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CS423523

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Last time talked about attacker reconnaissance. Low tech methods ... ORiNOCO antenna, Laptop, taxi cab in NY City. One hour found 455 access points. War Driving Stats ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: CS423523


1
CSCD 434/547
Lecture 7 Spring 2009 Reconnaissance,Scanning
1
2
Introduction
  • Last time talked about attacker reconnaissance
  • Low tech methods
  • Dumpster diving, social engineering, physical
    methods
  • Higher tech methods
  • Whois DBs, Reconnaissance tools .. can read
    about these, slides
  • This time
  • Google DB - overview
  • Scanning activities
  • War driving, port scanning

2
3
Google Basics
  • Several components to Google
  • Google Bots
  • Crawl web sites and search for information
  • Google Index
  • Massive index of web pages index is what gets
    searched. Relates pages to each other
  • Google Cache
  • Copy of 101K of text for each page
  • Even deleted pages still have copies in Google
    cache
  • Google API
  • Programs perform search and retrieve results
    using XML
  • Uses SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
  • Need your own Google API key to use Google API

3
4
Google Basics
  • Can use directives to focus search and limit
    amount of information returned
  • sitecounterhack.net
  • Says to search only in counterhack.net
  • filetypeppt sitecounterhack.net
  • Limits file type to power point for
    counterhack.net site
  • cachewww.counterhack.net
  • Good for removed pages
  • Combining terms gives powerful searches
  • sitewellsfargo.com filetypexls ssn
  • Says to search only Wellsfargo site for
    spreadsheets with ssn social security number

4
5
Google Basics
  • If Web page removed
  • May still be in Google Cache
  • Another place for removed web pages
  • Wayback Machine
  • http//www.archive.org
  • Archives old web pages
  • Can search for active scripts
  • sitewellsfargo.com filetypeasp
  • sitewellsfargo.com filetypecgi
  • sitewellsfargo.com filetypephp

5
6
Google Basics
  • If Web page removed
  • May still be in Google Cache
  • Another place for removed web pages
  • Wayback Machine
  • http//www.archive.org
  • Archives old web pages
  • Can search for active scripts
  • sitewellsfargo.com filetypeasp
  • sitewellsfargo.com filetypecgi
  • sitewellsfargo.com filetypephp

6
7
Google Hacking
  • Something called
  • The Google Hacking Database (GHDB)
  • Database of saved queries that identify sensitive
    data
  • Google blocks some better known Google hacking
    queries, nothing stops hacker from crawling your
    site and launching Google Hacking Database
    queries directly

7
8
Google Hacking
  • The Google Hacking Database located at
  • http//johnny.ihackstuff.com.
  • Created by Johnny Long, a security expert
  • More information about Google hacking can be
    found
  • http//www.informit.com/articles/article.asp?p170
    880rl1

8
9
Scanning - Phase 2
9
10
Scanning Introduction
  • Scanning
  • Phase after reconnaissance, prior to attack
  • Still gathering information for attack
  • Goal Attackers
  • Find out which machines might be more vulnerable
    to attack by discovering which services are
    running
  • Goal Defenders
  • To insure that attacks gain little information
    during this phase

10
11
Scanning Introduction
  • Techniques
  • Attackers use lots of different tools and
    techniques for gathering information
  • War driving for WLANs, war dialing for modems,
    network scanning, and vulnerability scanning
  • Note from Scoudis
  • Defenders need to defend all paths into the
    network
  • Attackers need to find just one open path
  • Attackers have all the time in the world

11
12
War Driving
  • Goal
  • Locate WLANs and determine their SSIDs
  • Definition
  • Service Set ID. The SSID is the identifying name
    of a wireless network - strictly it is the
    identifying name of a wireless access point. It
    allows one wireless network to be clearly
    distinguishable from another
  • SSID transmitted in clear text by access points
    and all wireless cards using the access points

12
13
War Driving
  • War Driving
  • Invented by Peter Shipley in 2001 when he drove
    around Silicon Valley and found hundreds of
    access points
  • Why does it work?
  • 802.11 signals only valid for a short distance,
    so arent we safe from War Drivers?

