ATA_ITLC_QED_NorthRiver_pres_r1'ppt

1
(No Transcript)
2
The Motor Carriers Voice in Supply Chain
Security Standards Development
3
Todays Panel

• Moderator - Craig K. Harmon, President CEO,
  Q.E.D. Systems
• Experts
• Michael Wolfe, Principal, The North River
  Consulting Group
• Craig K. Harmon

This presentation posted athttp//www.autoid.org/
presentations/presentations.htm
4
Michael Wolfe
5
Seals, Standards, Compliance ISO Security
Standards For Freight Transportation

• October 22, 2007
• Michael Wolfe
• noriver_at_att.net

6
Some Relevant Papers

• RFID e-seals and Port Security (2007)
• Motor Carrier Safety Programs and Technology
  (2007)
• Cargo Seals A Change in The Rules of the
  Game (2006)
• RFID Technology and Container Security (2005)
• Freight Technology Story, Analysis of Benefits
  (2005)
• Smart Container Product and Market Reports
  (2004)
• Automating Security Do E-Seals Make Sense?
  (2003)
• Security Must Yield an Economic Benefit, (2003)
• Co-author

7
Outline

• Security Standards in Context
• Standards, guidelines and regulations
• Mechanical Seal Standards
• ISO 17712
• Electronic Seal Standards
• ISO 18185
• Other ISO Supply Chain Security Standards
• Container Door End Security
• Supply Chain Security Management

8
Keep Security Standards in Context

• Standards do not inherently impose requirements
  or mandates for their use
• Standards get enforced via
• Self-adoption, for business reasons
• Guidelines, from industry groups, etc.
• Commercial mandates, from customers
• Government incentives requirements

9
Government IncentivesOr Are They Really
Requirements?

• C-TPAT
• Voluntary program
• Calls for ISO-compliant seals
• Needs attention to trading partners seal
  suppliers
• US SAFE Act
• Voluntary use of approved security technologies
  to qualify for C-TPAT Tier III green lane status

10
Outline

• Seal Standards in Context
• Mechanical Seal Standards
• Three flavors of 17712
• The essence of 17712
• Its implications
• Covering your flanks for C-TPAT
• Electronic Seal Standards
• Other ISO Supply Chain Security Standards

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The Evolution of 17712

• ISO PAS 17712, 2003
• Focus on physical parameters and grades
• Quick action to fill a void
• ISO PAS 17712, Revision 1, 2006
• Expands coverage to security practices
• Links product and process compliance

• ISO 17712, 2008
• Formal International Standard
• Increased clarity, tighter definitions

12
The Meaning of This Mark Is Changing
http//www.vihns.cl/
13
The Essence of 17712

• Product qualifications
• Indicative seals (I) no barrier protection
• Security seals (S) modest barriers
• High Security (H) moderate barriers
• Process qualifications
• 3rd party certification of manufacturers
  security practices
• Compliant products can only come from compliant
  sources

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C-TPAT and 17712Covering Your Flanks

• Trading partner security reviews should confirm
  four documents
• Current lab certificate showing seals comply with
  17712 H benchmarks
• Testing labs accreditation for 17712
• Current reviewer certificate showing seal
  supplier conforms to 17712s Security-Related
  Best Practices
• Business process reviewers accreditation for ISO
  17712

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Outline

• Seal Standards in Context
• Mechanical Seal Standards
• Electronic Seal Standards
• 18185s Long and Winding Road
• The 3-Tier Framework
• E-Seals and SAFE Incentives
• Other ISO Supply Chain Security Standards

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ISO 18185 Freight Containers - Electronic Seals

• The Long and Winding Road
• 1999 TC 104 begins work on 18185
• 2007 Multi-part 18185 approved
• The essence of 18185
• Single use, permanent unique ID
• ISO 17712 compliant
• Dual frequency seal
• 433 MHz, ISO 18000-7, Item Management
• 2.4 GHz, ISO 24730-2, Real-Time Location Systems
• Either of two infrastructures

17
18185 is Part of a 3 Tier Framework

• User-defined architecture
• Container ID tag -- ISO 10891 (in process)
• Permanent, mandatory RFID tag
• E-seal ISO 18185 series (approved)
• Single use, unique ID
• Shipment tag ISO 17363 (approved)
• Optional data-rich tag for supply chain

