GV337week 6

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GV337-week 6

• State capacity and state building

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Define capacity

• Aggregate performance of governments or ability
  to carry out tasks and policies chosen given
  domestic and internal constraints and competing
  interests.
• Relative political extraction ability of
  government to extract material resources to
  implement desired policies
• Mobilizing resources available in the society
  (difference between developed and developing
  countries)
• Relative political reach Scope and breadth of
  government influence on population (e.g.
  population policies, health policiesRussia vs.
  US or Ireland)
• Measurements of state capacity taxation, size of
  bureaucrats, access to water or other health
  measurements

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• Can externally imposed political systems become
  capable?
• Is external help (e.g. aid, technological
  assistance) hampering or strengthening state
  capacity?

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NOTES FROM INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQI
OFFICERS BAGHDAD, IRAQ 21, 26 - 27 September
2005 (Note prior to recent amendments to
referendum)
Drawing by Iraqi Officers 12-yr old daughter
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QUESTIONS
Prepared by LtCol Hawkins, Marine Corps Center
Lessons Learned Major Kepner, Center for Army
Lessons Learned
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PREFACE
The following observations were collected from
the Iraqi military officers assigned to the new
Iraqi Center for Lessons Learned (ICLL). These
observations were collected during a series of
unofficial conversations with officers from the
Marine Corps Center Lesson Learned and the Center
for Army Lessons Learned mobile training team
supporting NATO Training Mission - Iraq. These
are candid observations of the assembled group.
The statements are related as close to verbatim
as possible. The method of recording was via
notes written during the conversations. There
is no analysis of the information provided. The
opinions and recommendations presented are the
opinions and recommendations made by the Iraqi
officers only. Eight of the eleven officers hold
Masters Degrees. The group was composed of 1 MG
(ret), 3 Colonels, 4 Lieutenant Colonels, 2
Majors and 1 Captain. The mobile training team
officers and the Iraqi officers have been working
together daily for over 3 weeks. In the words of
one of the Iraqi officers we have opened our
hearts to you. Some of the measurable claims
have been verified with other agencies working
outside the wire.
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DEMOGRAPHICS RANK DEG SECT BRANCH 1. MG
(retired) MASTERS SUNNI INFANTRY 2. COL MASTERS
SUNNI AIR DEF 3. COL MASTERS SUNNI INFANTRY 4.
COL MASTERS ? ? 5. LTCOL MASTERS SUNNI ARTILLE
RY 6. LTCOL MASTERS SUNNI ARTILLERY 7. LTCOL MA
STERS SHIA INFANTRY 8. LTCOL BACHELORS SHIA INF
ANTRY 9. MAJ BACHELORS SHIA MECH
INF 10. MAJ BACHELORS SHIA ENGINEER 11. CAPT MA
STERS SHIA COMPUTER
We do not want to say Sunni/Shia we are
Muslim The Iraqi People do not like the
distinctionwe are the Army of Iraq, the Army of
Shia, the Army of Sunni, the Army of
ChristianIraqi people want to be Muslim
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TOPICS DISCUSSED

• POLITICAL ISSUES
• ELECTIONS VOTING PROCESS
• INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES
• THE INSURGENCY
• EDUCATION
• MILITARY SERVICE
• THE ROAD AHEAD WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

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POLITICAL ISSUES

• Return all employees to previous jobs.
  (restated during infrastructure conversations)
• Dissolve all fundamentalist or religious
  parties. Do not have or allow any religious
  political parties. (Firmly believe in the
  separation of religion and state.)
• Remove the outside Iraqis from positions of
  authority. The ones from outside are only here
  for the money. They are here for personal issues
  and not for the country. These outsiders will
  leave once they make their money.
• Disband the militias so people are not afraid.
  Every party has its own militia and they cause
  problems in elections.
• If I vote against them they will kill me.
  Iraqis are at personal risk to remove bad
  people through the election process.
• In recent election, they (religious leaders)
  urged us to vote for certain purposes/people. If
  we did not vote this way we are not religious.
  They are using religion to control us and our
  vote. We vote in accordance with the desires
  of our religious leader.
• Iraqis do not trust the election process or the
  people running the elections.