13
14
War Driving
  • Distances in 802.11
  • Signal travels 100 meters or less
  • War driving, dont need to send traffic just
    detect the LAN
  • If using a highgain antenna, researchers have
    shown signals can travel gt 2 km
  • Km to miles 1 to .62
  • When both ends have a highgain antenna, signals
    can travel gt 100 km or 62 miles
  • High-gain antenna (HGA) an antenna with focused,
    narrow radiowave beam
  • Narrow beam allows more precise targeting where
    radio signal goes - also known as a directional
    antenna

14
15
War Driving
  • Techniques
  • Active Scanning
  • Passive Scanning
  • Forcing de-authentication

15
16
War Driving
  • Active Scanning
  • Broadcast 802.11 probe packets with ESSID of
    any, check for access points in range
  • Like going outside and shouting, Whos there?
  • Netstumbler is free tool for doing active
    scanning
  • www.netstumbler.com
  • Most popular tool for active scanning WLANs
  • Runs in Windows

16
17
War Driving
  • Statistics (Ed Scoudis)?
  • Netstumbler
  • ORiNOCO antenna, Laptop, taxi cab in NY City
  • One hour found 455 access points

17
18
War Driving Stats
  • http//www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/654/10456
    54/london-leads-wifi-access-points
  • From survey by RSA, security firm, 2008
  • London still has more wireless network access
    points 12,276 t than
  • New York City, 9,227, or
  • Paris 4,481
  • War-driving for unsecured WiFi access points has
    replaced war-dialing for unprotected dial-in
    modems as the preferred attack mode of network
    intruders

19
War Driving Stats
  • Looked at Access Point Security
  • New York, 97 corporate access points
  • used
    encryption,
  • Was 76 in 2007,
  • Paris, 94 corporate access
    points were
  • encrypted,
  • 72 had WPA or
    more
  • London 20 corporate AP's
    unsecured,
  • 48 beyond WEP

20
Netstumbler
  • What does Netstumbler do?
  • Gathers MAC address, ESSIDS, Wireless Channels
    and relative signal strength of each access point
  • Tells if security is turned on, WEP
  • Coordinates with GPA system
  • Locates access points on a map

21
Netstumbler
21
22
San Francisco Wi-Fis
22
23
War Driving
  • Defense Against Active Scanning
  • Configure access points to ignore probes with
    any set
  • Becomes invisible to Netstumbler
  • Active scanning alerts security people to
    attacker presence if monitoring
  • Improved method is Passive Scanning

23
24
War Driving
  • Passive Scanning
  • Stealthier way of discovering WLANs
  • Puts wireless card into rfmon mode
  • Monitor Mode
  • Like Ethernet, promiscuous mode
  • Sniffs all wireless traffic from the air
  • Allows a machine to see all traffic on the LAN
  • Not just traffic destined for that machine

24
25
War Driving
  • Passive Scanning
  • Kismet by Mike Kershaw
  • Does Detailed packet capture and analysis
  • Linux but can run it in cygwin for Windows
  • www.kismetwireless.net
  • Wellenreiter - by Max Moser
  • Optimized for war-driving
  • www.remote-exploit.org
  • Runs on Linux and supports, prism2, lucent, and
    cisco wireless card types

25
26
War Driving
  • Passive Scanning
  • Wireless interface also supports promiscuous mode
  • Only see packets for WLAN machine is on
  • Rfmon allows a machine to view all packets within
    range from multiple WLANs
  • Doesnt associate with any of them
  • Intercepts beacons and extracts ESSIDs from them
    ESSIDs sent in clear text!