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E-Seals and SAFE Incentives

• SAFE sec. 216
• DHS may set technology requirements to qualify
  for C-TPAT Tier III green lane
• CBP to test solutions for compliance
• Likely options
• ISO 18185 is logical candidate
• Parts of DHS lean toward more complex container
  security devices

E-seals make economic sense as part of robust
data networks
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SAFE Mandates

• SAFE sec. 204 mandates
• Requires DHS to set minimum security requirements
  for containers to enter US
• DHS leans toward information-based requirements
• DHS decides against Seal Verification Requirement
  (SVR)
• Struggle over 100 inspection

20
Outline

• Seal Standards in Context
• Mechanical Seal Standards
• Electronic Seal Standards
• Other ISO Security Standards
• Container Door End Security
• Supply Chain Security Management System

21
Container Door End Security Work of ISO TC 104

• Attack the congenital design deficiencies in
  door end design
• Ability to by-pass traditional seal
• Ability to remove entire door assembly
• Standards actions
• Approved Amendment 5, "Door End Security," to ISO
  1496-1
• Added door end design criteria

However, the focus is on new builds, and no
solution will be fool-proof
22
Defeating the Seal
Courtesy of ISO TC 104 Horizon Lines
23
Defeating the Seal
Courtesy of ISO TC 104 Horizon Lines
24
Supply Chain Security ManagementISO 28000 Family

• ISO 28000, Specification for Security management
  systems for the supply chain
• ISO 28001, Best practices for custody in supply
  chain security
• ISO 28003, Auditing and Certification
• ISO 28004, General guidelines on principles,
  systems and supporting techniques on Security
  management systems for the supply chain
• ISO 28005, Electronic port clearance under
  development

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Summing Up

• 17712 Mechanical Seals
• Compliant seals from compliant sources
• International trade C-TPAT Required
• International trade non-C-TPAT Recommended
• Domestic commerce Recommended
• C-TPAT program reviews assure documentation
• 18185 E-Seals
• Tilt towards ISO compliant solutions
• Consider e-seals as part of a network management
  system
• 1496-1 Door Ends
• Consider ISO solutions in new trailer buys

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• Thank you for your attention

Mike Wolfe noriver_at_att.net 781-834-4169
Extra Material Follows Sources and references
27
Sources References for Supply Chain Security,
Productivity, Technology (1)

• Technology for security and productivity
• RFID e-seals and Port Security (2007)
• AIM Global Podcast, 9/07.
• Motor carrier safety programs and technology
  (2007)
• QUALCOMM, (2/07, with Ken Troup)
• Cargo Seals A Change in The Rules of the
  Game (2006)
• Containerization Intl, 12/06
• RFID and Supply Chain Security e-sealing the
  deal (2006)
• AIM Global Podcast, 8/06
• Mobile Wireless Communications Enables Security
  (2005)
• National Safety Council (11/05)
• RFID Technology and Container Security (2005)
• Cargo Security International, October/November
  2005
• Mobile Wireless Communications Enables Security
  (2005)
• National Safety Council
• The Freight Technology Story Intelligent
  Freight Tech. Benefits (2005)
• http//www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/intermodal/ind
  ex.htm, with Ken Troup
• Mechanical Seal Market Segmentation Study
  (2005)
• contact Mike Wolfe, co-author with Ken Troup

28
Sources References for Supply Chain Security,
Productivity, Technology (2)

• Security and productivity policy and analysis
• Gulf Region Security Overview (2006)
• Gulf of Mexico States Partnership Trade Corridor
  Transportation Study, 3/06
• 2005 Review and Outlook
• Journal of Commerce, January 3, 2005
• In This Case, Bad News is Good News on Cargo
  Security (2004)
• Journal of Commerce, July 26, 2004
• The Dynamics of Supply Chain Security (2004)
• G-8 Summit edition of The Monitor, Univ. of GA,
  Center for International Trade Security
• Security Must Yield an Economic Benefit (2003)
• Journal of Commerce, December 1, 2003
• Supply Chain Security Without Tears (2003)
• www.manufacturing.net/scm/index.asp?layoutarticle
  WebzinearticleidCA278114
• Freight Transportation Security and
  Productivity (2002)
• http//ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/publications/Secur
  ExecSumm.doc
• Defense Logistics trends and implications
  (2001)
• http//www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/theme_papers/t
  heme_paper_index.htm

