Coments to Energy Integration in South America: Driving Force for Regional Integration Process? By Maria Mendes da Fonseca and Luis Eduardo Duque Dutra - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Coments to Energy Integration in South America: Driving Force for Regional Integration Process? By Maria Mendes da Fonseca and Luis Eduardo Duque Dutra

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Title: Coments to Energy Integration in South America: Driving Force for Regional Integration Process? By Maria Mendes da Fonseca and Luis Eduardo Duque Dutra


1
Coments toEnergy Integration in South America
Driving Force for Regional Integration
Process?By Maria Mendes da Fonseca and Luis
Eduardo Duque Dutra
  • Fernando Navajas
  • FIEL University of La Plata, Argentina
  • ELSNIT 5th Annual Conference
  • Barcelona, 27 October 2007

2
Index
  1. The paper
  2. Integration in energy and the security of supply
    issue
  3. Why is natural gas different? Infrastructure,
    public goods and contracting.
  4. Natural gas integration in the southern cone
    from success to crisis
  5. Issues and lessons for regional cooperation

3
Papers contribution
  • Describes the rise and fall of energy integration
    in the 80s and 90s wave.
  • Explains underlying political process that shape
    views and policies
  • Analyses problems ahead. Lack of incentives to
    cooperate, asymmetries, etc.
  • Gives details in some particular relevant energy
    segment, such as natural gas.
  • Issues to discuss
  • Security of supply
  • Oil, natural gas, electricity conclusions that
    apply to one may not apply to all
  • Rol of market reforms and performance,
    particularly in Argentina
  • Lessons from Integration attempts in NG.

4
Integration and security of supply issues
  • Oil is a commodity, liked or not. Price is set in
    world markets and risks of supply disruptions are
    manageable with many instruments.
  • Integration to world markets is defined by your
    border prices.
  • Oil security is sometimes mixed with energy
    independence, with the objective of insulating
    consumers from world prices.
  • Its a trap that small-open net-oil-importing
    economies cannot afford and, in practice, do not
    (Bacon and Kojima, 2006).
  • Should large economies relatively well endowed
    with energy follow that? Answer is better dont
    try.
  • Natural gas is another story. Why? Costs of
    supply disruptions are less easy to deal with.
    Lock-in effects and short run costs are high.
  • So regional integration is more about natural
    gas (and electricity, to complement each other)
    than about oil. Evidence shows exactly this, both
    in Latam and in Europe.

5
Infrastructure, public goods and contractual
issues
  • Regional infrastructure is seen as a platform to
    support exchange in an expanded economic area.
  • The regional public goods perspective looks at
    coordination failures related to multidimensional
    externalities (Ruffin, 2004).
  • Experience in the 90s suggest active private
    sector participation under the umbrella of good
    legal and regulatory frameworks.
  • Absence of or insufficient supply of
    infrastructure projects has not been a problem in
    southern cone natural gas integration.
  • But exchange supported by infrastructure comes in
    long term contracting format required to recover
    sunk investments, in bilateral idiosincratic
    exchanges.
  • Its the energy component . Evidence show
    failures in exchanges of energy.

6
Natural gas integration in the southern cone
from success to crisis
  • Important discoveries of natural gas in Argentina
    along with changes in regulatory regime and
    business climate prompted several exports
    projects to Chile, Brazil and Uruguay.
  • Several protocols under the ALADI framework were
    signed and authorizations were granted.
  • Pipelines were built with capacity to deliver up
    to 42 MMm3day, with initial investments of about
    2 billion USD.
  • Exports to Chile increased substantially in the
    second half of the 90s as projects were
    completed. Price Convergence
  • In 2002 Argentina had a severe contractual
    problem at a macro level and in infrastructure
    regulation.
  • From 2004 natural gas shortages were followed by
    important cuts in exports.

7
Competing Views of Broken Exchanges
  • Hypothesis 1 Structural fatigue in supply not
    properly anticipated by suppliers and government.
  • May render contracts become incomplete if
    unforeseen, or lead to arguments of negligence of
    participants concerning investment provisions
    given that it could have been foreseen.
  • Hypothesis 2 Imbalance in domestic markets due
    to policy interventions, particularly on prices,
    and its effects on domestic demand.
  • May suggest unforeseen contingency to private
    sector participants. Exports constraints need not
    be direct, but bite anyway through induced
    imbalances and mandatory supply to domestic
    markets

8
Sluggish Production or Exploration Efforts?
Since when? How Much?
9
Natural Gas Reserves Depletion is a post 2001
phenomena It points to demand
10
NG Shortage in Argentina Supply or Demand?
atenuantes
agravantes
Navajas and Cont (2005)
11
Issues and Lessons for Regional Cooperation
  • Beyond regional coordination on
    regulation-cum-competition design for
    infrastructure (Beato and Benavidez, 2004).
    Conditions to support exchanges needed.
  • Energy planning as policy coordination.
  • Weak form exchange of information. Introduced
    too late (2002) in the Argentine-Chilean
    exchange.
  • Hard forms difficult to implement due to
    sovereign decisions and ex-post repudiation.
  • Contract design Why is so difficult?
  • Study and include provisions related to energy
    imbalances on both sides, but particularly on
    suppliers
  • Ex ante clauses to govern contingencies.
  • Lesson (not learned) for current
    Bolivia-Argentina pipeline.
  • Contract exposed to same problems.
  • Poor treatment of non-deliverability
    contingency.

12
References
  • Bacon, R. and Kojima, (2006) M. Coping with
    Higher Oil Prices. ESMAP Report 323/06. The
    World Bank, August..
  • Beato P. and J. Benavides (2004) (eds.), Gas
    market Integration in the Southern Cone, IADB,
    Washington.
  • Navajas F. (2006), The Argentine Energy Crunch
    2002-20XX (In Spanish), DT Nº89, FIEL.
  • Navajas F. (2007),     Infrastructure
    Integration and Incomplete Contracts Natural Gas
    in the Southern Cone, January 2007, 2nd LAEBA
    meeting Seoul, forthcoming in Integración y
    Comercio (2008).
  • Navajas F. And W. Cont (2005), Uma Anatomia da
    Crise Energética Argentina,en Energia Da Crise
    Aos Conflitos?, Cadernos Adenauer, Rio do
    Janeiro, Ano VI, Nº4, 2005
  • Rufin C. (2004), Regional Public Goods and
    Infrastructure, in Estevadeordal A., B. Frantz
    and T.R.Nguyen (eds.), Regional Public Goods.
    From Theory to Practice, IABD and ADB,
    Washington.
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