The Nature of The Artificial

1
The Nature of The Artificial
IV International Conference The Culture of The
Artificial. Urbino, Italy, 25-27 May 2001.

• Augmenting Negrottian Artificiality with
  Heideggerian-Whiteheadian Naturality

Syed Mustafa Ali, Ph.D
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The Meaning(s) of Nature

• nature1
• the collective term for all that exists apart
  from the artificial
• NATURE AS OTHER TO THE ARTIFICIAL
• nature2
• all that exists in the evolving universe of
  space and time
• NATURE AS EXISTENTIAL TOTALITY
• nature3
• that which is expressed all other things being
  equal, when it develops according to its kind
  without outside interference.
• NATURE AS ESSENCE

EXISTENTIAL CONTINUUM
Ferré, F. (1988) Philosophy of Technology. Englewo
od Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
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Mimetic Nature3 of The Artificial
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The Theory of The Artificial (I)

• Definition The Artificial
• An object or machine that reproduces by means of
  different materials and procedures the essential
  performance of a natural object taken as an
  exemplar based on a more or less shared
  representation at a particular observation level.

Negrotti, M. (1999) The Theory of The Artificial.
Exeter, Intellect. Negrotti, M. (1999) From The
Artificial to the Art A Short Introduction to a
Theory and Its Applications. Leonardo 32 (3),
183-189.
5
The Theory of The Artificial (II)
observation level
representation
exemplar
essential performance
nature1
nature3
conventional technology
nature2
?
artificial
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Evaluation of The Theory

• Merits
• Self-evident simplicity of conceptual foundations
• Possible overall correctness
• Drawbacks
• Problematic metaphysical assumptions about the
  nature3 (as essence) of nature1 (as other to
  the artificial)

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The Philosophy of The Artificial

• Realism
• A human-independent reality exists
• Representationalism
• Human interactions with phenomena are mediated by
  mental representations
• Essentialism
• The essence (or what-ness) of a phenomenon is
  definable in terms of a finite set of necessary
  and sufficient features that it must possess

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Negrottian Realism (I)

• Accessible and Inaccessible Reality
• The objects that we perceive from the
  observation levels that we assume in each unit of
  time and space are not pieces or partial
  spheres of reality rather, they are the
  verifiable reality that we can grasp from those
  selected levels. (p.13)
• Finite Access to Reality
• There is no reason to think that, having to deal
  with a finite, limited and filtering sensory
  power, reality should disappear from our
  horizon. (p.13)

OBJECTIVE RELATIVISM (OR)
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Negrottian Realism (II)

• Accessible Reality as Infinite
• The observational levels of concrete reality -
  both of the natural and of the artificial reality
  - and their interplays have to be considered as
  infinite. (pp.36-37)
• Inaccessible Reality as Infinite
• Reality includes, that is to say, it has in
  itself, all the features observable by all the
  species, along with infinite others which cannot
  be observed by any species and which are
  sometimes revealed through investigations using
  scientific instruments. (p.14)

HIERARCHICAL INFINITISM
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OR TR or ER ?
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Negrottian Realism (III)

• Reality In-Itself as Inaccessible
• it does not matter what the world is in
  itself, since the only ways we have at our
  disposal to describe the world are our
  representations of it. (p.15)

TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM (TR)
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The Problem of Consciousness
Where appearance is concerned we cannot make the
appearance-reality distinction because the
appearance is the reality. (p.122) Searle,
J.R. (1992) The Rediscovery of The
Mind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Consciousness provides at least one example of
reality accessible as it is In-Itself.
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From TR to ER

• Heideggerian Empirical Realism
• Hermeneutic (access-oriented)
• Pluralistic (multiply-moded)

Dreyfus, H.L (1991) Being-In-The-World.
Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.

• Robust (supports scientific-naturalism)
• Evolutionary account of consciousness
• Materialistic conception of nature1
• nature1 as absurd, meaningless
• nature1 as In-Itself yet not For-Itself
• nature1 as non-experiential or vacuous

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ER and The Hard Problem
The Hard Problem of Consciousness Explaining
how ontological subjectivity (or first-person
experience) can arise in (or from) an
ontologically-objective (or non-experiential)
substrate. Chalmers, D.J. (1996) The Conscious
Mind In Search of a Fundamental Theory. OUP
Heideggerian ER cannot solve it.
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Post-Heideggerian ER

• What we know
• Some form of ER is correct
• Proof In-Itself reality of consciousness
• Heideggerian ER is incorrect
• Proof Failure to solve The Hard Problem
• Cause Non-experiential ontology of nature1
• What we must do