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Craig K. Harmon
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Craig K. Harmon President CEOQ.E.D. Systems

• Chair, ISO TC 122/104 JWG - Supply Chain
  Applications of RFID
• Chair, RFID Experts Group (REG)
• Founder, JTC 1/SC 31Ad Hoc Chair, Mobile Item
  Identification and Management
• Senior Project Editor ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 31/WG 4
  (RFID)
• Chair, ISO TC 122/WG 4 (Shipping Labels) ISO TC
  122/WG 7 (Product Packaging)
• Vice-chair, ASC MH 10 and U.S. TAG to ISO TC 122
  (Packaging)
• Project Editor, ISO 18185-5 (Electronic Container
  Seal - Physical Layer)
• AIAG Bar Code, Applications, 2D, Tire,
  Returnables, RFID Committees
• Member, EPCglobal HAG (UHFGen2), FMCG BAG, HLS
  BAG, SAG, TLS, TDS, AIWG, SBAC
• JTC 1 TC 104 Liaison Officer to the
  International Telecommunications Union (ITU-R
  ITU-T)
• Past Chair, U.S. TAG to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 31/WG 4
  (RFID)
• Past Chair, ASC INCITS T6 (RFID) - ANS INCITS
  2561999, 2001
• Advisor and Member of USPS Strategic Technology
  Council
• ISO TC 104 122 (Freight Containers / Packaging)
  Liaison Officer to JTC 1/SC 31
• Chairman Project Editor, ANS MH10.8.2 (Data
  Application Identifiers)
• Project Editor, EIA Shipping Label, Product,
  Product Package, Component Marking
• Original Project Editor, NATO STANAG 2233 (RFID
  for NATO Asset Tracking)
• Vocabulary Rapporteur to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 31,
  ISO/IEC 19762 - Harmonized vocabulary
• CompTIA RFID Subject Matter Expert and RFID
  Certified Professional (CRCP) - RFID

This presentation posted at http//www.autoid.or
g/presentations/presentations.htm
31
Technology

• Technology is not a silver bullet
• Process is more important than technology
• Automating a broken process will only give you
  bad data more quickly
• In Quality the process is described in ISO 9000
• In Supply Chain security the process is described
  in ISO 28000

32
ISO 28000 series

• ISO 28000, Supply chain security management
  systems
• Published Similar Risk based approach as ISO
  14001
• ISO 28001, Best practices for implementing supply
  chain security, assessments and plans
• Published conducting security vulnerability
  assessments
• consistent with WCO Framework of Standards
• Assist industry in meeting Authorized Economic
  Operators (AEOs) criteria set by WCO
• Note Only a National Customs Agency can
  designate certify AEOs
• ISO 28003, Auditing Certification
• Published - guidance for accreditation
  certification bodies
• ISO 28004, Guide for implementing ISO 28000
• Published assist users in implementing ISO
  28000
• ISO 28005, Electronic port clearance
• Under development - computer-to-computer data
  transmission
• All reporting related to ships clearance in or
  out of a port

33
Process

• Commercial freight traffic presents a security
  threat.
• All elements of the process of transporting
  freight (cargo, container, vehicle, personnel)
  are sources of concern.
• Whether the objective is to stop terrorism,
  theft, or counterfeiting a process with a
  definable chain-of-possession is the best
  deterrent.

