Aviation Security

1
Aviation Security

• Set Up To Fail

2
The Targets of 9/11 WTC, Pentagon, Aviation
Industry, Economic Base

• The WTC was a symbol of U.S. economic power
  around the globe as well as home to some of the
  most important financial services firms in the
  world.
• The Pentagon was both a symbolic and literal
  nerve center of the armed forces. It is also the
  worlds largest building.
• The aviation system in the U.S. is critical to
  the economic well-being of the nation. Civil and
  commercial aviation account for approx. 9 of the
  total gross domestic product in the U.S.
• 900 Billion annually
• 11 Million jobs

3
The Intelligence Breakdown

• Two set of facts that are indisputable
• The large volume of intelligence warnings our
  government received in the months leading up to
  9/11.
• The proof that there was a viable threat of
  suicidal hijackers taking over a commercial
  aircraft and slamming into a predetermined target.

4
What did they know when did they know it?

• July 18, 2001 the FAA warned the airlines to
  exercise the highest level of caution.
• July 31, 2001 the FAA advised the airlines that
  terrorists were planning and training for
  hijackings.
• August 17, 2001 INS detained Zacarias Moussaoui
  for suspicious activity at a Minnesota flight
  school.
• September 4, 2001 the FBI told the FAA of
  Moussaouis arrest, but the FAA did not alert the
  airlines

5

• The CIA knew that Nawaf Alhazmi and Hkalid
  Al-Midhar, two of the hijackers on American
  Airlines Flight 77 (Pentagon) were in the U.S.
  and that they were connected to AL Queda.
• For 21 months they were identified by the CIA as
  terrorists, but lived openly in the U.S., using
  their real names, getting drivers licenses,
  opening bank accounts, and attending flight
  schools.
• The CIA did nothing with the information. They
  did not notify either the FBI nor the INS.
• When AL-Midhars visa expired, the State
  Department issued him a new one in July 2001,
  even though the CIA had linked him to one of the
  suspected bombers of the USS Cole in Yemen in
  October 2000.

6

• Warnings from other governments
• Russian intelligence notified the CIA during the
  summer of 2001 that 25 terrorist pilots had been
  specifically geared toward suicide missions.
• In June, 2001 German intelligence warned the CIA
  and Israel that Middle Easter terrorists were
  planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as
  weapons to attack important symbols of American
  and Israeli culture
• Aircraft as a flying missile
• Before the 1996 summer Olympics in Atlanta,
  intelligence officials at the FBI and CIA
  identified crop dusters and suicide flights as
  potential terrorist threats and took steps to
  prevent any attack from the air during the games.
• In 1995, the FBI warned of a terrorist plot to
  hijack several commercial airliners and slam them
  into the Pentagon and the CIA headquarters in
  Langley, Virginia.
• In January of 1995, a fire in the Manila
  apartment building of Abdul Murad and Ramzi
  Yousef led Phillippine investigators to uncover a
  plot to plant timed explosive devices on several
  U.S. airliners.
• On September 11, 1994 a distraught unemployed
  student pilot stole a Cessna, flew it into
  prohibited airspace around the White House and
  crashed it on the lawn just south of the
  executive mansion. He was aiming for the Oval
  Office.

7

• In April, 1994 a flight engineer fired from his
  job at Federal Express, boarded one of the
  companys DC-10 cargo planes in Memphis.
  Traveling under the guise of an
  employee/passenger, he stormed the cockpit and
  used a hammer to attack the three pilots. He
  stated that he had planned to slam the aircraft
  into FedExs handling facility in Memphis.

8
The Human Impact

• WTC 3000 (approx. 500 rescue personnel)
• Pentagon 189
• Flight 93 approx. 50.