Reconsider the nature3 of nature1
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Rethinking Nature1 A Sketch
WHITEHEADIAN PANEXPERIENTIALISM
A process-atomism in which the fundamental units
of nature1 are dipolar physical-mental events
(actual occasions), relationally-constituted via
a process of actualisation (concrescence) involvin
g mental selection of physical feelings (prehensio
ns) of actualised events (objects) by actualising
events (subject-superjects).
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Concrescence Subject Phase
OTHER- CAUSATION
PHYSICAL PREHENSIONS
SUBJECT1
SUBJECT2
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Concrescence Superject Phase
SELF- CAUSATION
MENTAL SELECTIONS
SUPERJECT1
SUPERJECT2
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Types of Prehension (Feeling)

• Physical
• objects of prehension are concrete actualities
  (prior actual occasions)
• pure
• actualities prehended in terms of their physical
  pole
• hybrid
• actualities prehended in terms of their mental
  pole
• Conceptual
• objects of prehension are abstract potentialities
  (eternal objects)

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Aggregates and Individuals

• Collections (or complexes) of actual occasions
  form societies or nexus
• Societies can be distinguished into two kinds on
  the basis of internal structure
• Aggregates
• non-experiential, non-creative
• Compound Individuals
• experiential, creative (regnant monad)

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Post-Mimetic Artificiality ?

• Conventional panexperientialism does not provide
  any criteria other than the mimetic (behavioural)
  by which to distinguish aggregates from
  individuals
• Problem Case 1
• Pseudo-non-experience (Guillain-Barré syndrome)
• (Searle 1992)
• Problem Case 2
• Pseudo-experience (Chinese Room, Zombies)
• (Searle 1980) (Chalmers 1996)

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The Poietic Difference (Ali 1999)
The being or existence) of an actual entity is
its becoming or process (Whitehead)
Being and becoming are the same in the sense that
they belong together in essential, unitary
relation (Heidegger)
A difference in becoming entails a difference in
being
?
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Phenomenology of Artificing
Aristotelian Framework
NATURALS
ARTIFACTUALS
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Panexperientialist Conception

• Contraction of the field of incoming prehensions
  to a concrescing occasion occurs in two ways
  (Ferre 1996a)
• forcing discordant elements on subjectivity
• negating elements of potential richness (pure
  physical feeling)
• En-forcing or En-Framing (Heidegger 1977) is
  an intrinsically temporal process involving
  effective purpose sustained over time by constant
  renewal and refreshment (Ferre 1996b)
• En-Framing involves canalization and
  intensification of originality through hybrid
  prehension (Sherburne 1966)

Artificing as Canalization (En-Framing)
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Process Model of Artificing
Whiteheadian Framework
NATURALS
ARTIFACTUALS
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Negrotti on Replication (I)

• According to Negrotti,
• We can define A as a replication (in empirical
  terms and not logical) of B if A is the result of
  a reproduction of B at all its observation levels
  by using the same materials and, more
  importantly, by drawing upon all its
  performances, without making any selection of
  essential performances. (p.75)

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Negrotti on Replication (II)

• Technological Systems
• Closed
• Completely Formal
• Finitely-describable at single observation level
• Therefore, replicable

• Natural Systems
• Open
• Partially Non-Formal
• Infinitely-describable at infinite levels
• So, non-replicable

• Assumption of Hierarchical Infinitism
• However, is the number of levels infinite?

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Whitehead on Replication

• Although nature1 is hierarchically infinite, all
  naturals (except God) are finite
• Non-replicability of naturals follows from their
  openness which follows from ...
• self-creativity (final causation)
• Self-creativity more pronounced in higher
  compound individuals

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Necessity and Sufficiency (I)

• Replication is only possible in 3 cases
• When we know all the steps and all the
  components needed to reproduce something, for
  example, in the case of mass production
• When we are able to act as combiners of natural
  elements which, when they are combined, are
  necessary and sufficient for producing a complete
  system, as, for example, in the case of
  artificial insemination
• When the reality to be reproduced is composed or
  is describable from only one possible level of
  observation this is clearly possible only for a
  reality man has himself created in purely formal
  or informational terms, as, for example, in the
  case of replicating a computer program. (p.78)

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Necessity and Sufficiency (II)

• On a panexperientialist conception of nature1,
  need to distinguish between
• preparatory (or subjective) necessity
• efficient causation (physical and conceptual
  feelings) from prior actual occasions
• can be established by the artificer
• consummatory (or superjective) necessity
• final causation (self-creation) of actual
  occasion
• cannot be established by the artificer

Even in phenomena such as artificial
insemination, artifactual combination must work
in conjunction with natural combination