Title: Risk Assessment
1Risk Assessment
Dr Mike Rejman Risk Assessment Adviser
2Why do Accidents Happen?
3Why do Accidents Happen?
4How do Accidents Happen?
Organisation and processes - Deficiencies
Prior conditions - basic causes contributory
factors
Unsafe acts - active failures (SRK errors)
Multiple Defences
Patient Safety Incident
5Understanding the Problem
- 80 of accidents are attributable to human
factors, at the individual level, the
organisational level, or more commonly both - This is a conservative figure and is irrespective
of domain - To manage this we need to identify and understand
the risks (causes and contributory factors) - Without this we cant put appropriate remedial
action in place
6Seven Steps to Patient Safety
- Build a safety culture
- 2. Lead and support your staff
- 3. Integrate your risk management activity
- 4. Promote reporting
- 5. Involve patients and the public
- 6. Learn and share safety lessons
- Implement solutions to prevent harm
7Step 3 - Integrated Risk Management
- All risk management functions and information
- patient safety,
- health and safety,
- complaints,
- clinical litigation,
- employment litigation,
- financial and environmental risk
- Training, management, analysis, assessment and
investigations - Processes and decisions about risks into business
and strategic plans
8Risky Jobs
9Risky Jobs
10Risk Assessment by Donald Rumsfeld
- As we know,
- There are known knowns.
- There are things we know we know.
- We also know there are known unknowns.
- That is to say
- We know there are some things we know we do not
know. - But there are also unknown unknowns -
- The ones we dont know we dont know.
11The Accident Iceberg
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-
-
- accidents
- serious incidents
-
- incidents
-
- near misses
- hazards
-
-
12Prior Indicators of Risk
- Challenger Space Shuttle
- evidence of seals shrinking in cold temperatures,
but political pressure to launch - Columbia Space Shuttle
- long-standing problem with foam falling off (for
9 years) - even after Columbia disaster, a minority report
noted at least 3 crucial issues not actioned - this endangered Discovery
13Poor Design and Labelling
14Poor Design and Labelling
15Identifying Areas of Risk
- Retrospective learn lessons
- Accidents and incidents,
- Root Cause Analysis
- Prospective anticipate issues
- Reporting systems, near misses, reported hazards
- Prospective Risk Assessments, (proactive hazard
assessment)
16Some Risk Assessment Methods
- HRA Techniques
- HEART
- Human Error Analysis and Reduction Technique
- THERP
- Technique for Human Error Prediction
- SHERPA
- Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction
Approach - GEMS
- Generic Error Modelling System
- IDEAS
- Influence Diagram Error Analysis System
- (H)FMEA
- (Healthcare) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- HACCP
- Hazard and Critical Control Points
- HAZOPS
- Hazard and Operability Studies
- PRA
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment
- SWIFT
- Structured What If Technique
17Risk Assessment Methods
- There are a great many methods
- Most were developed in safety-critical industries
other than healthcare, only a few have been
adapted to healthcare, with mixed success - Problems over
- some quantitative, some qualitative
- whether they can combine factors or only treat
them independently, - issues over number generation
- few experimental comparisons, validation, or
guidance - some very resource intensive
- Which one to use?
18Risk Assessment Methods
- NPSA is developing two approaches to the issue
-
- (i) Patient Safety Research Fund longer term
research to identify the best methods for
healthcare and adapt methods if necessary. Will
take 2 years to produce a toolbox - (ii) Fast track pragmatic approach to produce
guidance in the short-term
19Risk Assessments Four Basics Questions
20Lead to Four Management Options
- Terminate
- Treat
- Tolerate
- Transfer
21SWIFT
- Structured What IF checklisT
- Good technique for considering both human and
organisational factors, as well as equipment
factors, that may affect safety - Structure
- Identification driven by
- Question driven
- What-if ?
- Checklist
- Best done using a multi-professional group
22Risk Assessment Flow DiagramAustralian/New
Zealand model
- Risk assessment is a PROCESS
- Helps to determine if systems, facilities or
activities are acceptable - Aid to decision making
23Record Sheet
24Risk Matrices
- Used for
- Qualitative assessment of the level of risk from
an event - Commonly used in risk assessments
- Found in many forms
25Risk Matrix
- Two dimensions
- Consequence
- (Also commonly called impact or severity)
- Likelihood
- (Also commonly called frequency or probability)
- How to use
- Define for a risk
- Its consequence
- Its likelihood
- Read off the risk level
Risk
Frequency/Likelihood/Probability
Consequence / Severity / Impact
26How to Use a Risk Matrix
- Identification of hazardous event/scenario
- Determining the risk using a risk matrix
- Assessment of the events/scenarios consequence
- Assessment of the events/scenarios likelihood
of occurrence - Determination of risk, (plotting scenarios on the
risk matrix) - Risk evaluation and decision making
27How to Use a Risk Matrix
- Assessment of the events/scenarios consequence
- May be a range of possible outcomes
- If possible chose outcome which is of regular
concern - (Otherwise assess risk for different outcomes)
28How to Use a Risk Matrix
- Assessment of the events/scenarios likelihood
- Note that the likelihood is for the outcome being
considered - Common error is to match event likelihood with
worst case outcome which only happen in a
minority of the event outcomes
29How to Use a Risk Matrix
- Determination of risk
- Plot scenario on the risk matrix
30Risk Evaluation and Decision Making
- The risk classes help drive risk mitigation
decision making - Common approach
- Where the risk is assessed as
- Low
- Evaluate as tolerable
- No risk mitigation recommendations needed
- High
- Evaluate as intolerable
- Risk reduction is required - aim to reduce medium
or low - Medium
- Evaluate as tolerable if ALARP demonstrated
- Practical and cost effective recommendations to
reduce risk needed
31For Example - IT Systems
- Introducing IT systems can greatly increase
capacity AND help eradicate certain errors - BUT
- Unless systems are carefully designed to take
account of human factors, they can actually
increase errors and even introduce new ones, with
catastrophic consequences
32New Technology in Airbus 320
- Glass cockpit and fly by wire state of the
art technology - Multifunction displays with many pages some of
which are remarkably similar - Operator awareness issues - leading to the
introduction of a new error - mode error - 87 people died in a crash at Strasbourg
33New Error
34Results from NPSA Funded Study on GP IT
Systems (University of Nottingham)
- Allergy alert may not be generated
- Hazard alert generated every third prescription
- Single keystroke to over-ride alert
- No audit trail
- Not all safety functionality activated (e.g.
contra-indications) - Hazards generated by drop-down menus (wrong
selection made awareness) - GPs unsure of safety functionality on systems
- Some think functionality is present when it isnt
(e.g. contra-indications)
35Risk Assessment
- To ensure safe operation
- Systems and Processes need
-
- To be well designed (human factors) and
thoroughly risk assessed - To be more intuitive
- To make wrong actions more difficult
- To make correct actions easier (telling people to
be more careful doesnt work) - And it should be easier to discover error
36Hospital at Night (HaN) Risk Assessment Guide
- Presents an approach to risk assessing Hospital
at Night solutions - Available on the NPSA web site