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• ELECTION and VOTING PROCESS
• BALLOT DESIGN
• The ballot requires pictures. Many Iraqis are
  unable to read. The election official then
  stands with them to help them vote and they tell
  them who to vote for.
• VOTING PROCESS CONFIDENCE
• Remove the men at the voting places and put in
  women. Women in our society must follow the
  rules and men are allowed to modify the rules.
  Make the women swear an oath to be fair. There
  will be a higher level of confidence.
• There must be an international organization that
  specializes in monitoring the fairness of votes.
  This must be an organization that has done it for
  other countries. It can be multi-national.
  Arabs can participate if they are really a part
  of the organization and have worked on other
  elections.

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• ACCESS TO VOTING PLACE
• During the voting (last election), for 3 days,
  there is curfew. It was 10 KM from my house to
  my voting place. This is too far to walk. In the
  last 2 hours of the last election they moved the
  voting box but many people could not vote.
• BALLOT BOX STUFFING
• (Provided by a former IP who was stationed
  inside a polling place) The person who controls
  the registration list knows who has been to vote
  and who has not. The reason there was such a
  large turn out was because when someone did not
  come to vote, their ballot was filled in for
  them.
• Main problem is the person who manages the
  ballet boxes. They have relationships with
  different organizations. Ballot box minder will
  decide the vote. Happened in my neighborhood,
  I watched an old lady take a ballot, she could
  not read or write, she told the man she wanted to
  vote for Allawi and he saw the minder select
  someone else (Chose name from own party)

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• LOSERS ASSIGNING VOTES
• It is not fair that my vote can be given to
  someone who I did not vote for.
• This makes it too easy to change what the people
  want.
• VOTING FOR A LIST INSTEAD OF INDIVIDUAL
• The system of voting for a list of people
  supports the religious influence. There should
  not be a religious list. There should be
  individuals only.
• WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO HOLD OFFICE
• There is a resentment towards the ex-pats who
  came back into leadership positions. The general
  feeling is that they were dancing in the discos
  of Europe for 10 years while we were here
  suffering they are not here for the Iraqi
  people, they are here to make their money and
  leave

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INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

• Day by day it is getting worse
• Electricity is still a huge problem.
  Pre-Invasion we had electricity, now every house
  has its own small generator to provide power.
  There is only four (4) hours average power a
  day. (Baghdad)
• Gasoline is a 4 hour wait and when I get home
  there is no power or water. Sometimes I go 3
  days without water. My family washes their
  clothes in the river because it is there.
  (Baghdad)
• Destruction in 1991 was much larger, but Saddam
  was able to rebuild because the people who ran
  the infrastructure were still in place.
• I do not see any new buildings for Iraqis All
  we see is concrete walls all over our cities.
  Provide us with something as simple as paving
  the roads.
• The US should push the Iraqi government to
  improve services

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INSURGENCY

• Ambassador Bremer disbanding the Iraqi Army
  and government was a bad thing. Now the
  salaries (monthly allotments) paid to these
  former Army and employees is not enough, they can
  receive more money from the insurgency.
• They have to feed their families
• Question If Ambassador Bremer had not
  disbanded the military would there be this
  insurgency/secular tension? Answer No
  Problem, Iraq would have a different image
• Parties (insurgent groups) are serving outside
  countries. (Iran Syria) They do not want Iraq
  to have settlement. If Iraq gets settled, then
  they think it will be their turn. They have
  money, authority and power (from their
  countries).
• Neighboring states (Iran Syria) want us like
  thisthey do not want to see us regain power
• Many Iraqis believe that the US does not want a
  settled Iraq because they want to move the
  terrorism fight from the US to Iraq. We see
  this in your news.
• Most of Iraqi people are threatened by the
  Militias.
• Our children want peace

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EDUCATION

• Educated people believe in a more liberal
  system of government. Uneducated Iraqis are a
  simple people who follow traditional ideas
  religious leaders tell them who to elect and
  follow. US must educate the Iraqi people.
• The more we educate the people the less
  problems we will have.
• Before Saddam we used to have people go to
  university abroad. That is stopped. We need
  more people to be educated. (This issue was
  narrowed to before Saddams relationship with the
  Western world deteriorated. The point is that
  they want to regenerate the overseas education
  that once existed.)
• My brothers son needs special medical
  attention. There are no special doctors or even
  teachers. They are either dead of have left the
  country out of fear. (repeated during
  infrastructure discussions)
• We need education our schools and
  universities have been destroyed.