34
ISO TC 104/SC 4/WG 2Electronic Container Seals
35
Secure-ity

• Between trusted partners the freight must be
  secured
• Secure legitimate inputs
• Verify legitimacy of customers and distributors
• Manage production waste and damaged or unusable
  inventory
• Ensure legitimacy of purchased products at retail
  level
• Monitor brand integrity
• Outreach to law enforcement and regulatory
  officials

U.S. Chamber of CommerceCoalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP)
36
Secure-ity

• Between trusted partners the freight must be
  secured
• Secure legitimate inputs
• Verify legitimacy of customers and distributors
• Manage production waste and damaged or unusable
  inventory
• Ensure legitimacy of purchased products at retail
  level
• Monitor brand integrity
• Outreach to law enforcement and regulatory
  officials

U.S. Chamber of CommerceCoalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP)
37
Secure-ity

• Between trusted partners the freight must be
  secured
• Secure legitimate inputs
• Verify legitimacy of customers and distributors
• Manage production waste and damaged or unusable
  inventory
• Ensure legitimacy of purchased products at retail
  level
• Monitor brand integrity
• Outreach to law enforcement and regulatory
  officials

U.S. Chamber of CommerceCoalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP)
38
Secure-ity

• Between trusted partners the freight must be
  secured
• Secure legitimate inputs
• Verify legitimacy of customers and distributors
• Manage production waste and damaged or unusable
  inventory
• Ensure legitimacy of purchased products at retail
  level
• Monitor brand integrity
• Outreach to law enforcement and regulatory
  officials

U.S. Chamber of CommerceCoalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP)
39
Secure-ity

• Between trusted partners the freight must be
  secured
• Secure legitimate inputs
• Verify legitimacy of customers and distributors
• Manage production waste and damaged or unusable
  inventory
• Ensure legitimacy of purchased products at retail
  level
• Monitor brand integrity
• Outreach to law enforcement and regulatory
  officials

U.S. Chamber of CommerceCoalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP)
40
Secure-ity

• Between trusted partners the freight must be
  secured
• Secure legitimate inputs
• Verify legitimacy of customers and distributors
• Manage production waste and damaged or unusable
  inventory
• Ensure legitimacy of purchased products at retail
  level
• Monitor brand integrity
• Outreach to law enforcement and regulatory
  officials

U.S. Chamber of CommerceCoalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP)
41
Secure-ity

• Between trusted partners the freight must be
  secured
• Secure legitimate inputs
• Verify legitimacy of customers and distributors
• Manage production waste and damaged or unusable
  inventory
• Ensure legitimacy of purchased products at retail
  level
• Monitor brand integrity
• Outreach to law enforcement and regulatory
  officials

U.S. Chamber of CommerceCoalition Against
Counterfeiting and Piracy (CACP)
42
Technology

• Electronic Data Interchange - X12 856 and 210/211
• Bar code - Verification of product codes,
  lot/batch/serial numbers
• RFID - Rapid identification of pallet/unit load
  information
• Electronic container seals

43
Three tags - different purposes
Supply Chain Tag - ISO 17363
Container ID Tag - ISO 10891 (nee ISO 10374.2)
Electronic Seal -ISO 18185
44
ISO TC 104 project status

• ISO 17712, Freight containers Mechanical seals
• Publicly Available Specification (PAS) published
  2006-07-25
• Draft International Standards (DIS) approved
  2007-05-03
• Final Draft International Standards (FDIS)
  expected 2007-07-31
• ISO 18185, Freight containers Electronic
  container seals
• Part 1, Communication protocol, IS Published
  2007-04-26
• Part 2, Environmental characteristics, IS
  Published 2007-04-16
• Part 3, Application requirements, IS Published
  2006-05-22
• Part 4, Data protection, IS Published 2007-04-24
• Part 5, Physical layer, IS Published 2006-05-04
• Sensors (original Part 5) and Message sets
  (original part 6) withdrawn
• ISO 10891, Freight containers RF automatic
  identification
• Renumbered from ISO 10374.2 (Resolution 307) with
  DIS due October 2008
• 10374 IS Issued 1991, Amd 1 1995
• ISO/CD 10891, Balloting 2007-07-01 through
  2007-12-31

