 2034D- DART INBOUND TO DO PHO.
• 2035D- QRF HIT IED ENROUTE TO CRASH SITE, 5X CF
  (US) KIA, 3X CF (US) WIA AND 1X M2 BFV DAMAGED.

WHO MND-N WHAT DOWNED OH-58 WHEN 281816D
MAY 07 WHERE 38S MC 7696 5353
1816D - OH-58 CRASH SITE
2048D - QRF HIT IED
SAF/HMG POO
LEGEND
LOCATION
AS OF29 0630D MAY 07
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Attacks Matrix SEP 06 - MAY 07
AS OF 30 MAY 07
Dates IDF SAF IEDDIS IEDDET IED TOTAL VBIED Total
SEP 06 55 (25) 29 (4) 27 (1) 33 (4) 60 (5) 1 (0) 152 (34)
OCT 06 46 (22) 33 (6) 23 (3) 28 (4) 51 (7) 2 (1) 132 (36)
NOV 06 34 (13) 18 (2) 15 (2) 23 (2) 38 (2) 3 (3) 93 (22)
DEC 06 16 (5) 28 (1) 11 (0) 31 (7) 42 (7) 8 (6) 94 (19)
JAN07 39 (9) 34 (3) 41 (4) 23 (2) 64 (6) 2 (1) 139 (19)
FEB 07 38 (5) 39 (3) 23 (1) 22 (1) 45 (2) 4 (3) 126 (13)
MAR 07 34 (4) 32 (7) 47 (4) 24 (3) 71 (7) 3 (2) 140 (20)
APR 07 43(13) 25 (2) 18 (1) 20 (3) 38 (4) 1 (1) 107 (20)
MAY 07 35(6) 41(3) 15 (2) 17 (3) 32 (5) 2 (2) 110 (16)
Change SEP 06- MAY07 20 12 12 16 28 1 42
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23 MAR 07, 4/6 IA ICW 2-15 FA, OPERATION EAGLE
DIVE

• MISSION NLT 23 0330 MAR 07 4/6 IA ICW TF 2-15
  attacks to disrupt AIF in the KILO 12 and KILO 18
  areas IOT deny AIF FOI and FOM within 1/4/6 AO
  and establish IA BP on key terrain along ASR
  TEMPLE
• SUMMARY
• Successful brigade size operation along ASR
  TEMPLE. The Brigade was able to disrupt AIF
  activity while emplacing a new battle position
  (BP158).
• Discovered 9 weapons caches
• Eliminated 7 IDF systems
• Captured 13 Black list personnel
• Discovered and eliminated 4 IEDs

RFL
27
29 MAY 07, TF 2-15 ICW 4/6 IA OPSUM, EAGLE RAZOR
SOUTH II
DETAINEES 13 X LN DETAINED
INJURIES 1 X US WIA BR SM0998 MEDEVAC, GS
WOUND TO LEG, TREATED AND RTD STATUS
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COUNTERINSURGENT ADAPTATION

• Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in
  Iraq,
• RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008

29
Senior COIN Advisor

• Commanding Generals have a long history of
  employing specialist advisers (e.g.
  Allenby/Lawrence, Rommel/Laszlo Almaszy,
  Templer/Richard Noone, Woodward/Ewen
  Southby-Tailyour)
• Not the first senior COIN adviser (built on
  experience of others, stood on shoulders of
  giants like Kalev Sepp and, more distantly, drew
  on methodology of Bernard Fall, Gregory Bateson
  and Gerald Hickey )
• Cycled between personal interaction with CG MNF-I
  (daily), Ambassador and AID Mission Director
  (weekly), Station Chief (occasionally) and field
  interaction at BCT, PRT, Bn and Coy level
• Extremely high degree of autonomy, liminal
  status (pet expert, diplomat operating under
  military authority and ROE, SES rank)
• Acted as an accelerant to
• Interpret CGs guidance for execution-level
  officers,
• Provide ground truth and a feedback loop to CG on
  issues and conditions for those executing the
  mission,
• Conduct ops research on COIN best practices and
  feed latest TTPs to training and planning staffs,
• Create informal communities of practice across
  units and districts, and
• Provide technical (anthro/soc sci/COIN) advice to
  CG

