A Piece of paper for peace

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Mindanao and the Bangsamoro Prospects for Peace
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• Bangsamoro ("the Moro People")
• 13-ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes in the
  Philippines
• Comprising about 5 of the Philippine population
  and around 20 of the population in Mindanao.

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WHO ARE THE MUSLIMS IN THE PHILIPPINES?

• consist of 13 ethno-linguistic groups
• distributed according to their respective
  geographical locations. The first three are the
  largest groups.
• Maranao - Lanao del Sur
• Maguindanao - Maguindanao Province and Cotabato
• Tausug - Sulu
• Sama
• Yakan
• Sangil
• Palawani
• Molbog
• The number of Balik-Islam (reverts to Islam) is a
  surging phenomenon in the Phiilippines.

• Kolibugan
• Jama Mapun
• Iranun
• Kaagan
• Badjao

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I. Historical Foundations
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Were the Muslims always a minority in Mindanao?
Official Data as quoted from Tan, S. K., 1995,
NCSO 2000 census
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Were the Muslims always poor?
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH PIPED WATER, 1970/1990
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(No Transcript)
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Factors that led to decline
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Elements of the Radicalization of the Bangsamoro
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Simple functional literacy rate

• 88 can read and write

• 75 are functionally
• literate

• Simple Literacy Rate

Functional Literacy Rate
Sources MCW NCRFW
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Life Expectancy, 2000
Mindanao has the shortest life expectancy

66.7
65.5
63
Luzon
Visayas
Mindanao
Life expectancy is an estimate of the average
number of additional years a person can expect to
live, based on the age-specific death rates for a
given year.
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Child Labor as a way of dealing with poverty in
Mindanao
7 out of 10 Mindanao households have working
children within 5-17 years old, surpassing the
national average of 6 out of 10. (Oct 2001)
The phenomenon of child labor and child
prostitution points to the problem of extreme
poverty
Despite laws against child labor, many children
have remained in the labor market.
Sources MCW NCRFW
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II. Liberation Movements
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II. Liberation Movements
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II. The MNLF Peace Track

• 1976 Tripoli Agreement under Marcos regime
  autonomy in lieu of independence
• Congress passed Republic Act No. 6734, (Organic
  Act) under the Aquino administration
• Plebiscite held on August 1, 1989 in 13
  provinces only Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
  and Tawi-Tawi joined ARMM
• Final Peace Agreement between GRP and MNLF signed
  on September 2, 1996 under the Ramos
  administration
• RA9054 passed amending RA 6734
• Plebiscite in August 2001 Basilan and Marawi
  City joined ARMM

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II. STATUS MNLF Peace Track

• Problematic implementation of 1996 FPA.
• MNLF Chair Misuari was arrested 2001 on charges
  of rebellion. Allowed to post bail after 7 years
  of incarceration.
• MNLF troops loyal to Misuari went back to the
  hills
• Tripartite review of implementation ongoing

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Failing Autonomy

• The 1996 Peace Agreement has failed to deliver
  the peace dividends.
• Instead of the promised autonomy, there is
  increased and heavy dependence of ARMM on the
  National Government

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Human Development Index in ARMM Lowest 10
provinces
2005 Philippine Human Development Report
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Poverty Incidence in ARMM
2005 Philippine Human Development Report
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Agreement on cessation of hostilities
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STATUS GRP-MILF Peace Track
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CHALLENGES

• Lack of information about the conflict
• Continuing armed conflict
• High Iliteracy rates and unemployment
• Abject Poverty
• Militarization
• Discrimination
• Poor delivery of government basic social service

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Understanding the MOA-AD

• Basic principle There is no alternative solution
  to end the 35-year old Mindanao conflict but to
  address the very root of the Bangsamoro problem
  through a politically-negotiated settlement.
• The MOA-AD is a document that is the product of
  more than 4 years of negotiations between the
  government and the MILF.
• The prospective BJE would have fulfilled the
  Bangsamoro peoples struggle for self
  determination begun by the MNLF and pushed to
  completion by the MILF.

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III. The Road Back to Peace

• CEASEFIRE. Military strategies CANNOT resolve the
  Mindanao conflict. UN, EU, OIC, ASEAN assistance
  to bring parties back to negotiating table.
• Peace process must include all stakeholders,
  including religious leaders like the Ulama as
  well as civil society. This will give the process
  the legitimacy and the critical political
  constituency it needs to succeed.

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The Road Back to Peace

• Government must resolve, not just manage, the
  Mindanao conflict. It should not allow the peace
  process to be hijacked by political posturing and
  opportunism.
• All parties must show sincerity and allow the
  peace negotiations to proceed.

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The Road Back to Peace

• Genuine autonomy and lasting peace cannot be
  attained unless the central government divests
  itself of substantial powers and invest the same
  to local communities and allow them to chart
  their own destiny.
• Federalism as an option after the 2010 elections

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SHUKRAN!