26
27
War Driving
  • Passive Scanning
  • After discovering wireless AP or client, gains
    ESSID
  • Listens then for ARP or DHCP traffic to determine
    MAC and IP of each discovered wireless device

27
28
War Driving
  • Drawback of Wellenreiter
  • If access point is configured to omit its SSID
    from its beacons and no other users are sending
    traffic to access point, wont be able to
    determine SSID
  • Will know access point is there, not its name
  • Thus, another way to get SSIDs from WLAN is to
    force clients to send traffic

28
29
War Driving
  • De-authentication
  • ESSID-Jack is a tool that is part of Airjack
    toolkit
  • If WLAN ignores probes with SSID of any and
    omits SSID information from beacons, and no
    active traffic is going to it,
  • What do you do?
  • Use De-authentication!
  • Assume there are clients who have previously been
    authenticated to an access point

29
30
War Driving
  • Steps to de-authenticate and get SSID
  • 1. Attacker first sends wireless
    de-authentication message to broadcast address of
    the LAN
  • Spoofing MAC address of access point (AP)?
  • MAC address was previously grabbed from
    management frames using Kismet or Wellenreiter
  • 2. Client accepts de-authentication message as
    coming from access point
  • Result is that client will disconnect from WLAN
  • 3. Client then tries to re-associate with WLAN by
    sending an association message with SSID in clear
    text
  • 4. Attacker sniffs for association frame and gets
    SSID

30
31
Dissassociation and Rogue AP
Sniffs association frame packet for SSID
32
War Driving
  • De-authentication Why it works
  • Wireless clients accept wireless control messages
    without authentication!!!
  • Believes attacker is AP
  • Attacker can force client off WLAN by merely
    spoofing APs MAC address

32
33
Defenses to War Driving
  • Can set AP to omit SSID from Beacon packet
  • Not broadcasting name to the world!
  • Set up stronger authentication to APs
  • MAC address is not a great form of authentication
  • MAC addresses can be easily reset to anything in
    Linux or Unix
  • ifconfig eth0 hw ether mymacaddress
  • Windows a bit harder
  • Use strong authentication with 802.11i not WEP

33
34
Defenses to War Driving
  • Recommend use of Virtual Private Networks
  • VPNs use encryption
  • Help prevent sniffing of traffic
  • VPNs typically deployed across the Internet to
    connect clients securely to corporate networks
  • Yet, can serve similar purpose for wireless
    networks in home corporate environment

34
35
War Driving
  • http//www.wardrive.net/wardriving/faq
  • Is it illegal to War drive?
  • legality of wardriving hasn't been tested, but
    few people think that wardriving itself is
    illegal.
  • What is illegal is connecting to and using
    networks without the network owner's permission
  • Which is what most people call "breaking into a
    network"?
  • Wardriving has taken some hits by press because
    network crackers will sometimes use wardriving
    tools to locate networks to break into.

35
36
War Driving
  • Staying within legal bounds
  • Adhere to a relatively strict code of ethics
  • Don't look.
  • Don't touch.
  • Don't play through.
  • In other words,
  • 1) don't examine the contents of a network
  • 2) don't add, delete, or change anything on the
    network, and
  • 3) don't even use the network's Internet
    connection for Web surfing, email, chat, FTP, or
    anything else.
  • Somebody else paid for the bandwidth, and if you
    don't have permission to use it, you're stealing
    it

36
37
Summary
  • Reconnaissance
  • Google Hacking
  • Looked at one method of Scanning
  • War-driving
  • Great way to locate wireless machines and
    networks
  • Potential entry into the network of targets

37
38
Resources
  • URL's Wireless
  • www.wardrive.com
  • wardrive.net
  • www.netstumbler.net
  • www.remote-exploit.org
  • www.kismetwireless.net
  • http//sourceforge.net/projects/airjack
  • Books
  • http//www.amazon.com/gp/product/0764597302

39
The End
  • Next Time
  • Network Scanning
  • CounterHack Reloaded Ch. 6

39
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