Fall, 1967
Sepp, 2005
Kilcullen, 2007
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Field Methodology

• Participation in BUA, JECB, CIG activities, GOI
  engagement, campaign/strategic planning
  activities
• Select units for advisory support based on unit
  background and performance nature of task
  (big-picture criticality) methodology based on
  participant observation and RRA techniques
• Stages of an advisory deployment (3-5 days with
  frequent re-visit)
• In-brief with higher HQ (turf/rice-bowl issues)
• Field entry phase (rapport-building, establish
  trust)
• Historical discussions (reconcile reported
  SIGACTs with unit recollections, observe TOC and
  intel fusion center)
• Observation phase (patrols, KLEs, PRT activities,
  raids, cordon knock, combat engagements) some
  immediate advising as needed
• Advice phase (briefs, skills training, deliver
  key CG messages, identify equipment, personnel,
  support and training needs, rectify where
  feasible, establish ongoing plans with supporting
  agencies)
• Out-brief with higher HQ (no written outbrief
  product, to encourage honesty)
• Community-building phase (email, networking,
  link-up of similar groups)
• Follow-up (2-4 weeks in most cases, sometimes
  longer)

31
ADVISING U.S. FORCES
32
ADVISING IRAQI FORCES
33
ADVISING IRAQI U.S. CIVILIAN AGENCIES
34
DESIGN AND DELIVERY OF FORMAL TRAINING
35
Rapid Adaption 1 MNC-I COIN Guidance

• Need to orient incoming BCTs to new approach,
  re-orient in-theater BCTs, and align ISF and CF
  effort
• Conducted intense field ops research activity to
  identify best practices
• Produced Field Service Regulations
• Close consultation with MNC-I commanders advisor
  (Sky), DIV and BCT HQs
• Posted in all JSS/PBs
• Standardized approach for all assets,
  civil/military

Developed approach late March, field work
throughout April, briefing (MNF-I, USM-I, IMOD,
CENTCOM, MNC-I) late April to early May, drafting
(to draft 18) May, field testing late May,
guidance issued early June 2007.
36
Rapid Adaption 2 Local Security Forces

• Need to exploit rapid un-solicited emergence of
  anti-AQI Sunni groups in Baghdad and belts
• Anbar model (saHwa) not directly applicable,
  local alliances burgeoning out of control, GOI
  panicking
• Conducted field work with former insurgents, SOF,
  AWG and partnering US units to develop best
  practices and safeguards

Began tracking phenomenon closely Apr/May 07,
participation in Battle of Ameriya (2-7 June 07)
gave urgent impetus, close coord with MNC-I,
USM-I and FSEC, fielded final draft late Jun 07,
FRAGO early Jul 07.
37
Rapid Adaption 3 BCT PRT Orientation

• Need to re-orient incoming surge BCTs, ePRTs and
  USM-I personnel to new approach and new
  environment
• Focus on the 20 weeks leading up to Sep 07
  congressional testimony
• Training at Taji COIN academy, BCT and Bn
  headquarters, and Embassy/AID Mission compound

Developed initial brief March 07, continuous
refinement and development Mar-July 07, briefed
weekly or more often
38
Rapid Adaption 4 Deciding to Dismount

• Progressive co-evolution of IEDs and
  countermeasures had alienated CF from pop
• New devices (EFPs, DBIEDs, RPG-29) made up-armd
  vehicles vulnerable anyway
• Ops Research for MNC-I guidance suggested
  dismounting would build bond with pop, reduce IED
  cas, increase sniper cas
• Made risk judgment to proceed with dismount in
  late May, in time for Arrowhead series (June 07)