45
ISO TC 122/104Joint Working Group (JWG)Supply
chain applications of RFID
46
The Layers of Logistic Units (Radio Frequency
Identification - RFID)
Layer 5
Movement Vehicle (truck, airplane, ship, train)
Layer 4 (433 MHz)ISO 17363(Freight containers)
Container (e.g., 40 foot Sea Container)
Layer 3 (860-960 MHz)(Other 18000 with TPA) ISO
17364(Returnable transport items)
Unit Load Pallet
Unit Load Pallet
Layer 2 (860-960 MHz)(Other 18000 with TPA) ISO
17365(Transport units)
Transport Unit
Transport Unit
Transport Unit
Transport Unit
Layer 1 (860-960 MHz with TPA)(13.56 MHz with
TPA)ISO 17366(Product packaging)
Pkg
Pkg
Pkg
Pkg
Pkg
Pkg
Pkg
Pkg
Layer 0 (860-960 MHz with TPA)(13.56 MHz with
TPA)ISO 17367(Product tagging)
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
TPA - Trading Partner Agreement
Concept Source Akira Shibata, DENSO-Wave
Corporation
47
ISO TC 122/104 JWG project status

• ISO 17363, Supply chain applications of RFID -
  Freight containers
• International Standard published
• ISO 17364, Supply chain applications of RFID -
  Returnable transport items
• DIS registered for FDIS ballot 2007-06-12
• ISO 17365, Supply chain applications of RFID -
  Transport units
• DIS registered for FDIS ballot 2007-06-12
• ISO 17366.2, Supply chain applications of RFID -
  Product packaging
• International Standard under publication
• ISO 17367.2, Supply chain applications of RFID -
  Product tagging
• International Standard under publication

Issues
ISO/IEC 18000-3m3 - EPCglobal interference in ISO
process 18000-6C - EPCglobal assignment of bit
indication of HazMat
48
Chain of Possession - Primary Event and
Ancillary Data Concept
Lock1
Transfer2
Unlockn
Transfer3
Originator0
Custodian1
Custodian2
Recipientn

• Primary Event Data
• Seal ID, Container ID
• Seal Condition
• Transport Type, Transport ID
• Event Type
• Date, Time, Location
• Relinquished by
• Received by
• Data Sources

• Ancillary Data
• Seal ID, Container ID
• Electronic Manifest
• Origin, Destination
• Carrier ID and Type
• Custodian ID
• Data Sources
• etc.

• Primary event data should be recorded at the lock
  and unlock points.
• Primary event data should be recorded at each
  transfer and en route.
• Ancillary data should be recorded for each block
  of possession, including originator and
  recipient.

49
Chain of Possession - Data May Come From
Different Sources
Lock1
Transfer2
Unlockn
En Route3
Ancillary Data
Originator0
Custodian1
Custodian2
Recipientn
Reader1
Reader2
Reader3
Readern
Primary Event Data
Station1
Station2
Station3
Stationn
Other1
Other2
Other3
Othern

• Chain of possession data may come from different
  sources
• The person/system who has the container
  (custodian)
• The device that reads the seal (reader)
• The system that controls the seal reader
  (station)
• Other people/systems (e.g., an electronic system
  that identifies the custodian)

50
Chain of Possession - Example Primary Event and
Ancillary Data
Container ID Manifest Originator, etc.
Ancillary Data
Originator0
Seal Container ID Seal Condition
Reader1
Event Type1 Date1 Time1 Location1
Station1
Primary Event Data
Relinquished by1 Received by1 Container ID (from
container)1
Other1
51
An Operational Scenario
52
An Operational Scenario(contd)
DATA USERS
CUMULATIVE CHAIN OF POSSESSION DATA
Primary Event Data
Ancillary Data
Manifest ID Originator Seal ID, etc. Custodian
Data 1 Carrier type, ID, etc. Transport
type, status, ID, etc. Custodian type,
ID, etc. Container type, ID, status,
etc. Seal type, ID, status, etc. Route
plan actual Cargo type, ID, etc. Custodian
Data 2 Custodian Data 3... Custodian Data
4... Custodian Data 4... Custodian Data n
ORIGINATOR
Event Data 1 Seal ID Condition Seal
Container ID Transport Type ID Event Type
Date, Time Location Relinquished By
Received By Container ID Data Source
IDs Event Data 2... Event Data 3... Event Data
4... Event Data 5... Event Data n...
RECIPIENT
53
Border Crossing
Today
Container Reader/ Communicator
Proposed
?
On Board Unit (OBU)
?
10891 Tag
?
17364 Tags
?
18185 Tag/Seal
?
?
?
?
?
Fingerprint Reader
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
17365 Tags
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Transportation Worker ID Card (TWIC) with
Fingerprint BiometricISO/IEC 14443
17363 Tag
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Chassis Tag TC 204 Standard
Tractor Tag TC 204 Standard
On Board Unit (OBU)
?
Tomorrow
Road Side Unit (RSU)
Part of CALM Network
54
Border Crossing
Today
Container Reader/ Communicator
Proposed
?
On Board Unit (OBU)
?
10891 Tag
?
17364 Tags
?
18185 Tag/Seal
?
?
?
?
?
Fingerprint Reader
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
17365 Tags
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Transportation Worker ID Card (TWIC) with
Fingerprint BiometricISO/IEC 14443
17363 Tag
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Chassis Tag TC 204 Standard
Tractor Tag TC 204 Standard
On Board Unit (OBU)
?
Tomorrow
Road Side Unit (RSU)
Part of CALM Network
55
Standards

