Title: Fear of Floating Guillermo A' Calvo Carmen M' Reinhart
1Fear of FloatingGuillermo A. CalvoCarmen M.
Reinhart
- Presented By
- Rasha EL Kharbotly
2First Glance
- Marching towards floating
- IMF
- Evidence against formal label
3Thesis
- Paper analysis
- Exchange Rates
- Foreign exchange reserves
- Monetary aggregates
- Interest rates
- Commodity price
- Across the different exchange rate regimes to
asses the correlation between the official
label and actual practice. - Monthly observations for 39 countries, from
January 1970-November 1999. 154 exchange rate
arrangements.
4Construction
- I. Introduction
- II. Varieties of Fear of Floating
- 1. Monetary Policy and Lack of Credibility
- 2. Other reasons for Fear of Floating
- III. Fear of Floating The Evidence
- 1. Measuring Volatility Exchange Rates
- 2. Measuring Volatility International Reserve
- 3. Interest Rate Volatility, Lack of Credibility,
and Procyclical Policies - 4. Exchange Rates, Commodity Prices, and Fear of
Floating - Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Dynamics
- Concluding Remarks
5Monetary Policy and Lack of Credibility Model
- Model
- m, e logs of money supply, and nominal exchange
rate - Et Mathematical expectations ?
Interest-semi-elasticity parameter - Exchange rate today is directly influenced by
expectations due to lack of credibility. -
- Present exchange rate is a weighted average of
all future monetary aggregates. -
6Monetary Policy and Lack of Credibility Model
- Assume 1. Prefect Capital Mobility
- 2. International interest rate is zero
- Thus nominal interest rate is
- Thus nominal interest rate is also
-
7Monetary Policy and Lack of Credibility Model
- Case 1 Permanent Increase in Present m
- Assuming stead state, according to (2) and (3)
the exchange rate should devalue and interest
rate would not be affected. - Case 2 Permanent Increase in Future mAccording
to (2) and (3) this would lead to an increase in
exchange rate and interest rate.
8Monetary Policy and Lack of Credibility Problem
- If the policy maker faced with a current
depreciation does not increase the money supply,
he will cause hardship in the real and financial
sector. - If the policy maker adjusts the money supply
upward, this would lead to loss in credibility
and future expectations could become more
unruly and arbitrary.
9Central-Bank-Controller
- A model created to help the policy maker control
the money supply through CBC. - Where
- interest-earning money
- There is a direct relationship between the CBC
and interest rates. - The data shows that EM exhibit a
pro-interest-rate-volatility. - Policy makers would chose to stabilize exchange
over interest rate, since exchange rate provide a
stronger nominal anchor for the economy.
10More Reasons for Fear of Floating
- External debt and debt serves.
- Current account deficit.
- Terms of trade, commodities denomination. Limited
hedging possibilities. - Inflation problems, and the use of exchange rate
to control the growth in m.
11III. Fear of Floating The Evidence
- Pure Float is not very realistic
- The use of the G-3 , DM, to anchor the
analysis. They are the closest to a pure float
- Four exchange regimes set by the IMF Peg,
Limited Flexibility, Managed Floating, and
freely-floating. - Monthly frequency distribution of exchange rates,
foreign exchange reserves, interest rates (real
and nominal), monetary aggregates and specific
commodity prices are analyzed within intervals
and across regimes.
12The Evidence
- Notation
- ? exchange rate ?R/R Foreign exchange reserves
- ?m/m Money base ?i Change in interest rate,
it-it-1 - Xc An absolute value for a critical threshold (
?, ?R/R, ?m/m, ?i) - For example x ?, where Xc 1
-
-
- Because of Fear of Floating ?R/R and ?m/m should
exhibit the opposite relation -
- As for ?i it is influenced by the credibility,
exchange rate regime and the willingness of the
policy maker to use to as a policy tool or not.
13Measuring Volatility Exchange Rates
- Xc 1, Xc 2.5
- The conclusion from the tables are as follows
- P(?ltXCPeg)95.3gtP(?ltXCLimited
flexibility)92.0gt P(?ltXCManaged
Floating)87.5gtP(?ltXCFloat)79.3. - Surprising conclusion is, EM kept a stable ?
vis-à-vis the /DM, although they were suffering
times of inflation and terms-of-trade shocks - The difference across the regimes is very narrow.
The difference is large when comparing Peg to
Float, but it is not as significant for the
remaining regimes.
14Measuring Volatility International Reserves
- Original relationship
-
- There is evidence to prove contra this
relationship as seen from the tables - P(?R/R ltXcPeg) gt P(?R/RltXcFloat)
- Hidden foreign exchange transactions
- - Credit lines the case of European Exchange
Rate Mechanism - - Derivative transaction Thailands use of the
futures market in 1997 to support its currency - Relying on open market operations to decrease
volatility in exchange rates. -
15Interest Rate Volatility, Lack of Credibility,
and Procyclical Policies
- The use of Policy to insure exchange rate
stability, regardless of macroeconomic variables.
- The volatility in nominal and real interest rates
is not due to policy fundamentals. - The case of Mexico despite the move from Managed
Float to Float, interest rates were still very
stable. In the aftermath of The Russian crisis
in 1998, interest rates were very high in order
to limit exchange rate pressures, despite a
slowing economy and a shock to terms-of-trade. - Interest rates
- Most stable for Limited Flexibility Group
European Countries. - Least stable for Managed Floating EM countries.
Lack of explicit money supply rules.
16Exchange rates, commodity prices, and fear of
floating
- Concentration in primary good exports.
- Price of goods in domestic currency exhibit high
volatility. - Exchange rates are not adjusted to absorb the
shock to commodity prices. - Commodity prices in local currency are more
volatile than exchange rates. - Monthly fluctuations in excess of 5
- Floaters Prices is 38 versus 9 in exchange
rates. - Managed Floats Prices is 39 versus 4 in
exchange rates - Low correlation between exchange rates and
commodity prices. Wrong sign, as apparent from
the table.
17Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Dynamics