Counterintuitive result sniper risk up, IED risk
up. (82d Abn and 10th Mtn casualties) Emergency
field intervention discovered foot patrol
skills had atrophied, instituted crash
re-training (AWG). IED and sniper cas immediately
dropped and kept dropping, patrol situational
awareness and rapport improved.
39
New Tactics 1 -- Urban Oilspot
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE
40
New Tactics 2 IED counter-ambush
Chokepoint likely IED site somewhere in here
Of all key locations, the actual IED site is
least important. Look for early warning OPs,
firing and assembly points, infil/exfil routes.
Use friendly convoy movement as bait to trigger
en action. Pre-position sigint and recon assets
to identify teams moving into position, listen
for the calls between OP and firing team. Use
tank, atk helo or snipers for point engagement of
firing team, with ground patrol follow up.
Capture OP teams and exploit cellphone
data. Spring elements to capture and exploit
observation teams, kill or capture firing team,
trace back to assembly point, local and district
caches. This will require detainee exploitation
and THT ops as well as physical exploitation of
the firing point. Occupy the assembly point until
done.
A
B
41
New Tactics 3 -- Demographic Targeting

• Invented by McMaster in Tal Afar (2005), refined
  by Kilcullen (2007), applied in NW Baghdad and
  southern belts.
• Works on the fact that urbanization in Iraq is a
  relatively recent phenomenon, hence people in
  urban districts have rural relatives
• Exploits the dynamic whereby insurgents, when
  pressured in an urban area, run home along
  kinship lines to relatives in rural areas

Powerpoint Rogues Gallery D7
Exploitation D7 onward
Cordon Knock D to D1
Census / Human terrain analysis reveals
inhabitants village of origin
Sadr City (Illustrative only)
42
INSURGENT COUNTERINSURGENT CO-EVOLUTION

• Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in
  Iraq,
• RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008

43
Examples of Co-evolution

• IED and counter-IED
• Sniper and counter-Sniper
• Iraqi tribal uprising against AQI

44
IDF ATTACKS ON THE GREEN ZONE MAR 07
5d

• 10 MAR 07 1X 122MM RKT IN FOB HONOR
• 10 MAR 07 3X 122MM RKT IVO CP BLACK
• 10 MAR 07 1X 122MM IVO US EMBASSY (FRONT
  FOUNTAIN)
• 22 MAR 07 2X RND IVO LITTLE VENICE/PMS OFFICE
• 24 MAR 07 2x 107MM RKT IVO EMB(5a), KBR
  TRAILERS(5b)
• 25 MAR 07 1X 122MM RKT IOV KBR TRAILERS
• 26 1405C MAR 07 3X 107MM RKT IVO KBR
  TRAILERS(7a), EMB(7b), EMB(7C)
• 26 1609C MAR 07 3X 107MM RKT IVO EMB(8a),
  EMB(8b), KARADA (8c)
• 27 0120C MAR 07 1X 60MM MORTAR IN IZ
• 27 1927 MAR 07 1X 107 MM RKT IVO KBR BILLETING
  OFFICE

1
2
1
3
7d
4
4
10
3
5
2
1a
6
7e
4
8c
5c
3
7
10
5a
8a
5a
7
3
8
10
1c
7b
8b
11
5b
6
4b
7c
4c
9
6
7a
4a
3
10
11
5b
9
10
IDF POI FEB
PREPARED BY STRATOPS 28 MAR 07
45
SNIPER AND COUNTER-SNIPER
46
THE TRIBAL UPRISING
47
Building a ladder of tribes

• There remained the technique and direction of
  the new revolts but the direction a blind man
  could see...The process should be to set up
  another ladder of tribes, comparable to that from
  Wejh to Akaba only this time our ladder would be
  made of steps of Howeitat, Beni Sakhr, Sherarat,
  Rualla, and Serahin, to raise us three hundred
  miles to Azrak, the oasis nearest Hauran and
  Jebel Druse.
• T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 1935, Ch.
  LIX

