Title: template guidelines
1 2GRI SSE EFET RECIT Model - Recapitulation
- EFET presented a vision on a Regional
Independent System Operator model at the IG SSE
GRI meeting in Maribor - EFET believes that this model will effectively
provide market integration in a swift manner - Proposed model does not try to find a new
solution for design of the European gas market,
it is more likely an interpretation of the draft
of 3rd package published by EC in September 2007 - The model as such would be fully neutral and
compatible with all types of unbundling of TSOs
(OU, national ISO) ---gt the political decision
on structure of the TSOs would not have
influence on the processes and interactions
determined in the model - Two key results are awaited from this model
- Reducing of the existing market areas through
establishment of Regional Independent System
Operators - Enabling all stakeholders of gas industry to take
part in the drafting of binding documents on
topics that affect parts of the industry (market
rules for future European gas market)
3 GRI SSE EFET RECIT Model
- The first aspect derives from the finding of
Sector Inquiry where it was stated that a
decent market size is a prerequisite for increase
of liquidity (through diversity of source,
routes, storages, players) - Additionally a bigger market area with flow
optimisation based on regional ((intra)/inter-nati
onal) coordination will improve security of
supply in the relevant region - A stronger R_ISO might be able to better compete
against third party take over bids - The merging of the market zones with now
different operational, technical and commercial
(balancing) rules, will implicitly optimise
cross-border trade and enhances market entry
opportunities (bigger customer potential) - Establishment of clear regional governance for
the R_ISO backed by a consistent and stable
regulatory framework with a strong European
approach will overcome pure national interests
and also increase investment incentives.
4Potential regional market development with
determining of the short term index prices
Border price
(Spot) price index
0
2
R_ISO xy
Border price
1
Atlantic bassin LNG Spot price
R_ISO 3
R_ISO 1
LNG
3
5
4
R_ISO 4
see
Border price
R_ISO 5
LNG
Border price
LNG
5GRI SSE Decision making process concerning EU
Grid Code
Policy and legislation
EC,European Council, EU Parliament
Policy
ERGEG/ Agency
Easee-Gas
Draft EU-Grid Code
Secondary Legislation If empowered
GTE
EFET
OGP
IFIEC
Eure lectric
..
Regional regulatory Board
Consultation process on the EU-Grid Code
Execution Monitoring Controling
R_ISO
R_ISO
Operative
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
TO
6GRI SSE EFET RECIT Model role of market
players
- The model propose clear definition and separation
of the task and responsibilities of particular
market players - R_ISO
- Management of capacities in the Regional Gas
Grid - Balancing services implementation of market
place for them - Long-term planning
- Drafting of the grid standard transportation
contracts following the framework agreed within
EASEE-gas - Facilitation of a secondary market platform for
trading and secondary markets for capacity - Dispatching centre
- Collection of E/E fees and redistribution to the
relevant TO - TO
- Maintenance of transmission pipelines in
accordance with the R_ISOs standards - Compute and announce the available capacity to
the R_ISO - Enter into contract on exchange data with others
TO and R_ISO - Contribute to long-term adequacy
7GRI SSE EFET RECIT Model role of market
players
- Regulatory level EU/regional monitor, approve,
enforce - To ensure convergence between the regulatory
principles and practices - To approve the long term plans, methodology for
calculation of tariffs - To approve Regional Grid Code based on European
Grid Code chapters(regional appendix) - Easee-Gas
- Procedures for a coherent and common grid access
to the EU - Drafting of the grid standard transportation
contracts - Harmonisation of Invoicing and payments
- Harmonisation of Balancing rules / charges
- Defining of data format of communication
- Defining codification method
- Defining and agreeing on quality specification
- Harmonisation of trading arrangements
- ENTSO (GTE)
- Setting up of the Inter-TO compensation model
- Preparing of the ten Year Statements on system
enhancement - Ensuring closer communication and coordination
among TOs best dispatch - Agreeing of the minimum safety and maintenance
requirements - Agreeing standardized methodology for capacity
calculation
8GRI SSE EFET RECIT Model Comments received
- Stakeholder consultation on the paper on RECIT
model was taken, the deadline was 10 January 2007 - Comments from following parties has been received
so far - EC proposal is fully in line with 3rd package
- CEER supportive, asks for more details
- OGP rather supportive, wants to avoid
inefficient structures and more detail on the
economies - Eurelectric supportive
- Eurogas rather supportive, question on
investment - GTE rather negative, does not want to make
effort in regional initiative before 3rd package
ready - OMV Gas rather negative, asks for impact
assessment
9Barriers to enter national markets in the SEE
- Austria
- Lack of transit capacity
- Not harmonised rules for transit and domestic use
- Incumbent has the advantage of good knowledge
about the market - OBAs at Baumgarten etc missing
- Hub Baumgarten not virtual point yet
10Barriers to enter national markets in the SEE
- Hungary
- Different transit and domestic use regime
- Calculation of the capacity rights (80 Ukraine,
20 HAG) - No capacity without customer
- No firm capacity at the border
- Still partly regulated market (possibility for
the customers to switch from free prices to
regulated), partly different transportation
tariffs - No market based balancing regime (in case of
offering optional gas for balancing purposes the
provider gets higher tolerance) - No confidence in the market as the rules are
changing very often - Incumbent has the advantage of good knowledge
about the market
11Barriers to enter national markets in the SEE
- Czech Republic
- No free storage (fully booked by incumbent),
negotiated regime in spite of nearly monopolistic
position of incumbent - No market based balancing regime (as wished by
the traders) - No transparency prices, usage of capacity
(traffic lights) - Incumbent has the advantage of good knowledge
about the market
12Barriers to enter national markets in the SEE
- Italy
- Not enough storage capacities available to free
market participants - Limited transport capacity to Italy
- No market based balancing regime which would give
price transparency and free up storage capacities - Incumbent has the advantage of good knowledge
about the market - Not enough liquidity at the virtual trading point
PSV - A lack of transparency and data availability
(measurements, etc..)
13Barriers to enter national markets in the SEE
- Germany
- To many market zones with different regimes,
capacities are scarce - Balancing regimes with different tolerances and
extreme differences between payments for
excessive and missing gas ---gt no free market for
balancing - Potential cross subsidisation of short term
contracts via long term contracts - Only interruptible capacity available
- Setting up of the tariffs for transit pipelines
(Ferngasunternehmer) not cost based as a
competition is postulated ----gt no evidence for
this assumption to market users - Incumbents have the advantage of good knowledge
about the market