9
The Economic Impact

• Direct economic costs from the attack included
• Human loss
• Property loss (buildings, airliners, vehicles,
  utilities)
• Response costs (debris removal, clean up)
• Health effects (injuries and emotional distress)
• Insurance claims
• Legal fees
• Indirect economic costs
• Lost employee income
• Lost business profits
• Spending reductions
• Fiscal impacts such as reduced tax revenue

10
Glaring Weaknesses Within the Aviation Security
System

• Commercial aviation was used in the 9/11 attacks
  precisely because of specific defects that
  existed within the security system.
• Like the intelligence community, aviation
  security officials ignored the warning signs.

11

• It is now known that the 9/11 Hijackers were
  casing airports in the weeks prior to the attacks
  and taking test runs on flights to better
  pinpoint the weaknesses within the system.
• The FBI has identified 12 flights that the
  terrorists took immediately prior to the attacks.
• Testimony from passengers and flight crews reveal
  that the hijackers took pictures of the cockpit
  door and appeared to take notes during flights in
  May, June, July, and August of 2001.
• A woman traveling through Boston reported to the
  FBI after the attacks that she observed Mohammed
  Atta casing the terminal and taking copious notes.

12
Ease of Entry to the Cockpit

• None of the 9/11 flights had the captain or
  copilot telling air traffic control that they
  were being hijacked. Therefore it is logical to
  assume that the hijackers overtook the cockpits
  in one of three manners
• By stealth
• By sudden and brute force
• By creating a disturbance in the aircraft that
  would have compelled one of the flight deck
  members to exit the cockpit

13
Taking the Cockpit by Stealth

• On at least 3 of the flights, communications
  revealed that flight attendants had been stabbed
  and killed.
• The most likely reason for the assaults was to
  obtain the key to the cockpit door, which they
  each carried in compliance with FAA regulations.
• We can assume that the hijackers used the key to
  unlock the cockpit.

14
Taking the Cockpit by Sudden and Brute Force

• In the 2 years prior to 9/11, over 30 cases were
  recorded of passengers either completely or
  partially entering the cockpit of a commercial
  carrier.
• Such disruptive cases educated the 9/11 hijackers
  on the ease of storming the cockpit and gaining
  entry.
• Despite the heightened security measures, 7
  incidents of disruptive passengers entering a
  cockpit took place in the 6 months AFTER 9/11
• Cockpit doors prior to 9/11 were designed to be
  weak in order to allow easy exit in case of
  emergency.
• In early 2001, Congressional lawmakers held
  hearings to improve the airlines. However, they
  stressed the problems of delayed and missed
  flights, and lost baggage. They overlooked
  security almost entirely despite the fact that
  FAA agents, consumer groups, and flight
  attendants had been clamoring for years for
  stronger cockpit doors.

15
Taking the Cockpit by Creating A Disturbance

• In the 10 years prior to 9/11, disturbances by
  disruptive passengers were widely considered to
  be the greatest threat to cabin security.
• In 2000, for example, there were more than 10,000
  cases of air rage.
• Of those 10,000 only 266, or less than 3, were
  ever prosecuted.
• Because of the FAAs unwillingness to respond,
  the airlines developed policies where pilots were
  encouraged to intervene personally to take care
  of the situation, rather than diverting the
  flight to the nearest airport. Pilots were
  specifically instructed to exit the cockpit and
  confront the disruptive passenger head on.

16
Lax Screening Protocols

• 9 of the hijackers were selected for special
  security screenings the morning of 9/11.
• 6 were chosen by a computerized screening system.
• 2 were chosen because of irregularities with
  their documents.
• 1 had questionable identification.
• Eventually all were allowed to board their
  flights.

17

• On 9/11, according to FAA security protocols,
  passengers selected for further evaluation were
  only to have their checked luggage further swept
  for explosives or unauthorized weapons.
• The passengers carry-on bags and their person
  were not to be more fully examined.
• Only a couple of the terrorist had checked bags,
  so there was no security protocol in place to
  detect box cutters and other possible weapons
  they might be carrying on their person.
• Even more disheartening, the weapons used by the
  terrorists box cutters in particular were
  permitted under the existing FAA security
  protocols.