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MILITARY SERVICE

• I am a member of the new Iraqi Army and I
  cannot be proud of this. I must hide my uniform.
  I wear civilian clothes to work. When my
  small child asks me where I work, I tell him I am
  a school teacher.
• If I go away for 4 days and it is noticed by
  my neighbors then I will become a target.
• North and South Iraq, there is not as much
  problem with being in the military. Problem is
  in the triangle. In southern Iraq, they (members
  of the Iraqi military) can wear uniforms and walk
  along the street. In Baghdad, I wear civilian
  clothes and have to hide my job even from my
  relatives.
• Mix the new Iraqi Army with the old Army to
  provide us with order in the future. They (old
  army) will be welcomed in the new Army.
• We should retire the other (more
  controversial) groups and pay them their pensions
  or give them civilian jobs. (i.e. Remove
  incentive to serve insurgency)
• If former officer wants to join the new Iraqi
  Army, they examine his record and if he is a
  former Baath Party member he is not allowed to
  join new Iraqi Armylet the Baath Party members
  return.

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THE ROAD AHEAD WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

• 1st The Borders MUST be Sealed
• Implementing a 25KM demilitarized zone around
  the entire country is acceptable. Only allow
  access at designated points that are controlled.
  Use technology to kill anyone crossing the
  boarder at the wrong place.
• All it takes at the border is (the equivalent
  of) 5 to pass without being searched.
• The border guards must not be from the local
  areas
• This cannot be done fast enough
• 2nd THE REFERENDUM SHOULD FAIL - If not the
  terrorist activity will continue
• 3rd THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE DISSOLVED
  IMMEDIATELY AND A STRONG (US or US/Iraqi)
  MILITARY LEADER TAKE OVER!
• The country cannot withstand another year of
  political process
• This is exactly what the insurgents want to
  happen another year of elections another year
  of turmoil

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THE ROAD AHEAD WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

• THEN IMMEDIATELY
• Recall and Blend the Old Army into the New Army
• Recall the fired government workers that run our
  infrastructure
• Recall the fired Police (mixed support for this
  item in the group)
• Retire with a livable wage the hard core former
  military those with marketable skills for the
  insurgency
• Intelligence
• Republican Guard
• Special Guard
• These actions will immediately and significantly
  reduce the violence
• 5TH Disband the Militias
• 6TH - Conduct a meeting bringing all of the
  different parties together
• KEEP THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP UNTIL - WE LEARN
  RESPONSIBILITY

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State Capacity and State Building

• Link between state capacity and good governance
• Strong correlation between states with guaranteed
  property rights and economic growth (e.g. French
  Revolution, case of Peru)
• Social development correlates with institutional
  capacity and efficiency (e.g. protection of
  rights)
• Building institutions A bargaining process
• Institutions as constraints and costly signals
• Institutions as equilibria of coordinated
  preferences
• Institutions and preferences the chicken-egg
  question
• Cultural changes, beliefs, and practices, slow
  and progressive process
• Institutions and distributional outcomes
• Building capacity and institutions a conflictual
  process

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World Bank recommendations

• In reforming state institutions, get the right
  fit--It probably wont work unless you face the
  realities on the ground.
• Institutions that underpin systems of
  accountability are country specific, so that
  undifferentiated, best practice, cookie-cutter
  approaches are doomed to failure.
• Any efforts to strengthen administrative and
  accountability systems will have to fit
  country-specific constitutional structures and
  patterns of political, social, and economic
  interests.
• Building states that are both effective and
  accountable to their citizens is a centuries-long
  process. But small beginnings can set in motion
  progressively more profound consequences.
• If the country does not have bureaucratic and
  institutional capabilities comprehensive reforms
  may not be the answer.
• modest, viable initiatives, especially those for
  which results are observable.
• underlying drivers of political and institutional
  change.
• Instead of earlier and narrower technocratic view
  that problems are due to poor management and can
  be fixed by reorganizations, providing technical
  training, and installing hardware.
• In Africa the record of reforms has been mixed. A
  survey of World Bank operations in twenty-one
  African countries showed far-reaching gains in
  public administrative capacity only in countries
  with a strongly pro-development political
  environment.
• Lessons from the last six years also show that
  the roots of corruption too lie in dysfunctional
  state institutions.
• Anticorruption campaigns can play a valuable role
  but only when used in tandem with institutional
  interventions.
• It is now generally agreed that poor governance
  and corruption are major factors that undermine a
  countrys economic and social progress.