Security Risk Analysis Kuala Lumpur Conference on Piracy

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Security Risk AnalysisKuala Lumpur Conference
on Piracy Crimes at Sea 18-19 May 2009
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• Hans Tino Hansen
• Managing Director CEO

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Content

• Introduction
• Risk Management
• Risk Analysis
• Threat Assessment
• Case Transit Gulf of Aden March 2009
• Conclusion
• Questions

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1.About Risk Intelligence

• Risk Intelligence is a security intelligence
  company consulting private and governmental
  clients on security threats and risks
• Risk Intelligence is specialised in analysing
  threats from piracy, organised crime, terrorism
  and insurgency

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1.About Risk Intelligence

• Risk Intelligence provides its clients with
  tailor-made decision-making analysis and
  recommendations through its Analysis and
  Consulting Departments
• Risk Intelligence is one of the leading private
  providers of high quality intelligence-based
  security threat and risk services and products

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1. Intelligence Analysis Cells
Europe
N. Africa, M. East
Asia Pacific
Americas
Somalia
Nigeria / W. Africa
E. Africa
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1.Clients

• Shipowners and managers, shipowners associations,
  merchant officers associations, offshore supply,
  construction and drilling companies, oil
  companies, classification, underwriters and war
  risk, maritime authorities, ministries, defence
  and intelligence services
• Clients mainly in Europe but also include in
  Asia, Africa and North America
• Risk Intelligence clients operates about 3500
  vessels and insurance clients covers more than
  15000

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2. Risk Management

• The Analysis/Assessment of Security Risks is part
  of the overall risk management process.

Risk Analysis/ Assessment
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3. Risk Analysis

• Strategic or Generic Risk Analysis
• Example What is the risk of a hijacking for a
  whole fleet of vessels e.g. one flag transitting
  the Gulf of Aden
• Operational Risk Analysis
• Example what is the risk of a hijacking for a
  specific vessel at a specific date transitting
  the Gulf of Aden

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3. Risk assessment evaluation
1. StepRisk identification
System definition
Identify Threats and Vulnerabilities
2. StepRisk analysis
Determine likelihood
Determine consequence
3. StepRisk estimationR L x C
Risk estimation
Risk Reduction Measures
Risk evaluation
Tolerable risk not achieved
4. StepRisk evaluation - acceptable?
Risk acceptance
Adapted from AS/NZS 43602004 ISO/IEC Guide 51
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3. Security Risk Assessment

• Risk Likelihood x Consequence
• Likelihood threat likelihood and likelihood of
  attacker success
• Attacker success dependent on vulnerability
• Consequence potential outcome for the client
• Intent ? Uncertainty

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3. Threat Assessment

• Methodology
• Sources
• Validation/Verification
• Analysis

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3. Intelligence Methodology

• Risk Intelligence uses the Intelligence cycle and
  collaborative analysis for intelligence analysis

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3. Sources

• Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
• All sources in the public domain Media, web,
  printed media, TV, youtube etc
• Human Sources Intelligence (HUMINT)
• Organisations and networks
• Individuals
• Companies providing information through e.g.
  masters reports
• Post-incident Interviews with management and
  officers
• Image Intelligence (IMINT)
• Photos
• Satellite images
• Sensor-based images from partners

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3. Validation/Verification

• Validation against other sources
• Validation and exchange between likeminded
  private companies and organisations as well as a
  number of state agencies

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3. Data base

• MaRisk
• Risk Intelligences web-based maritime security
  monitoring system
• Accessible on subscription-basis
• MaRisk Data Base consists of data from a number
  of maritime-related incidents

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3. MaRisk Incidents

• Hijacking
• Armed robbery
• Kidnap/Ransom at sea
• Failed attack
• Anti-Piracy/Naval Operations
• Counter-Insurgency
• Insurgency
• Terrorsm
• Suspicious activity
• Other Maritime Crime

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3. MaRisk data

• Incident category and time/date
• Type of vessel
• Flag
• Cargo and journey or operation
• Description of incident
• Type of perpetrator(s) incl. motivation
• Number of perpetrators and of vessels, weapons
  and other equipment

• Attackers Modus Operandi
• Weather and light
• Weapons used
• Defensive measures
• Military or law enforcement involvment
• Hijack/KR destination
• IMO number and Call Sign, owner/manager
• Photo(s)

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Layers of intelligence
Focus
Incidents. Continual feed of current maritime
security incidents
Assessments. Overview of maritime risks in an area
Depth
Analysis. In-depth on specific risks
Fact file. Background and statistics
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MaRisk