Concept build a ladder of tribal alliances,
each bringing you closer to the objective, until
the revolt reaches a take-off point and
spontaneously ignites
48
The Iraqi revolt -- tribal ladder
Albu Mahal NW Anbar, Nineveh First to turn
against AQI
Vines, McMaster
49
Insights and conclusions

• Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in
  Iraq,
• RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008

50
General Insights

• By mid-April 07, AQI began to slip behind the
  destruction-replenishment cycle, and could no
  longer replace mid-level and HVTs as they were
  eliminated a critical mass (approx 25) of AQI
  leaders began to be eliminated and the
  organization began a cascading collapse
• MNF-I reacted with surprising agility to a series
  of major events (principally the sahawa and
  associated uprising) -- cf. 5 months to react
  to Samarra bombing 2006
• Orientation of new arrivals proved easier than
  re-orientation of units used to old TTPs
• Accelerant tools (Senior COIN Adviser, Archer
  Teams, Taji Academy, COIN Guidance,
  civil-military training) assisted greatly in
  speed of change
• Pairing and embedding of CF with Iraqi units
  improved performance of both
• Basic COIN approaches proved a useful guide, but
  had to be applied in a severely time-limited,
  resource-constrained, tribal environment
• GPF in 2007 possess capabilities that only
  existed in SMUs in 2001, while SMUs (and SOF
  generally) possess capabilities that only existed
  in Hollywood U.S. Forces are now unequivocally
  the best in the world at COIN, by a significant
  margin

51
The logic of local partnerships
Option 1 insert 50 000 U.S. troops into
theater FOB security, logistics, HQ, rear area
or other non-combat tasking 30 000 Force
available for combat tasking on a 11 or 21
rotation model 20,000 Force actually out
on the ground at any time (ie net effect)
7-10,000 Effect on enemy forces and recruiting
base NIL NET EFFECT 7-10,000 pax
improvement in force ratio
Option 2 win over 50 000 Iraqis into LSFs FOB
security, logistics, HQ, rear area or other
non-combat tasking NIL Force available
for combat tasking on a 11 or 21 rotation
model 50,000 Force actually out on the
ground at any time (ie net effect)
40,000 Coalition forces required for partnering,
mentoring and supervision 5,000 Effect on
enemy forces and recruiting base
-50,000 NET EFFECT 80-95,000 pax improvement
in force ratio (ie 8 to 12 times the value of
inserting CF)
52
Conclusions

• In a counterinsurgency, insurgent groups and
  security forces appear to engage in time- and
  resource-competitive processes of adaptation,
  driven by the Darwinian pressure imposed by a
  complex, hostile conflict ecosystem that
  operates on the edge of chaos
• Counterinsurgents appear mainly to adapt,
  insurgents to evolve but insurgent groups whose
  network and organizational structure is tighter
  may behave in a more purposeful adaptive manner
  (e.g. JAM)
• In Iraq in 2007, the following key factors led to
  relatively rapid coalition adaptation
• High degree of political will in coalition
  capitals (do or die)
• Quality of senior leadership (Petraeus, Crocker,
  Odierno)
• Units that were relatively familiar with the
  environment through previous tours
• Close integration/understanding between senior
  military and civilian leadership
• Focus on, and understanding of, political and
  influence elements of the campaign
• Presence of accelerant organizational learning
  tools
• Dense internal communications, information and
  social networks within the force
• Good pre-existing general understanding of COIN
  techniques across the force
• Coherent civil-military planning and execution
  (relatively speaking) via the JSAT and Joint
  Campaign Plan process

53
Research Implications

• This conflict ethnography will only be
  applicable to situations that are broadly
  analogous these may be rare
• But resource-constrained COIN in tribal
  environments will be the norm for the foreseeable
  future
• Further research could focus on
• Methods to assess evolutionary pressure on
  insurgent groups
• Options to extend the time available before the
  Metz threshold
• Development of best-practice learning accelerant
  tools
• Comparison of year-by-year organizational
  learning in Iraq
• Understanding the dynamics and force-ratio
  implications of local alliances

54
Questions/Comments