• ISO 17365 (transport unit) tags used to build
  17364 pallet tags
• ISO 17364 tags used to build 17363
  container/manifest tags and to communicate with
  container reader/ communicator
• ISO 10891 (formerly designated as ISO 10374.2)
  tag identifies container
• ISO 18185 is eSeal tag
• Chassis is identified by ISO TC 204 tag (ISO
  14816) note that ISO 10891 claims the chassis as
  well
• Tractor is identified by ISO TC 204 tag (ISO
  14816)
• Driver is identified by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17
  Transportation and DHS Worker Identification Card
  (TWIC)
• On-board Unit (OBU) communicates to Road-side
  Unit (RSU) via CALM (Communication Air-interface
  Long and Medium range) Network (OBU-RSU
  communications protocol provisional)
• On-board Unit (OBU) also provides location
  information and communications via / satellite/GPS

56
Concept of Operations

• As supply chain pallets are being built,
  transport unit tags are loaded to pallet tags
  identifying contents, who built the shipment,
  purchase order number, and when the shipment was
  built.
• As pallets are loaded into the container, pallet
  tags are loaded to container supply chain tags
  identifying contents, who built the shipment,
  purchase order number, container ID, eSeal ID,
  and when the container was stuffed.
• Container loaded onto chassis.
• When the tractor connects to the chassis,
  container information, chassis ID, and tractor ID
  is loaded to the On-board Unit (OBU) through
  CANbus-like communications
• Driver inserts TWIC to ID card/fingerprint print
  reader
• Immediately prior to border crossing event,
  driver records in vitro fingerprint to the OBU
  and a time stamp of fingerprint read.
• At the border crossing point the contents of the
  OBU are transferred to the Road-side Unit (RSU).
  The Road-side Unit (RSU) might also capture
  information from the Container ID, eSeal, and
  Supply Chain/Manifest tag.
• Process records the matching of the driver to the
  tractor, chassis, container, contents, eSeal, and
  time of the event.
• OBU also able to drive GPS system

57
Having the TruckingIndustrys Voice Heard

• Up and until 1999 ATA was an active participant
  in the development of standards affecting the
  industry
• Since then others have been developing the
  standards of which the trucking industry will be
  asked to follow
• In 2007 ATA has re-engaged the standards process
• Bad standards are the result of good industries
  that dont participate

58
Questions??
Michael Wolfe The North River Consulting
Group Box 67, 375 Union Street North Marshfield,
MA 02059-0067 (V) 1 781/834-4169 (F)
1 781/837-7681 (E) noriver_at_att.net
Craig K. Harmon Q.E.D. Systems 3963 Highlands
Lane, SE Cedar Rapids, IA 52403-2140 (V)
1 319/364-0212 (U) http//www.autoid.org(E)
craig.harmon_at_qed.org
59
Thank You!!
Michael Wolfe The North River Consulting
Group Box 67, 375 Union Street North Marshfield,
MA 02059-0067 (V) 1 781/834-4169 (F)
1 781/837-7681 (E) noriver_at_att.net
Craig K. Harmon Q.E.D. Systems 3963 Highlands
Lane, SE Cedar Rapids, IA 52403-2140 (V)
1 319/364-0212 (U) http//www.autoid.org(E)
craig.harmon_at_qed.org
60
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