• 6 Oct 2009

www.marisk.dk
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3. Assessing the threat likelihood

• Threat likelihood
• Historical data
• Projection, operational analysis
• Scenarios (what if?)
• Threat likelihood categories
• Threat scenarios
• Based on threat (generic)
• Based on threat vulnerability (specific)

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3. Likelihood classification
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3. Example Offshore Nigeria
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3. Threat elements

• Political/military context
• Motivation/objective
• Geography/battlespace/ext. factors
• Modus operandi
• Personnel
• Transport
• Comms
• Equipment/capabilities
• Tactics

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3. Vulnerability Assessment

• Vessel spec (speed, freeboard etc)
• Physical security
• Procedural security
• Company/ship relationship
• Crew morale, nationality and skill level
• Operational aspects (incl. cargo)
• Training awareness

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3.Consequence assessment
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4. Risk analysis

• Risk identification
• Risk estimation
• Risk evaluation

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4. Risk Identification Scenarios likelihoods

• Incident likelihoods (can be modified by vessel
  vulnerability and attacker success rates)
  Example OML 126, Nigeria
• Probability of attacker success

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4. Risk estimation
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4. Risk analysis
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4. Risk evaluation

• Likelihood/ consequence classification
• Acceptance criteria
• Risk (treatment) prioritisation
• Countermeasures effects

Likelihood
Avoidance/ mitigation
Consequence
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Case Transit Gulf of Aden

• Offshore special vessel

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5. Transit Gulf of Aden

• Task To produce a Security Risk Assessment for
  transit Gulf of Aden of vessel BS March 2009
• Threat Assessment
• Vulnerability Assessment (survey)
• Consequence Assessment

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5. Transit Gulf of Aden

• Threat Assessment
• Date of planned transit
• Weather conditions
• Lunar lumination
• Fishing areas including one overlapping IRTC East
  and Westbound
• Transit times through potential high risk areas

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5. Weather Forecast?
2008
2009
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5. Transit Gulf of Aden

• Modus Operandi changes
• Number of attackers
• Number of boats
• Use of weapons including RPG7
• Change in tactics
• Adaptation/increased risk taking e.g. operating
  in higher waveheights
• Increase in nighttime attacks
• Locations of mother ships (last seen)

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5. Pirate success rates

• January-March 2009 April 2009
• Success GoA 10-16 Success GoA 50

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5. Vulnerability Assessment

• Vessel spec (speed, freeboard etc)
• Physical security
• Procedural security
• Company/ship relationship
• Crew morale, nationality and skill level
• Operational aspects (incl. cargo)
• Training awareness

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Vulnerabilty example

• Exceptionally slow top speed (10 kts).
• Low entry point at the stern
• Apertures at the forward end of the work area on
  both sides abaft the accommodation block.
• Easy access to bridge from Canopy Deck and
  forecastle.
• Bridge has weak doors and is vulnerable to
  gunfire.
• Vanes/doors can be used as climbing aids to
  Canopy Deck level.
• Lack of large single safe haven that meets
  requirements regarding resistance to gun and RPG
  fire.
• Cluttered Canopy Deck impairs vision aft from the
  bridge.

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5. Consequence

• Hijacking scenario
• Average time held in captivity 47 days for
  relevant vessels 2008 and 2009
• Average time held in captivity 61 days for
  preceeding three months

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5. Risk Analysis

• Scenarios
• Escorted
• Group Transit
• Armed guards
• x three sub-scenarios depending on weather
  conditions and waveheights
• Total 9 scenarios

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5. Risk Analysis
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5. Risk Assessment Conclusion

• The risk levels for the respective transit
  scenarios are
• Naval escort for vessel BS
• LOW for direct escorting and embarked naval
  security forces
• MEDIUM to HIGH for joining a group of ships of
  which one has a naval team on board.
• BS unescorted transit
• HIGH
• BS transit with an embarked armed team
• LOW to MEDIUM

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6. Risk Analysis

• For general/generic risk analysis e.g. for
  insurance use historic data can be used seen over
  a fleetwide perspective
• For specific operations the risk analysis has to
  be specific

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• Questions?

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Contact
Risk Intelligence PO Box 55 08 09 22568
Hamburg Germany Tel [phone] Fax45 70
26 62 40 hamburg_at_riskintelligence.eu www.riskinte
llgience.eu

• Main Office
• Risk Intelligence ApS
• Vedbaek Stationsvej 18
• 2950 Vedbaek
• Denmark
• Tel [phone]
• Fax[phone]
• info_at_riskintelligence.eu
• www.riskintellgience.eu